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Preface 
During the 1950s many developing nations sought to adopt 
democratic systems by following the Western model of political de-
velopment. Almost all of them failed. 
In the 1960s transplanting democracy to the Third World was 
still a goal of the West. The experience of Vietnam, however, under-
scored the fact that it did not work very well. In the 1970s and early 
1980s there was more realism in the West concerning the appropri-
ateness of "quick fix" means of democratizing the rest of the world. 
Still there was much emphasis upon human rights, and, with that, 
political rights and freedoms. Democracy was still a goal and its 
advocates were usually not patient. 
During this same period Taiwan institutionalized democracy at 
a measured pace. Elections were first made a meaningful part of the 
political process at the local level. Government at all levels was 
made more responsive to public demands and the needs of economic 
and social change. 
As a result, by 1980 the nation was ready for party competition 
in elections that coincided with expanded political freedoms and an 
enlarging of the size of the National Assembly and the Legislative 
branch of the government. The process of democracy "from below" 
seemed to prove to be the right approach, as did putting economic 
modernization and social change before democratization. 
To some extent, however, Taiwan was under pressure to make 
the system democratic through meaningful elections, even though 
maintaining stability was considered a sine qua non. The U.S., 
which had considerable influence over political decisions in the Re-
public of China, wanted democracy. Taiwan also needed to make a 
favorable impression with the international community in order to 
defend its right to exist in the face of threats by the People's Repub-
lic of China to "liberate" Taiwan and incorporate the Republic of 
China's territory. Thus, it had to take risks in terms of speeding up 
the process of democratization. 
Taiwan has been a success story in terms of elections, democ-
racy and political development; it is, in fact, a model for other non-
Western nations. Obviously it will be studied more as other nations' 
leaders and more scholars and observers of events outside their own 
country realize its significance. This study is only a beginning. 
More precisely, this work focuses on Taiwan's elections andre-
(iii) 
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lates the election process to political development. It is a process 
that deserves both attention and analysis not only in the Republic of 
China but in all developing countries. 
John F. Copper, with 
George P. Chen 
June 1, 1984 
TAIWAN'S ELECTIONS: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
John F. Copper 
George P. Chen 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
For a number of years many in the West have held great expec-
tations regarding the growth of democracy in China. Some of the 
reasons for such hopes were valid, some spurious. Clearly, however, 
democracy was premature. The evolution of democratic institutions 
in the West took several centuries. Why should China differ? Per-
haps it should take longer. 
Indeed why should democracy develop in China at all? China 
was thought to have the makings of a democratic nation because of 
its so-called democratic culture: little central government; the imper-
ative of good and virtuous government, which restricted the ultimate 
authority of all political leaders; a class system which was not rigid; 
government which conducted itself in the name of the people; con-
siderable mass participation in local government; and finally the 
presence of individualism, free speech, and religious freedom. 1 
Added to this, in 1911, China, behind the leadership of Sun 
Y at-sen, repudiated the ancient imperial system and its autocratic 
rule and established a republic. And although democracy at that 
time had its enemies, it was neither repudiated by the masses nor 
defeated by dictatorial forces or tendencies in subsequent years. 
Chiang Kai-shek-a Christian, whose wife and frequent spokesman 
was Western educated, followed in Sun Yat-sen's tradition of de-
mocracy. Chiang was an ally of the West during World War II and 
knew how to make friends-whom he and China needed. He main-
tained during internal and external crises China's democratic institu-
tions in form if not in practice.2 
During World War II China's political system and its political 
culture were contrasted with Japan's, which were highly undemo-
I. For further details on these points, see Lawrence K. Rosinger, China's Crisis 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1945), pp. 3-5 and Creighton Lacy, Is China A De-
mocracy? (New York: John Day Co., 1943), pp. 12-17. 
2. Lacy, supra note 1, pp. 73-74. 
(1) 
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cratic, militaristic and authoritarian. Some in fact, saw the antipathy 
between the two as evidence of their different political traditions and 
proclivities. China, by contrast, was seen as a bastion of individual-
ism and democracy in Asia. 
Many in America felt U.S. aid would help realize democracy 
quickly in China. Others argued that the establishment of demo-
cratic institutions in China was possible to a meaningful degree only 
when the war ended. But most anticipated that it would be realized. 
The belief that China was a world power or soon would be and that 
for this reason it should-or must-be a democracy provided a 
strong impetus to think that China would democratize. This would 
solve two problems: China could be fully accepted by the West, and 
there would be no fear it might disrupt the international system. It 
also meant that the Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union 
would be balanced or offset. 
In 1949 the West suffered a big disappointment. It even had to 
search for scapegoats for the fact that Communism won in China 
over democracy. Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists were gener-
ally written off as proponents of authoritarian dictatorship and spe-
cial privilege-not democracy. The Nationalists were labeled 
corrupt and incompetent. To many the Communists were seen as 
reformers and by some even as true democrats-though this view 
did not last long in the West except among the extreme left and a few 
naive idealists. 
Informed scholars meanwhile generally admitted that it was 
premature to think of China, either the People's Republic of China 
or the Republic of China, as evolving a working democratic system 
soon. For the next ten years, those that felt that Western influence 
and a free economy were important, gave the Republic of China 
some hope, but not much. Seeing attempts at democracy fail 
throughout the world during the 1950s, the Republic of China on 
Taiwan was generally categorized as an example of the authorita-
rian-development modeJ.l Whether democracy was to evolve from 
this kind of system was uncertain. To some it depended upon the 
further success of economic development. To others it depended on 
much more. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the world realized that Taiwan had 
3. Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham G. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Develop-
mental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 383. Almond later refers to 
Taiwan as a preindustrial nation. See Gabriel A. Almond (gen. ed.), Comparative Poli-
tics Today: A World View (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), p. 34. 
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become an economic miracle. But what about political develop-
ment? Some argued that the gap between economic development 
and political modernization had produced a revolutionary situa-
tion-some even anticipating a change in the system by force.4 
Others argued that the gap was of little importance. More careful 
observers noted that significant progress in political modernization 
had already been made (though admittedly most of it was little ad-
vertised) and that more was in the making. 5 
However, the latter view was heard infrequently. And it was 
not widely accepted. Most argued that political modernization re-
quired a change in the structure of the political system and changes 
in its basic workings. Others cited legal and constitutional changes 
as a sine qua non of political development. There was still another 
reason to pay little attention to political development in Taiwan: 
most scholars felt that Japan was a much better model to study. De-
mocracy was clearly working there, and its economic miracle was 
even more impressive. Others focused on the People's Republic of 
China because of, or, in spite of, its totalitarian communist system. 
Its politics were much more exciting to study and its success or fail-
ure was much more relevant to the rest of the world. Finally few 
regarded the Republic of China as a nation that would accomplish 
democracy quickly and even fewer regarded it as either an economic 
or political model for developing countries in spite of evidence to the 
contrary. 
There appear to be four basic reasons why Taiwan has, in spite 
of a lack of attention, succeeded. One is its history. China's past 
holds many of the preconditions for democracy. And this is even 
more true of Taiwan than the mainland. Second, the Nationalists 
brought with them to Taiwan in 1949 democratic institutions-even 
though they did not make the system they transplanted to Taiwan a 
working democracy at the top. Third, Taiwan has experienced eco-
nomic growth of the kind and magnitude which has engendered a 
new material culture, a middle class and a mass interest in politics. 
These factors contribute to the growth of democracy in almost any 
4. Those who knew little about Taiwan or who held such a view based upon theo-
retical perspectives promoted this view. It is a perspective often espoused by the Far 
Eastern Economic Review. (See e.g., Asia 1984 Yearbook.) 
5. See John F. Copper, "Political Development in Taiwan," in Hungdah Chiu (ed.), 
China and the Taiwan Issue (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), pp. 37-76; John F. 
Copper, "Political Development in the Republic of China, 1949-1981," in Hungdah 
Chiu and S.C. Leng (eds.), China: Seventy Years After the Hsin-hai Revolution (Char-
lottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1984). 
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setting. Finally, Western influence and pressure (especially from the 
United States) has been continuous as it has been pervasive. Both 
were of the right style and in the right measure to foster democratic 
political development. 
By 1980, it was evident that these factors, combined with spe-
cific political leaders and events, were reinforcing each other to the 
extent that democracy seemed to be ready to bud. In any case, the 
election held at the end of that year was clearly a watershed event in 
terms of Taiwan's political system transforming into a democratic 
one. Those there at the time were astonished and impressed that the 
country held a competitive election campaign and that candidates 
discussed and debated issues with such candidness and freedom. 
This, of course, could have been staged for the benefit of the 
U.S., which had just broken diplomatic relations with Taipei and 
moved its embassy to the People's Republic. The election was re-
ferred to by some as a "period of freedom" or a political "holiday" 
granted by the government. Yet the experiment, if that is what it 
was, turned out well for the most part. In fact, the subsequent, 
though smaller and less important, elections confirmed that free elec-
tions can be held in the future without cause for worry about polit-
ical instability. During these elections, the electorate expressed 
much greater concern about tangible issues rather than ideology. 
Hence, while the public has not been reluctant to criticize the gov-
ernment, those who have not done so constructively or have done so 
in a spirit of opportunism or radicalism have generally been 
repudiated. 
As a result, several conclusions seem to be warranted. One, the 
Republic of China has finally attained democracy, though it is in its 
early stages of development in some ways. Further democratization 
will probably transpire quickly. Those that in the past felt that this 
was possible were not wrong; they were simply incorrect about the 
timing. Two, Taiwan's progress deserves much more attention and 
study from the West than it has received. There are many lessons-
ranging from how Taiwan should be treated as a member of the in-
ternational community to learning how Taiwan accomplished what 
it did. In fact, scholars of political development may want to ex-
amine Taiwan's transition from an authoritarian (authoritarian-de-
velopment) system to one of democratic-development. Finally, 
Taiwan's experience will be instructive for Third World countries 
who are experimenting with economic development and political 
participation and feel that the two must be related but do not know 
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how to accomplish this.6 Taiwan's elections are especially worthy of 
attention inasmuch as they have been the barometer of political de-
velopment and reflect the connection or ties between economic and 
political modernization. 
The following pages will examine in-depth Taiwan's experience 
with elections. This includes relating Taiwan's history and culture 
and the impact of economic development to political development 
while connecting competitive elections to political modernization. 
The study will assess elections before 1980 in terms of laying the 
foundation for a more important election. A single chapter analyzes 
the 1980 election-the watershed election--due to its importance. 
Another chapter treats the several local elections in 1981 and 1982, 
which afford evidence of the fact that progress made in that crucial 
election was not lost or reversed. Because of its importance, the na-
tional election of December 1983 is also dealt with in a separate 
chapter. That election offers still further proof of the significance of 
elections in the Republic of China's political system and evidence of 
political development of a democratic kind in that nation. Finally, 
the conclusion deals with the importance of elections and their sig-
nificance to Taiwan's polity and the process of democratization. 
This study is necessarily cursory on some issues. Its purpose is 
to tell the reader, especially those generally unfamiliar with the 
country, how Taiwan has changed in terms of making elections a 
meaningful part of the political process and how elections reflect 
both the change toward a democratic system and political develop-
ment. This process, of course, is still going on. The authors hope 
that the reader realizes where Taiwan has come from, what it has 
accomplished, and where it is now in terms of it becoming a fully 
modem democracy. 
Although the Republic of China is a small country it is still an 
important one for several reasons. It is a focal point in world affairs 
because the People's Republic of China claims Taiwan is its terri-
tory. The growth of democracy in Taiwan will no doubt help win 
support from other nations for an alternative view. Similarly the 
contrast between the two Chinas,-the Republic of China on Taiwan 
and the People's Republic of China, is marked. This will draw at-
tention to Taiwan as the more successful "China." It is no coinci-
dence that Taiwan's economic success is something that the People's 
6. For further details on this point, see Chalmers Johnson, "The Taiwan Model," in 
James C. Hsiung (ed.), Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience, 
1950-1980 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp. 9-18. 
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Republic of China is emulating. It has no doubt also been asked: 
why not emulate its political system also? 
Finally, Taiwan's democratization process, of which its elections 
are a major part, is interesting for still other reasons. It has been 
carried out in a climate of considerable risk in terms of the magni-
tude of an external threat. It has also been criticized by an indepen-
dence movement that challenges the government of the Republic of 
China in terms of its legitimacy. It has had its critics and detractors 
in the West. And it has been accomplished in haste. Though the 
context in which Third World nations must adapt to a changing 
world is not quite the same, Third World leaders generally perceive 
their situation as one that demands quick movement. Thus they are 
in need of a model. Taiwan has clearly done in a very short time 
and during a period of adversity what Third World nations now will 
have to do. The West did not. Thus, others should view Taiwan's 
political development experience, of which its elections are a central 
fundamental part, as a precedent and a lesson. 
The next chapter begins with a look at where Taiwan started. It 
examines Taiwan's political history and political culture in order to 
provide a background to understand the role of elections in the dem-
ocratic processes which evolve later. 
TAIWAN'S ELECTIONS 
CHAPTER 2 
ELECTIONS AND THE POLITY OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
7 
To understand the importance of elections in Taiwan and their 
impact on the democratization process there, it is necessary to first 
comprehend the role of participation in the political system in Tai-
wan wherein elections play a major role. This necessitates seeing the 
election process in the context of Taiwan's political history and polit-
ical thought, and the structure of the government in the Republic of 
China. The role of exogeneous factors, particularly the pressure ap-
plied by the United States to establish a democratic system and the 
impact of economic growth, both directly and indirectly, are also 
crucial to understanding the election process in the Republic of 
China. The next chapter examines the last two factors. 
Political thought in Taiwan is for the most part of Chinese ori-
gins. Both the early migrants to Taiwan (which now constitute the 
majority of the population) as well as the Chinese who came after 
World War II (mostly in 1949 after the Nationalists were defeated by 
the Communist forces on the mainland), were steeped in Chinese 
political tradition. But China is a large country and variations in 
terms of political thought and tradition among the provinces are 
considerable. Furthermore, Japan ruled the "native" Taiwanese, 
i.e., the Chinese who moved to Taiwan before Japanese occupation, 
from 1895 to the end of World War II, thus creating some new atti-
tudes in terms of political culture. Foreign powers prior to the Japa-
nese colonial period also ruled Taiwan. China experienced foreign 
encroachment and limited political control, but never foreign rule. 
For these reasons foreign influence in Taiwan historically was 
both greater than and different from that in China. Similarly the 
period of Japanese rule had a distinct effect upon the political think-
ing and political culture of the Taiwanese, though it did not neces-
sarily stimulate democratic thought. 1 It is also accurate to say that in 
1945 Taiwanese were more cosmopolitan than their brethren from 
the mainland, yet the latter were better educated and were more po-
litically astute. In any event similar Chinese political tradition that 
I. The Japanese rule of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945 stimulated democratic thinking 
in the sense that it promoted economic development, which to some extent fostered the 
need for an open, representative political system. Japanese exclusivism also fostered a 
desire among the Taiwanese for democracy in order to gain greater equality. Also, dur-
ing the last years of Japanese control, greater political participation was promoted in 
order to win support of the population in the context of Japan losing the war. 
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may or may not have included democracy influenced, more or less, 
both groups. 
Arguing that China has no democratic tradition, some China 
scholars note that serious consideration was never given--consider-
ing the writings on politics throughout thousands of years of Chinese 
history-to a democratic system of government.2 Confucius advised 
that the average person should not take an interest in politics. Chi-
nese leaders were also authoritarian and at times despotic. Clearly 
Chinese political tradition is different and in some ways less demo-
cratic when compared to the West. 
On the other hand, China's political tradition contributed to 
and was molded by a bureaucratic system wherein political power 
was legitimized through an objective civil service recruiting exami-
nation that disregarded class, profession, and birthright. Political 
power throughout most of Chinese history was in the hands of the 
scholar cum official, not those with the force of arms or money-as 
in the case of most other political systems. Moreover, in the Chinese 
bureaucratic system ·the scholar-official idealized good government 
which meant maintaining the support of the people and generally 
preserving a high level of ethics in politics. In short, they considered 
a good and just rule-meaning fair treatment of the people, peace 
and prosperity-their goals. Rulers who were unsuccessful in this 
effort generally did not stay in office long. In other words the notion 
of vox populi, vox die was part of the Chinese political tradition-
translated as the "mandate of heaven." This was certainly not an 
undemocratic tradition. 3 
The social class system in China was also flexible; enabling an 
individual of any class, if he (women were not given opportunities in 
education or politics) possessed the mental capacities to pass the civil 
service examination, to become an official and at the same time a 
member of the scholar gentry class. Thus a peasant could rise to 
enter the imperial court and advise the emperor on political affairs. 
This advice, which according to tradition and custom the emperor 
had to receive graciously and gratefully, was generally followed. 
Hence, in theory egalitarianism was at least built into the Chinese 
2. See Joseph R. Levenson and Franz Schurmann, China: An Interpretive History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). 
3. See John K. Fairbank, The United Stales and China (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1972), chapter 3, for further details. Cf., W. T. de Bary, "Chinese Despot-
ism and the Confucian Ideal: A Seventeenth-Century View," in Johri K. Fairbank (ed.), 
Chinese Thought and Institution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 
163-203. 
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political system and any male, regardless of his birth, could become 
a politicalleader.4 
Also the Chinese political system, while unitary in theory, was 
loosely organized or decentralized, in terms of its actual operations. 
Because of this the Chinese political system historically was less des-
potic and more democratic than is generally assumed. 5 China was 
theoretically governed from the emperor's court; yet, because of its 
vast size and population, officials sent from the capital to rule the 
provinces and political units on down to the village relied upon local 
leaders to get their work done harmoniously and effectively. This, in 
fact, they had to do, or suffer being recalled, which would result in a 
less than favorable efficiency report. Bad effectiveness reports meant 
slow or no promotions and little chance to serve in the imperial pal-
ace. Thus, competition between and among local families (generally 
extended families) or cliques characterized local politics in China. 
Central government officials served to a large extent in a go between 
role or mediating role in local politics rather than ruling by fiat. 6 
This mediating role was an important one to all concerned. It also 
represents a kind of democratic tradition as did the decentralization 
of political power itself inasmuch as it kept political decision making 
largely in the hands of those who best understood their constituency 
and who were close to those ruled. 
The leadership style of the government of the Republic of 
China on Taiwan, as well as the Nationalist Party, reflect this tradi-
tion. Chiang Kai-shek ruled with a Confucian aloofness and es-
poused an attitude that politics was a matter for a professional elite. 
Yet, he also mirrored a concern for the welfare and will of the people 
and a preoccupation with morality and justice. Chiang Kai-shek en-
couraged democratic political participation at the local level 
notwithstanding his preoccupation with national unity and security. 
He never preempted local government and seldom undermined the 
work of local government officials. 
His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who is now President, also main-
4. T'ung-tsu Ch'u, "Chinese Class Structure and its Ideology," in Fairbank (ed.), 
supra note 3, pp. 235-50. 
5. Decentralization of political authority is seen in Chinese political culture as a 
product of the fear that our centralization of power leads to both tyranny and turmoil. 
See RichardS. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1971), pp. 141-42. 
6. See Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, 
Gunn and Haim, Publishers, Inc., 1981), p. 141. Pye explains this in terms of personal 
relations. 
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tains this tradition. He seldom makes public speeches. He alone 
makes decisions on certain issues. He disciplines his subordinates as 
if they were responsible to him personally. But he allows local gov-
ernment to function democratically-in fact, more democratically 
than the central government. Looking at China's past it is easy to 
see why this is not a serious contradiction. 
Chiang Ching-kuo has, however, broken from tradition by giv-
ing considerable time to the press and by expressing his concern for 
the masses by mingling with them and showing an interest in their 
problems. He also heeds public opinion on many important issues, 
has mandated that the government represent all of the people of Tai-
wan and that the Nationalist Party recruit from every segment of the 
population. More important, he has helped make elections an im-
portant part of the political process. 
The Nationalist Chinese government can justifiably be accused 
of authoritarianism in many respects; yet unlike political elites in 
most developing nations it has never acted to suppress local democ-
racy. In fact, as we will see in following pages, mass participation in 
local politics has been encouraged ever since the Nationalists moved 
to Taiwan and local government there has been for some time as 
democratic as local government in most Western countries. Nor has 
there been any political leader in the Republic of China openly at-
tack democratic principles. Constitutionalism has been upheld as 
well as a democratic system of government. The obstacles to the 
development of a working democracy have been precipitous change 
causing political instability; never has there been a repudiation of 
ultimately realizing democracy. 
Of equal importance to Taiwan's Chinese political tradition is 
the historical experience of Taiwan as an autonomous political entity 
prior to Western rule, the influence of European contact and control, 
and the 50 years of incorporation into the Japanese empire before 
World War II. All three affected the attitudes and the disposition of 
the Taiwanese toward politics in some profound ways. Similarly the 
impact of the West on China, which served as the catalytic force to 
bring an end to the imperial system and the rise of a democratic 
movement led by Sun Yat-sen, influenced the political outlooks and 
culture of the Mainland Chinese (those who came to Taiwan after 
World War II). The latter also contributed to a unique experience 
and a special attitude toward democracy when it merged with 
Taiwanese experience after 1945. 
Due to the unique local political conditions, people in Taiwan 
developed special political views and traditions. In fact, in some 
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ways Taiwan's political culture was somewhat different from 
China's. These differences are important in understanding why Tai-
wan has some advantages in developing a democratic political sys-
tem in contrast to the People's Republic of China. 
First, since a generally less civilized and clearly unfriendly non-
Chinese population already inhabited Taiwan, the early Taiwanese 
migrants established enclaves and lived along the coast. For this 
reason, coupled with the mountainous geography of Taiwan, polit-
ical organization in Taiwan consisted of family or local clique rule 
(in the coastal areas), which later started to evolve into a kind of 
feudal system.7 As a result force of arms and money both played a 
more important role than it did in China in terms of wielding polit-
ical power and determining the hierarchy of political influence. 8 In 
this sense Taiwan's political culture resembled European and Japa-
nese feudalism (and the American political tradition which came 
from Europe). This was an advantage in terms of importing West-
em democratic tradition and Western political institutions. They fit 
better and were understood better. 
Moreover, unlike China, Taiwan came under foreign influence 
from the 15th century. In fact, for some years European powers 
ruled or controlled Taiwan. Likewise it became a trading nation 
early on-engaging in commerce with both the Europeans and other 
Asian countries, unlike China which was economically self-suffi-
cient. Early trade fostered cosmopolitan attitudes and a tendency to 
look outward for ideas about political administration and govern-
ment. It also gave rise to a more open, free and pluralist society.9 
Japanese rule in many senses reinforced an already developing 
non-bureaucratic political tradition. The Japanese political system 
was a feudal one like the European systems, and was hierarchial and 
authoritarian with power based upon wealth (largely in the form of 
land ownership) and arms (in the form of samurai retainers). At the 
time it ruled Taiwan, Japan ended its period of insularity and was a 
nation whose sights were external to its borders rather than internal. 
7. Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 
6. 
8. See Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), for further details regarding the argument 
that arms and money were essential to holding political power, or were the basis of polit-
ical power in feudal Japan and were not in "bureaucratic" China. 
9. See George M. Beckman, "Brief Episodes-Dutch and Spanish Rule," in Paul 
K.T. Sib (ed.), Taiwan in Modem Times (New York: St. John's University Press, 1973), 
pp. 31-42. 
12 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
This reinforced Taiwan's cosmopolitan tradition and made the pop-
ulation of Taiwan think in terms of foreign models for economic and 
political development. It also weakened Taiwan's insularity and 
Chinese political tradition. 
During the period of Japanese rule Taiwanese were fully cogni-
zant of the fact that they were governed by a foreign nation and that 
they were not accorded the privileges and rights accorded Ja-
panese-even though Japanese control was generally considered effi-
cient and beneficial (in that it eradicated local banditry which 
plagued Taiwan before 1895 and brought economic progress to Tai-
wan unmatched elsewhere in Asia except in Japan itself). Thus de-
mocracy meant greater political freedom and rights. During the 
Japanese period the Taiwanese population also became more aware 
of the development of modern political institutions in Japan and the 
West, of which they were not immediate beneficiaries. But they as-
sociated these institutions with their political future. 10 As we will see 
in a following chapter some progress was made during the Japanese 
period to establish political forms that were in a rudimentary sense 
democratic. 
Meanwhile democratic tradition sprouted in China in the form 
of opposition to Manchu rule and imperial tradition. In 1911 Sun 
Yat-sen, a man brought up with Western political thought-having 
lived in the U.S. for a good part of his early life-led a revolution 
that overthrew the ruling government of China. Sun then estab-
lished a republican form of government-the first in Asia. 
Sun realized, however, that democracy must be founded upon a 
democratic political culture and that this was to a large extent miss-
ing in China. In order to bridge this gap he envisioned the gradual 
evolution of democratic institutions and practices, with political 
power turned over to the people only after a period of tutelage. The 
fact that his democratic revolution was immediately preempted and 
that plans to establish a democracy had to be abandoned in order to 
avoid civil war aptly demonstrated Sun's reality-the reality that the 
Chinese state was not ready for democracy. On the other hand, the 
fact that Yuan Shih-kai (who assumed the mantle of political au-
thority from the Manchu government by virtue of his controlling a 
strong modern military force), tried to establish himself as a new 
emperor and failed because of widespread opposition to returning to 
the old imperial system of government constituted positive proof 
10. See Hyman Kublin, "Taiwan's Japanese Interlude, 1895-1945," in Paul K. T. Sib 
(ed.), supra note 9, p. 352. 
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that democracy and republicanism had caught on in China even if 
the roots were not completely embedded. 11 
In fact, it can be argued that the successive failures of various 
warlords to rule China, the survival of Sun's political ideals and his 
political system during Chiang Kai-sheks's campaign to eradicate 
warlordism and unify China, and the persistence of plans to build 
democracy during the war with Japan and subsequent civil war be-
tween the Nationalists and Communists, seem to confirm the respect 
for and desire of a system of government founded on mass political 
participation. Chiang Kai-shek clearly had ample opportunity to 
scrap Sun's ideals-ideals which in many senses were a burden and 
interferred with his efforts to unify and rule China and fight the Jap-
anese and Communists. Similarly the struggle between the Nation-
alists and the Communists for the minds and souls of the Chinese 
people was not one between forces for and against democracy; both 
sides advocated democracy. Rather it was a matter of how political 
participation should be rendered meaningful and democracy imple-
mented. For Mao Tse-tung democracy meant something very differ-
ent from that which evolved in the WestY 
Democracy had manifold origins in terms of political culture 
and has come to mean many things in Taiwan. When the National-
ist government recovered Taiwan in 1945 and even more when 
Chiang Kai-shek and his followers, numbering over a million, fled to 
Taiwan, democracy became the common goal and the standard of 
judging both the right of Chiang and his group to rule Taiwan as 
well as its effectiveness. Democracy has since been invoked by those 
who want a more rapid transition of political power to the 
Taiwanese and those who feel that the Republic of China's future is 
on Taiwan, not in trying to return to the mainland or in negotiating 
with the Communists, and that to make this possible the nation 
needs the support of the international community. Thus, democracy 
serves as a common language and inspiration. 13 
Asserting that mass participation in political decision making-
the basis of democracy and a republican form of government-was 
both necessary and inevitable in Taiwan when examining the system 
of government created by the Constitution written in 1946 and put 
11. Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise oj Modern China (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1970), p. 571. 
12. See Frederic Wakeman, Jr., History and Will· Philosophical Perspectives oj Mao 
Tse-tung's Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 26-27. 
13. See F.A. Lumley, The Republic ojChina Under Chiang Kai-shek (London: Barrie 
and Jenkins, 1976), p. 91. 
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into force in 1947 serves as an even stronger argument. This Consti-
tution served as the basis for establishing a democratic form of gov-
ernment in China in 1947 and remains the legal and organizational 
foundation for the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan 
today. It was based philosophically upon the basic concepts of de-
mocracy set forth by Sun Yat-sen to fit the Chinese environment in 
his Three Principles of the People and more specifically upon propos-
als setting forth democratic principles and the structure of the gov-
ernment of the Republic of China found in his last will (especially 
regarding the National Assembly), and the draft constitution written 
in 1936. The last two documents reflect the need for detailed plan-
ning before democracy could be implemented and all were commit-
ted to that as a goal. 
The Constitution of the Republic of China contains provisions 
for guaranteeing fundamental rights to citizens found in what is gen-
erally labeled a "bill of rights" in Western democracies. 14 All citizens 
having reached the age of 20 years have the right to vote and those 
23 years or older possess the right to be elected to public office. 
Elected officials are subject to recall, and citizens are given the rights 
of initiative and referendum. 
In terms of mass participation, or more specifically the influence 
of the ballot, the most important organs of government were made 
elective; positions in others were to be filled by appointment. This 
was similar to democratic systems that existed elsewhere at that time. 
The most important elected bodies were the National Assembly and 
the Legislative Yuan (or branch of government). One of the five 
branches of government (China adopted three of the functions of 
Western political systems~xecutive, legislative and judicial-plus 
two from the traditional system~xamination and control), the 
Control Yuan was elected indirectly. Because China was a nation 
with numerous enclaves of people (for reasons of history, geography, 
language and culture), who were not part of the political influence-
the election system also protected minority rights. 
The National Assembly was designed to be the highest political 
organ representing the people, and was given the functions of elect-
ing (also recalling) the President and Vice-President and amending 
the Constitution, directly or by voting on amendments proposed by 
the Legislative Yuan. It was also given the powers of initiative and 
14. See Lih-wu Han, Taiwan Today (Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Company, 1978), 
chapter 2, for further details on the Republic of China's political system. Cf., Republic of 
China: A Reference Book (Taipei: Tung Hsing Culture Press, 1983), Part II. 
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referendum according to special laws to be subsequently written. 
Delegates to the National Assembly were to be elected on a geo-
graphical basis, though special provision was also made for the rep-
resentation of Mongolia and Tibet, Overseas Chinese, women and 
occupational groups. These representatives of the people, the Con-
stitution stipulated, would be elected for a six-year term and could 
not concurrently hold another political office. The National Assem-
bly would be convoked 90 days prior to the expiration of the presi-
dential term and at other times under special circumstances. 
The President was given powers and duties resembling those 
given heads of state in Western democratic systems. The Vice-Presi-
dent was given no actual political power, but would assume the pow-
ers given to the President in the event the office of the president 
became vacant. 
The Legislative Yuan was made the highest law making body in 
the country and its members were to be elected proportionally from 
the various geographic regions of China in a similar, but not identi-
cal manner, as the National Assembly. Like members of the Na-
tional Assembly, members of the Legislative Yuan were prohibited 
from holding other political office. Unlike the National Assembly, 
however, delegates to the Legislative Yuan were given only a three-
year term, though they could be reelected. The powers given the 
Legislative Yuan were almost identical to those given the U.S. Con-
gress: passing statutory and budget bills, declaring war, approving 
treaties, and granting amnesty. The President and Vice-President of 
the Legislative Yuan were to be chosen by its members. The Control 
Yuan was constituted with powers of consent, impeachment, censure 
and auditing. In the case of impeaching a President or Vice-Presi-
dent checks and balancing applied. An impeachment motion re-
quired a vote from one-fourth of the total members of the Control 
Yuan. To be enacted it must be followed by a resolution presented 
by a majority to the National Assembly. The Control Yuan was also 
given the power to investigate the activities of public functionaries 
and propose corrective measures in the event of malfeasance by gov-
ernment officials or organs of government. 
Members of the Control Yuan were to be chosen by provincial 
and municipal councils, local councils in Mongolia and Tibet, and 
the Overseas Chinese. Members serve a six-year term and are eligi-
ble for reelection. As in the case of the other elected bodies men-
tioned above Control Yuan members are not allowed to 
concurrently hold other office. 
In addition to the power of the ballot given citizens of the Re-
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public of China to elect members of those organs of government just 
mentioned, the populace was indirectly given some influence or con-
trol over other organs of government. This they were given via their 
franchise in picking members of the National Assembly, the Legisla-
tive Yuan and the Control Yuan. These organs choose delegates or 
approve nominations of officials in the other major branches of gov-
ernment. In the case of the Executive Yuan-the highest adminis-
trative organ of the government-there are several checks on its 
power that ultimately reflect the public's will. The Legislative Yuan 
has to approve the appointment of its head, the Premier or President 
of the Executive Yuan. The Legislative Yuan is also given the au-
thority to interpellate, alter by resolution or refuse the Executive 
Yuan's reports on policy. (The Legislative Yuan can be asked to 
reconsider, but in essence it possesses something akin to veto power.) 
Finally the Legislative Yuan is empowered, if it does not change its 
views upon hearing entreaty from the Executive Yuan, to approve 
any resolution relevant to its lawmaking role by a two-thirds major-
ity, thereby going over the Executive Yuan. If that occurs the Presi-
dent of the Executive Yuan must accept the resolution or resign. 
In the case ofthe Judicial Yuan-the highest legal organ of gov-
ernment-the Control Yuan is empowered to consent to or reject 
appointments to that body made by the President of the Republic. 
The Examination Yuan, which has the responsibility for hiring for 
civil service positions, making efficiency reports on government offi-
cials, and formulating promotion and retirement policies, is checked 
by the Control Yuan-the latter having the authority to consent to 
or reject appointments of members of this branch of government. 
According to the Constitution, local government is to consist of 
two basic levels: the province and the county (hsien). Each province 
elects a provincial assembly and each county a county assembly. 
Specific powers are delegated to the provinces with little oversight or 
recourse as is the case in most federal systems of government. In 
short, there is clear constitutional authority for local democracy. 
Inasmuch as the National Assembly, which adopted the Consti-
tution in 1946, was comprised of members elected in the mid-1930s 
and had considerable political experience, and since the Nationalists 
were in a favorable position vis-a-vis the Communists at the time, 
due consideration was given to debating the Constitution and its 
provisions-including the power and authority given the electorate. 
The same, however, cannot be said of the elections which followed. 
Elections were held amid Communist successes on the battlefield. 
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Political chaos prevailed in some parts of the country while in other 
the government was isolated from its constituents. 
Subsequently, in 1948, in the context of a full scale war with the 
Communists, the Constitution was amended by adopting "Tempo-
rary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebel-
lion." These laws gave the President the authority to take emergency 
measures not subject to the procedural restrictions of the Legislative 
Yuan. The "Temporary Provisions" also forbade the forming of 
new political parties. Though this action was clearly legal and, 
moreover, justified by almost any criteria given the circumstances, 
the continuation of the "Temporary Provisions" after the govern-
ment moved to Taiwan has been seen by many observers as a para-
mount obstacle to the development of democracy. Likewise, as 
economic and social change has fostered more intense demands for 
political participation, especially competitive elections, the "Tempo-
rary Provisions" have become a symbol of the government's authori-
tarianism and its unwillingness to truly implement the Constitution 
and establish representative democracy. This is a subject that will be 
discussed in following chapters in greater detail since it relates di-
rectly to the realization of democracy as well as the significance of 
the right to vote and is relevant to the degree of choice in all elec-
tions held in Taiwan. 
Except for the controversy surrounding the "Temporary Provi-
sions," the Constitution of the Republic of China clearly was written 
by men of considerable foresight and is a document that has, like the 
U.S. Constitution, come to be regarded in many respects as sacred. 
It is a document that the overwhelming majority of the population 
supports in terms of the political philosophy it embodies and the or-
ganizational structure and operation of the government that is based 
on that document. 
In other words, the Constitution of the Republic of China and 
the system of government it legitimatized have become implanted. 
This same history is common to almost all constitutional, democratic 
systems. For that reason, political opposition in Taiwan has almost 
always been couched in constitutional terms. It generally centers on 
how quickly the spirit of the constitution should be implemented and 
in what manner. Even the staunchest opponents of government do 
not advocate scraping the constitution and establishing some other 
kind of political system. 15 This is important; it says there are ground 
15. Clough, supra note 7, pp. 64--66. 
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rules. Democracy in other countries developed in this context; de-
mocracy has generally not survived in other environments. 
In summary, then, the Republic of China's political system was 
founded upon democratic principles and mass participation. Sun's 
political philosophy, which assumes a "training" period for the peo-
ple to become knowledgeable and responsible citizens, has not been 
discarded or replaced. All children in Taiwan's schools study Sun's 
teachings; government officials and members of the Nationalist Party 
read and quote his writings. Regarding the implementation of de-
mocracy the question is one of timing, not whether or not democracy 
is, as defined in the Constitution, desirable or applicable. 
Both the political structure and organization of the government 
of the Republic of China in functional terms, are democratic in 
form. Elections put the system into operation and have since sus-
tained it. These elections have not been as meaningful as they might 
be because of the "Temporary Provisions" which preclude party 
competition. The fact that the Republic of China claims jurisdiction 
over the mainland of China as well as Taiwan and attempts to repre-
sent the former in absentia also means that the system is not repre-
sentative of just the territory it governs although it has evolved in 
this direction as time has passed. Without elections and without 
elected officials whose work and decisions depend on the mandate of 
the people, Taiwan's government, both national and local, would not 
retain its legitimacy. Again it is not a question of whether, but one 
of degree. 
Elections also serve other functions in the polity of the Republic 
of China. First, they fulfill a purpose that they only recently have 
begun to accomplish in Western democracies: They give a voice to 
the disenfranchised or marginally franchised-minority groups, wo-
men, and special interest groups that need special representation. 
The Constitution recognizes the special rights of minority and other 
groups that are not represented or are underrepresented in the polit-
ical system as it would otherwise work. Without elections this prom-
ise would be meaningless. Elections in Taiwan also give additional 
political power to labor, professional groups and certain other orga-
nizations. The electoral process in this way formalizes political rep-
resentation for certain interest groups and facilitates what scholars of 
political development call interest articulation. 
Second, elections bridge the gap between local government and 
the national government. In the traditional Chinese system the 
scholar-gentry officials did this. This has been the task of the Nation-
alist Party in Taiwan since 1945. But the Party cannot do this effec-
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tively and with credibility unless elections are held to reflect 
competition for political office and rank within the Party. In the fu-
ture, it may be done by other parties as well as the Nationalist Party. 
Third, elections facilitate the role of the national government as 
broker and mediator in local politics. Democracy in Taiwan has de-
veloped primarily from the bottom up because the people were more 
interested in local politics and were given a greater voice there. Thus 
elections must be held at the national level in order to keep pace 
with progress in political development. At the same time national 
elections provide an opportunity for the central government to check 
on the honesty of local elections and ensure that they work according 
to constitutional provisions and that the whole system-local gov-
ernment and central government-is working effectively and its 
parts operate in tandem. 
Fourth, elections reflect ethnic differences between the 
Taiwanese (and among them as well) and the Mainland Chinese that 
came to Taiwan after World War II. The latter group has domi-
nated government and education for the past three-plus decades; the 
former has dominated business. There are differences in outlook 
and purpose that need to be brought into the open, articulated, and 
measured. Elections do this. They also reflect in some cases the fact 
that differences or gaps do not exist when they are widely presumed 
to. Fortunately for the growth of democracy in Taiwan the gap be-
tween the two groups has closed significantly in recent years; and 
elections have proven this. 
Finally, elections mirror progress, or the lack thereof, made in 
realizing democracy and the effectiveness of the political system in 
providing mass participation. In Taiwan's case there has been tre-
mendous pressure from both inside and outside the system to make 
democracy work, as will be seen in the next chapter. Elections are a 
functional reaction to this pressure. Elections also are a gauge of 
how much progress has been made and how much remains to be 
made. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES 
EVOKING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
AND ELECTIONS 
As noted in Chapter 2, the infrastructure or foundation for par-
ticipatory democracy is present in Taiwan, as are the legal and con-
stitutional structures for a democratic system. Elections, however, 
have been impeded by special circumstances and events. At the na-
tional level (quite in contrast to the local level) elections were, until 
1980, less than meaningful for a variety of reasons, most of which in 
the legal sense relate to the "Temporary Provisions Effective During 
the Period of Communist Rebellion." The "Temporary Provisions" 
were used to justify freezing elected positions, thereby retaining the 
representatives of provinces on the mainland in the National Assem-
bly and the Legislative Yuan and some other elected bodies after the 
government moved to Taiwan. In fact, this situation still exists, 
though as we will see to a much lesser degree than in the past. 1 
The situation just described made the political system of the Re-
public of China at the top one which was democratic in structure 
and in most senses democratic in spirit. But as the system operated it 
was more authoritarian than democratic. Also there was a gap be-
tween the level of participation and the way the political system 
worked at the local level as compared to the national level. In short, 
the central government, rather than being a model of democracy that 
trained the population for future democratic politics, had the oppo-
site effect; it impeded or at least stalled the development of par-
ticipatory democracy. Meanwhile, democracy was allowed to work 
at the local level, and did. 
Since the early 1950s there has been pressure, both internally 
and externally, to change this situation. This, in fact, helps to ex-
plain what may be described as amazingly quick progress toward 
participatory democracy, perhaps even a transition to a fully demo-
cratic system, during the last five years. Meaningful elections begin-
ning with the watershed election in 1980, local elections in 1981 and 
1982 and another competitive national election in 1983 are all evi-
I. The preconstitutional National Government on July 4, 1947 issued orders to sup-
press the communist rebellion in China. Subsequently the National Assembly enacted 
the "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion" as an 
attachment to the Constitution-which was enacted the next year. The second plenary 
session of the National Assembly, held in Taipei in March 1954, decided that the "Tem-
porary Provisions" should remain in force. The ''Temporary Provisions" have, however, 
been revised four times. 
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dence of "transition" to democracy. In short, after 1980 Taiwan en-
tered a kind of "take off" stage in terms of the process of 
democratization. 
The factors which gave rise to or fostered this accelerated evolu-
tion of participatory and competitive democracy may be generally 
classified as: (1) the impact of economic development (including cul-
tural change evoked by economic development); (2) the influence of 
the United States on politics in Taiwan, of both an indirect and a 
direct (or intentional) nature; and (3) Taipei's need to present a posi-
tive image to the global community to win support for its continued 
existence as a sovereign nation-state in the face of threats by the Peo-
ple's Republic of China to incorporate Taiwan using the threat of 
military force combined with diplomatic and other efforts to accom-
plish that. 
Taiwan's economic development for more than three decades 
has provided the impetus for marked changes in the society, new and 
stronger demands for participation in political decision making, and 
the intertwining of economic and political decision making. For rea-
sons which will be explained below, the impact of successful eco-
nomic growth has been nothing less than spectacular. In this 
connection, one would also bear in mind that economic growth, and 
the material and other comforts it has provided, have been accepted 
as the foremost or priority goal of the overwhelming majority of the 
population. Moreover, there has been mass participation in realizing 
the economic miracle; basically no one has been left out of the eco-
nomic development process either in terms of making it happen or 
realizing its benefits. And as a result of this process of working to-
gether to promote economic development, the masses have given the 
government due credit for planning and engineering growth. Few 
are under the illusion that it happened by accident or was the prod-
uct of external forces. 
As a product of Taiwan's rapid economic modernization, the 
government has gained tremendous prestige and support from the 
people. In short, the government is credited with making the eco-
nomic miracle occur. This has helped to offset some of the pressures 
for a more democratic system. At the same time it has made top 
government officials perceive that they have the support of the 
masses, thereby making the government more willing to put democ-
racy into practice.2 It has similarly compensated for the govern-
2. See Copper, "Political Development in the Republic of China, 1949-1981," supra 
Chapter l, note 5, for further details. 
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ment's failure in foreign affairs (though these "failures"-which will 
be discussed later-were seen as inevitable by most of the 
population). 
To understand the magnitude of the social change fostered by 
economic modernization and its impact on political outlooks and de-
mands, it is necessary to realize the scope of the economic develop-
ment Taiwan has experienced. Some figures are helpful: Just over 
thirty years ago, in 1952, the gross national product of the Republic 
of China was $1.33 billion; in 1982 it was estimated at almost $50 
billion. Per capita income rose from around $45 annually at the end 
ofWorld War II to a projected $2,600 in 1984------<>r more than a fifty 
fold increase.3 Taiwan's economic growth over the last thirty years 
has been one of the highest in the world. Moreover, while per capita 
income lagged behind growth for some time due to a high rate of 
investment, incomes have increased as fast or faster than GNP over 
the last decade. This has given the population rapidly increasing 
buying power-unprecedented in the island's past. In fact, this has 
occurred at such a pace that Taiwan has probably become a mass 
consumer-oriented society more quickly than any in the world. 
Moreover, the changes in social attitudes resulting from eco-
nomic prosperity are even greater than they would normally be be-
cause of the even distribution of incomes that has also occurred 
during this same time period. In 1952 incomes differed between the 
top 20 percent of the population and the bottom 20 percent by a 
factor of fifteen (incidentally not particularly high for a developing 
Third World country). By 1980 the gap between the same two 
groups dropped to 4.34 times, putting the Republic of China in the 
category of low income inequality. Now, in terms of equality of in-
comes, Taiwan exceeds both the U.S. and Japan not to mention most 
communist countries (including the People's Republic of China).4 
3. See Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Gustav Ranis and John C.H. Fei, The Taiwan Success 
Story: Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of China, 1951-1979 
(Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1981), p. 7 for further details on Taiwan's rapid eco-
nomic growth in GNP and per capita income terms. For the latest statistics, see The Free 
China Journal, AprilS, 1984. Cf., Chu-Yuan Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan 
and Mainland China: A Comparison of Strategies and Performance," Asian Affairs 
(Spring 1983), pp. 60-86. Cheng puts Taiwan's per capita income at $50 annually at the 
end of the war, or about the same at the mainland. According to official figures, Taiwan 
is now more than 8 times that of the People's Republic of China. 
4. SeeYuan-li Wu, "Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth ofthe 
Republic of China" (Baltimore, Md.: University of Maryland School of Law, Occasional 
Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1977-No. 2) for further details on 
Taiwan's income distribution. 
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Income equalizing has occurred at such a pace that, according to 
World Bank reports, Taiwan has the most equitable income distribu-
tion of any rapidly developing country in the world. 5 
Some other facts about Taiwan's economic development are 
also relevant in terms of explaining the impact of economic growth 
upon social and political change. Inasmuch as Taiwan has few natu-
ral resources and suffers from a severe population density problem 
(almost three times as many people per square mile of arable land as 
Japan and four to five times that of the People's Republic of China) 
Taiwan's economic development had to be based upon astute plan-
ning, the rapid industrialization of the island's economy and foreign 
trade. 
Economic assistance was important, as will be seen in the fol-
lowing pages, but it played no role after the mid-1960s. Also consid-
ering the fact that most of the nations receiving foreign assistance at 
that time (and since then as well) did not use aid productively, its 
effective utilization in Taiwan obviously reflects effective govern-
ment planning. (In fact, very few countries that have received U.S. 
or other outside economic assistance can argue that it was used effec-
tively to promote economic development. Cuba's situation in the 
1960s was similar to that of Taiwan's during its economic takeoff 
period and it received from the Soviet bloc six times the aid in per 
capita terms given by the U.S. to Taiwan during the peak years in 
the 1950s. Yet during that decade Cuba failed to show even moder-
ate economic growth.)6 
Thus, it appears that acumen in planning and a commitment to 
economic growth by both the government and the population pri-
marily account for Taiwan's rapid economic growth. This being the 
case, it is axiomatic that the effects of economic growth have been 
desired by both the political elite and the masses, and both have 
sought to functionally adjust socially-though one might argue that 
simply because of the magnitude of Taiwan's economic growth to-
5. See John C.H. Fei, Gustav Ramis and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Growth with Equity: 
The Taiwan Case(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1979), pp. 325-26. C.f, Ian M.D. 
Little, "An Economic Reconnaissance," in Walter Galenson (ed.), Economic Growth and 
Structural Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 498 and Wan-yong 
Kuo, The Past and the Prospects for Income Distribution in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute of 
Economics, August, 1976). 
6. A. James Gregor with Maria Hsia Chang and Andrew B. Zimmerman, Ideology 
and Development: Sun Yat-sen and the Economic History of Taiwan (Berkeley: Center for 
Chinese Studies, China Research Monograph 23, 1981), pp. 87-88. 
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gether with its pervasiveness in terms of the mass impact this adjust-
ment was at least to some extent destabilizing. 
The scope of social change engendered by Taiwan's rapid eco-
nomic growth must also be seen in the context of understanding how 
that growth was achieved. It is worthy of note that its growth was 
not based upon the sale or use of the nation's natural resources, as 
was the case of many other rapid growth countries. Instead growth 
was based upon the use of human resources which required the ra-
tionalization of the economy, specialization in production, foreign 
trade, quality control and good marketing techniques. This made 
possible a quick shift from an agricultural-based economy to an in-
dustrial-based one. All of this was planned and overseen by the 
government. 
The degree to which government planning worked can be easily 
documented. In less than thirty years between 1952 and 1981 the 
general index of industrial production increased threefold. The av-
erage annual growth rate in construction was 20.3 percent; in manu-
facturing it was 14.5 percent; and in public utilities it was 11.6 
percent. This translates to a 40 percentage point gain in the share of 
the GNP by the industrial sector, compared to 11 percent for the 
U.S. and 22 percent for Japan during its first 40 years of industrial 
growth.7 Although agricultural productivity continued to increase 
during this same period, this was accomplished only because of im-
proved farming methods and seeds-since there was a massive 
movement of labor from rural Taiwan to the cities. In fact, industry 
absorbed new labor at a rate of 9 percent annually throughout most 
of the period.8 As a result Taiwan became quickly urbanized. 
All of this had many effects. First, it resulted in the cities be-
coming younger. Second, it created new political inputs due to 
crowding in the cities, the greater need for services and higher stan-
dards of living. Third, it created a more politically active population 
and voting electorates with different (and generally more adaptive 
and progressive) political attitudes. The importance of these factors 
will be discussed at greater length in subsequent chapters. 
The rapid process of industrialization had many other spin-off 
or side-effects. Already mentioned is the growth of consumerism 
based upon vast improvements in individuals' buying power and 
standards of living. The magnitude of change in this realm is noth-
ing less than spectacular. During a period of less than thirty years 
7. Ibid., p. 77. 
8. See Kuo et al., supra note 3, pp. 13-17. 
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from 1952 to 1981, Taiwan experienced increases in the following 
indicators as follows: Calorie intake rose from 2,070 per day to 2,830. 
Protein intake increased from 49 grams per day to 78. The average 
life span increased from 58 years to 72. The number of households 
with television sets shot up from zero to more than 100 percent.9 
By the 1970s automobiles, motorcycles, refrigerators, air-condi-
tioners and washing machines were commonplace. So were many 
other consumer goods such as stereos, tape recorders, cameras, and 
color televisions. In short, within twenty years of the government of 
the Republic of China moving to Taipei, Taiwan had grown into a 
full fledged consumer society facing all of the implications of that 
change. Prosperity fostered materialism, breaking down old values. 
This altered both the thinking and behavior of the Republic of 
China's populace, engendering, in fact, a new political culture. Eco-
nomic decision making and political decision-making merged or 
overlapped. A new afiluent class became more interested in politics. 
Family ties and loyalty diminished. Nationalism increased. The de-
sire of the masses to participate in political decision making rose. 
Before examining the demand for political participation that 
followed Taiwan's prosperity, it is necessary to look first at some of 
the intermediate causes and effects. One important effect of increas-
ing living standards and the development of a materialist culture was 
the fact that consumerism tended to level ethnic as well as social 
class differences. This was even more true than it might have been 
otherwise since the Taiwanese (who dominated business) benefited 
more from the economic growth policies of the government (domi-
nated by Mainland Chinese) than did the Mainland Chinese them-
selves. Economic growth and prosperity also reduced the influence 
of the ideologues in politics. Specifically it undermined the policy of 
return to the mainland-inasmuch as it created a tremendous stan-
dard of living gap between Taiwan and the People's Republic of 
China. According to official statistics released by the two govern-
ments in 1981, Taiwan's living standard was more than ten times 
higher. 10 This created a greater sense of self identity as well as inde-
9. For some of the early figures on increases in living standards and the social and 
other effects of economic growth, see Yung Wei, ''Taiwan: A Modernizing Chinese Soci-
ety," in Sih (ed.), supra Chapter 2, note 9. Cf., Clough, supra Chapter 2, note 7, pp. 
71-72. 
10. The People's Republic of China underestimated its per capita income in order to 
categorize itself in the "poorest" nation category and thus qualify for the most generous 
loans from the World Bank and other international aid giving organizations. Realisti-
cally its per capita income is probably one-sixth to one-eighth of the Republic of China. 
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pendence and nationhood. 
However, rapid economic development after years of poverty 
also tended to evoke some insecurity regarding retaining the benefits 
of better standards of living and material possessions. This without 
doubt offsets to some degree the progressive forces fostered by con-
sumerism and the growth of a material culture. In fact, this may 
help explain the fact that in 1979 following the violence in Kaohsi-
ung initiated by progressive anti-government forces, the population, 
which had generally supported the protestors' demands for change, 
clearly turned around when it became apparent that the anti-govern-
ment forces might create conditions that would destabilize the polit-
ical system and hence hurt the economy. 
Another important moderating influence associated with Tai-
wan's economic prosperity is the fact it has given the business com-
munity in Taiwan, which like business groups elsewhere is basically 
conservative, an increasing influence in politics. This is true both in 
the sense that the business community can affect government deci-
sion-making, but also because business has increasingly become a 
stepping stone to important positions in government. Similarly, en-
gineering economic growth has built meaningful bonds between 
Taiwanese businessmen and Mainlander Chinese officials and helps 
to explain an interesting integrative phenomenon: In political con-
tests in recent years many Taiwanese business leaders have been re-
luctant to support more progressive Taiwanese candidates. The 
reason for this is that the latter are less pro-business and are seen to 
endanger a very good working relationship that now exists between 
business and government. This situation has also prompted many 
Taiwanese to join the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party (even though 
it is still seen by many Taiwanese as a "Mainlander" Party). This 
situation, plus the breakdown of ethnic barriers that has occurred for 
other reasons, make it possible for the KMT to become a 
"Taiwanese" party eventually and/or facilitate the mutual absorp-
tion of the two ethnic groups. 
Another important factor to consider regarding Taiwan's eco-
nomic growth and its impact on politics, especially political partici-
pation, is the fact that Taiwan's period of rapid growth paralleled a 
time of decline in the West in ways that affected perceptions of the 
Western economic growth model. Particularly during the latter dec-
ade or decade and one-half of Taiwan's rapid economic develop-
ment phase, the U.S. and most Western European countries were no 
longer experiencing significant or impressive growth. Instead, Japan 
was at a center stage in terms of an economic growth model. As a 
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result, both Japan's economic and political system emulated and 
competed with Western models. 
Japan's political system, while certainly a participatory democ-
racy, does not emphasize individual and civil rights as much as polit-
ical systems in the U.S. and most other Western countries. Political 
and social stability, a lower crime rate, and compromise rather than 
confrontation (especially litigation) characterize the Japanese sys-
tem. Perhaps most noteworthy in the context of studying Taiwan's 
elections, Japan does not have a very meaningful political opposition 
in the party sense. Rather it has one dominant political party. Many 
in Taiwan see this as an advantage in terms of political stability as 
well as economic development which depends upon a stable political 
environment. 
In addition, most people in Taiwan during this same period 
viewed (and still view) the U.S. as a nation that suffers from serious 
social problems such as crime (which makes it impossible to walk 
freely on the streets of most American cities), serious drug problems, 
an alienated youth, racial tension, mental illness, mistreatment of the 
aged, and other serious social problems. Most people in Taiwan at-
tribute such social maladies to a political system that lacks effective 
controls and provides too much freedom, or is too democratic. They 
see excessive party competition as the cause of political polarization 
and some of the other problems endemic to the American political 
system. Clearly, the huge majority of the population of Taiwan was 
and remains of the belief that these problems should be avoided and 
that the U.S. political system that grants too many political freedoms 
and rights is in many respects not a model to emulate. 
Finally, it is important to note that the Western liberal demo-
cratic model of political development had been discredited in the 
1950s by Third World countries-in fact, by most that tried to use it. 
In the immediate post-World War II period, many developing na-
tions adopted the U.S. political model and established a two party 
competitive democratic system-only to find that it polarized the so-
ciety and created confrontation politics in the country, which led to 
conflict and instability. Nearly all of the newly independent nations 
that adopted it subsequently abandoned the two party model. Simi-
larly, the federal system and the local autonomy which the U.S. and 
other Western nations promoted did not work well in developing 
countries. In most cases, economic development and increasing 
political control over the population from the top seemed to be mu-
tually supporting. 
The nations that were successful in the 1960s and 1970s fol-
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lowed the Western model selectively. Singapore, South Korea, 
Hong Kong and the other economically successful nations in Asia 
did not use the decentralized, competitive party democratic model. 
Rather the political systems of these nations, with the exception of 
Hong Kong, like Taiwan combined authoritarian political control, 
strong influence of the technocrat and a high level of distribution of 
the benefits of economic growth provided for by the government. 
These governments used economic growth and the opportunity for 
the individual to benefit from economic development and a free 
market system and political freedoms to win popular support. 
Granting the right of political participation through mass move-
ments, campaigns, and demonstrations, which the communist na-
tions (especially the People's Republic of China) gave its citizens in 
lieu of a better material life had little appeal. 
Another by-product of Taiwan's economic success and higher 
standards of living was a marked increase in the level of education 
throughout the nation. The following figures indicated the magni-
tude of this: In 1950, 80 percent of school age children were in 
school; in 1979 this figure had increased to more than 99 percent. In 
1950 there were 139.6 students per 1,000 people; in 1979 there were 
262.3 per 1,000. At the elementary level, in 1950 there were 1,231 
schools in Taiwan enrolling 906,950 students; in 1981 there were 
2,444 schools with 2,213,179 students-and increase of 144 percent. 
At the secondary schoolleve1, in 1950 there were 128 schools enroll-
ing 79,948 students; in 1981 there were 838 schools with 1,253,333 
students. This was an increase of 1,467.7 percent. In higher educa-
tion, in 1950 there were seven schools enrolling 6,665 students; in 
1981 there were 104 schools with 358,437 students. This was an in-
crease of 5,277.9 percent. 11 
More and better education, of course, increased the literacy rate 
and fostered increased social awareness and changed political atti-
tudes. It also had other effects. It happened so quickly (Taiwan in 
the early 1980s had a level of education about 4 times the norm for a 
country with its level of GNP) and the number of people with ad-
vanced education grew so rapidly that it perpetuated attitudes that 
lent themselves to elitism (or elite democracy), as well as detached or 
aloof attitudes towards politics. 12 This no doubt offset some of the 
egalitarian idealism that might otherwise have made greater de-
II. See Republic of China: A Reference Book, supra Chapter 2, note 14, pp. 219-26 
and Gregor et al., supra note 6, pp. 80-81. 
12. Gregor et al., supra note 6, p. 80. 
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mands for participatory democracy and in some measure countered 
growing positive attitudes toward political freedoms and democracy. 
Another variable that has inhibited the development of par-
ticipatory democracy patterned after the West is the strength and 
richness of Chinese culture. Although the importance and the direct 
relevance of this factor is difficult to assess, there is obvious resist-
ance to wholesale Westernization of the society or political system in 
Taiwan based on tradition. In fact, many in Taiwan perceive an 
"over-participation" in many Westen democracies in the sense that 
demonstrations and protests represent excesses in granting rights to 
the individual while society's concerns are ignored. Some other ave-
nues of political expression are also considered undesirable and un-
wanted. Even elections in the United States and other Western 
countries are viewed to some extent as too devisive, too frequent and 
too costly in terms of money and talent. 
Having assessed the major internal dynamics fostering social 
and political change that can be tied to greater demands for political 
participation and voting in Taiwan, it is now necessary to examine 
external pressures upon the Republic of China to institute change 
and expand the role of the electorate in terms of both the frequency 
and significance of elections. While it is difficult to say whether the 
external pressures contributing to progress in making the franchise 
more meaningful are more important, it is clear that the internal and 
external pressures have been and are mutually reinforcing. In fact, 
together their effects have been greater than were the two factors to 
operate separately. 
Although the Republic of China's ties with the United States 
have constituted the most important source of exogenous influence 
(which will be discussed below) there have also been other sources of 
influence. One of the most important of these is the Overseas Chi-
nese. The Overseas Chinese were in the past (and they remain) an 
important source of material and spiritual support for the Republic 
of China. And even though most are not active participants in the 
politics of the nations where they reside (generally because they are 
more interested in business and in many countries are forced to 
maintain a low profile politically), they have generally been strong 
supporters of a "free" and "democratic" China. This is especially 
true inasmuch as they associate capitalism with democracy and are 
both practitioners and advocates of the former. 13 
Also relevant is the fact that as Taiwan's economy experienced 
13. See Clough, supra Chapter 2, note 7, pp. 131-34. 
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rapid growth-foreign trade in large part making this possible-Tai-
wan's businessmen came in contact more frequently with business-
men in capitalist countries that advocated, or assumed, participatory 
democracy both in principle and as a political system compatible 
with capitalism and the capitalist free market model of economic 
growth. Government officials in Taiwan had many of the same con-
tacts. During the years after about 1960 this had a particularly 
strong impact on the government of the Republic of China. 
Also, since the Republic of China in its contact with all foreign 
nations claims to be "Free China"; it was, and is, therefore, under 
some obligation to give evidence of mass participation in the polit-
ical system in order to justify this claim. Albeit in the past this may 
not have been of overriding importance in maintaining relations 
with most Third World countries, it is now. Needless to say it is 
vitally important for Taipei in maintaining contacts with most West-
ern nations in the context of competing for contacts and the People's 
Republic of China's efforts to isolate Taipei. 14 
Evidence of political participation is especially important re-
garding Taiwan's relations with the United States. In fact, a more 
in-depth analysis is warranted here. 
The view of the U.S. government during World War II was that 
Taiwan was territory "stolen by Japan" (so stated in the Cairo Dec-
laration) which should be returned to the Republic of China. On the 
other hand, the Atlantic Charter-which stressed the desires of the 
people living in territories whose future was yet to be determined-
was also important in relation to deciding Taiwan's future. The 
Charter of the United Nations incorporated this thinking, which has 
thus been reinforced a multitude of times. 
While self-determination was not an issue in 1945, since the 
population of Taiwan did not want the Japanese to remain and wel-
comed incorporation in the Republic of China, it has subsequently 
been of some relevance insofar as the Republic of China's claim to 
represent all of China has eroded and Taiwanese demands for more 
democracy and more representation in the government have in-
creased. It is also important in light of various "independence" 
groups, known collectively as the Taiwanese Independence Move-
ment, which advocate an independent, autonomous Taiwan while 
rejecting ties between Taiwan and the mainland. Their views have 
been heard sympathetically in the U.S. Hence, U.S. public view re-
garding Taiwan's legal status may be said to relate to self-determina-
14. Ibid, Chapter 5. 
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tion and hence the legitimacy of the government of the Republic of 
China relates intimately to the democratization process. 15 
Understanding the influence the U.S. had on the Republic of 
China since it moved to Taiwan is also crucial to understand how 
the U.S. has pressured Taiwan to democratize. In 1950 the U.S. at 
the onset of the Korean War provided the Nationalist Chinese gov-
ernment with a respite from communist attack by neutralizing the 
Taiwan Strait and shielding Taiwan from invasion. The National-
ists used that time to engage in a process of introspection and self-
analysis to take stock of their failure on the mainland. The Nation-
alists then thoroughly cleaned the government and the Kuomintang 
(even though a good share of corrupt and dishonest officials had al-
ready fled the country). 
Due to the fact that many talented men and women fled from 
communism to Taiwan, the Nationalists were able to muster quickly 
a tremendous reservoir of dedicated and honest bureaucratic and ad-
ministrative talent and plan for the future in terms of strengthening 
the economy. Implementing Sun Yat-sen's ideals regarding the par-
ticipatory democracy was on the agenda, though due to the state of 
tension (officially war) between the Republic of China (the National-
ist Chinese) and the People's Republic of China (the Communist 
Chinese) and low public demands it was given a lower priority. 
Moreover, economic development was regarded as the necessary 
precondition for democracy and it had widespread appeal as a na-
tional goal. 
As a precondition to understanding the specific kinds of U.S. 
influence vis-a-vis political development in Taiwan that will be men-
tioned below, it must also be realized that in the 1950s Mainland 
Chinese and Taiwanese alike had great respect for the U.S. as ana-
tion and this included the American political system. Not only was 
this true, but personal relationships were built as a result of an 
American presence in Taiwan at various levels. Diplomatic repre-
sentatives, military aid personnel, missionaries, and students 
throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s established very close and 
cordial relations with both government officials and the population 
of Taiwan. Mutual respect and understanding was the rule-quite 
in contrast to suspicion and hatred which have frequently character-
ized the interaction of foreign people and cultures elsewhere in the 
15. See John F. Copper, "Taiwan's Legal Status: A Multilevel Perspective," Journal 
of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. I, No.4 (December 1982), pp. 57-69 for further details. 
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world. 16 
The first set of joint actions taken by the U.S. and the Republic 
of China to help build an infrastructure both for economic develop-
ment and democracy was land reform. Inasmuch as the Nationalists 
realized that this was a major reason for their defeat by the Commu-
nists, while they owed nothing to the Taiwanese landlords and had 
large amounts of formerly Japanese owned or controlled land to dis-
tribute, there was generally no disagreement that land reform should 
be implemented with haste. To the American advisors in Taiwan it 
was a key to promoting economic growth because more equitable 
land ownership and higher agricultural productivity were viewed as 
closely related. It was also seen as a means of promoting political 
development since it made the peasant independent of the landlord 
and gave him a stake in the political decision-making process. 
The land reform program instituted in 1950 was extremely suc-
cessful. In fact, it was a model of success. It erased the hold land-
lords had on the peasants and generally destroyed remnants of the 
feudal political system which was part of Taiwan's past and which 
had been reinforced by Japanese control for fifty years. It not only 
freed the peasant, but it also made him more efficient in terms of 
producing food since he became highly motivated as owner of his 
own land. Increased productivity in the agricultural sector as al-
ready noted had secondary effects upon economic and political 
change since it made possible the industrialization of the nation by 
releasing labor to the factories and by prompting a rapid increase in 
the urbanization of Taiwan's population. 17 
U.S. economic assistance was also an important source of pres-
sure as well as inspiration to build democratic institutions. From 
1950, when U.S. economic assistance was restored to the Republic of 
China, up to 1964 when it ended, the Republic of China government 
was beholden to the U.S. for its help. This gave the U.S. leverage 
over political decision-making and made Taipei more sensitive to 
keeping the U.S. Congress happy so that financial help would not be 
discontinued. Thus, while U.S. aid had little or no effect in democ-
ratizing many political systems in Third World countries and per-
haps its social and political effects are generally overstated, in the 
case of Taiwan there were special reasons why it had an impact of 
considerable magnitude upon the political system and particularly 
16. For further details, see Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign 
Aid, Se!f-Help and Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966). 
17. See T.H. Shen, Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of Development: The Taiwanese 
Experience (Taipei: Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction, 1974), p. 275. 
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upon political participation. 18 
First, U.S. aid was justified every year in Congressional debate 
primarily in terms of fighting communism. In the case of the Repub-
lic of China this had specific significance since communism consti-
tuted an immediate and direct threat. Thus, U.S. aid was more 
generous than it would have been otherwise. Also, since the U.S. in 
large part blamed itself for Mao's success in China it wanted to see 
democracy succeed in Taiwan and make Taiwan a showcase of dem-
ocratic institutions as well as the effectiveness of U.S. aid. In fact, 
the two were seen as related-particularly in Taiwan. Hence, in or-
der to portray itself as anti-communist to the U.S. Congress, the gov-
ernment of the Republic of China had to present the image of an 
evolving democratic system. To some extent democratization con-
sisted for the most part of window dressing. This was particularly 
true of the 1950s and 1960s when Taiwan was not yet ready for de-
mocracy. But this situation changed in the 1970s. 
Second, the government as well as the population of Taiwan 
was obsessed with economic development. At first, the government 
saw aid as a means of building its military strength in order to recap-
ture the mainland. Soon, however, it became a symbol of its ability 
to reform, the superiority of the Three People's Principles over Com-
munism, and its claim to represent China in world affairs. Finally 
the Taiwanese population had still another motivation: they had ex-
perienced prosperity under Japanese rule and wanted economic 
growth restored after a period of decline during and immediately 
following the war. In other words they had done it before; they 
wanted to do it again. 
Third, U.S. aid, regardless of whether economic or military in 
categorization, espoused specific objectives that related to or was sy-
nonymous with political development. The most obvious of which 
was the request for elections. And whereas this approach was gener-
ally ineffective or counterproductive in inducing democratically held 
elections in most developing countries, Americans had more hope 
for Nationalist China than other Third World countries. High offi-
cials, who were mostly Mainland Chinese, of course were cautious 
inasmuch as they were a minority and harbored the fear they might 
be voted out of office or become victim of an "uprising of the 
masses." There was also the fear that democracy instituted too 
quickly, as other Third World nations experienced in the 1950s, 
18. Jacoby, supra note 16, pp. 62-63. 
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would lead to instability. Moreover, Taiwan was "under seige" and 
political change was seen as risky. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the growth of democratic 
processes in Taiwan generally disappointed the U.S. During this pe-
riod Washington's disapproval, in fact, constituted additional moti-
vation for the government of the Republic of China to increase 
political participation, or at least go through the motions. When aid 
appropriations were voted on in Congress, mention was often made 
of the lack of party competition in Taiwan and the slow progress 
made in establishing democratic rule. In fact in Taiwan's case, this 
tended to be stressed more than was true of other nations because of 
American expectations stemming from the concepts of a "free" and 
"unfree" China, the reports of Christian missionaries in Taiwan, 
economic growth and the expectation that capitalist-style economic 
modernization should produce democratic institutions. In fact, ex-
pectations in the U.S. were exaggerated due to the problem of not 
understanding the government's minority status vis-a-vis the 
Taiwanese and the insecurity caused by the threat from the Main-
land-which the government of the Republic of China generally 
perceived to be larger than it actually was and Americans saw to be 
less than it really was. 
During the 1960s as concern increased in the U.S. regarding mi-
nority and civil rights, as well as voting rights, sympathy grew con-
siderably for the Taiwanese. Many advocated that they would be 
better represented in their own nation. The U.S. government, in 
fact, had some difficulties rationalizing support for the Republic of 
China which many Americans, especially of liberal persuasion, char-
acterized as an authoritarian dictatorship run by an ethnic minority. 
Thus a two-China policy began to evolve. Both the American gov-
ernment and the U.S. population (which knew little about Taiwan 
and to whom events were interpreted through the media) began to 
think in terms of supporting Taiwan as an independent nation-not 
because of anti-communist but rather because of Taiwan's right to 
self-determination. 
As a result, support in the U.S. grew, both officially (though this 
was subtle), and unofficially, for the cause of Taiwanese indepen-
dence. This was vividly demonstrated in the late 1960s and early 
1970s through a series of events, including the escape (which most in 
Taiwan felt was engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency) of a 
Taiwanese leader, Peng Ming-min, who had been imprisoned for 
treason and later released to be placed under house arrest. Another 
event-a attempt made on Chiang Ching-kuo's life in New York by 
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two Taiwanese activists (who were subsequently freed on bail and 
were "allowed" to flee the U.S.), provided confirmation of U.S. sup-
port for Taiwanese independence. In short, while the U.S. govern-
ment never established any formal contacts with Taiwanese 
Independence Movement leaders and never officially recognized the 
movement in any way, Washington put pressure on Taipei to reform 
by flirting with the Movement. 
Toward the end of the 1960s U.S. China policy changed in favor 
of closer ties with the People's Republic of China, particularly after 
the Sino-Soviet border conflict and the announcement of the Nixon 
Doctrine in 1969. Subsequently, secret contacts were held. 
America's probes to better relations were even more ominous. 
Due to the importance of the U.S. economically-aid had been 
replaced by access to the American market (receiving 30 to 40 per-
cent of Taiwan's exports) in terms of bolstering Taiwan's economic 
development-and because the U.S. was the Republic of China's 
only important military ally there was little the government could do 
in protest. Its reaction instead was to try to bring more Taiwanese 
into the system (or at least the timing suggests this) by giving them 
more important positions and encouraging them to join the KMT. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to be sure of cause and effect in this 
case. By 1972, Chiang Ching-kuo assumed a more important posi-
tion in government and was able to break down resistance in the 
government and party to greater Taiwanese participation. This may 
have been as important or more important than U.S. pressure. Ob-
jectively, it was probably due to both factors almost equally; and the 
two factors were mutually reinforcing. 19 
Still another factor added pressure on the Nationalist govern-
ment to democratize. The U.S.-PRC detente was followed by efforts 
by Peking to come to some agreement with the Taiwanese (as op-
posed to the Mainland Chinese-dominated government and Party) 
in order to undermine the Republic of China's legitimacy and force 
Taipei to engage in unification talks. While these appeals were pa-
tently unsuccessful, they did cause some concern among the ruling 
elite in Taiwan. And the Taiwanese rejection was seen as a vote of 
confidence in the government. 
Taipei's diplomatic failures during this time prompted a con-
cern among the population ofTaiwan about the Republic of China's 
future. After the Cultural Revolution ended in the PRC, Peking 
made a concerted effort to establish formal diplomatic ties with more 
19. See Clough, supra Chapter 2, note 7, pp. 62-63. 
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foreign nations. And Peking succeeded at Taipei's expense. Fur-
ther, in 1971 Peking won a U.N. vote for admission and Taipei was 
expelled from the world body. Other diplomatic defeats followed. 
Taipei's waning position diplomatically fostered a grassroots move-
ment that advocated democratizing the political system and aban-
doning the claim to represent China lest Taiwan be sacrificed in the 
process of Peking's successes in winning diplomatic ties with most of 
the nations of the world. There was, in fact, considerable concern 
among Taiwan's populace that Taiwan's right to self-determination 
and autonomy would be denied by the U.S. and world community 
unless Taiwan democratized its political system. 
The subsequent proliferation of independent or "outside of a 
party" (dang wai) candidates and a movement to establish party 
competition, open more seats in the elected bodies of government to 
representatives from Taiwan (as opposed to the provinces on the 
mainland which were also represented) and give political candidates 
considerably more latitude in campaigning all seem to be related to 
Taipei's failing diplomacy. At least the timing suggests so. Similar 
demands for more political freedoms in the realms of holding meet-
ings, rallies and demonstrations also increased during this period. 
The importance of these demands relative to subsequent successful 
elections and their role in political development are axiomatic. 20 
However, there is again a problem of identifying the proper 
causes for the effects. It must be borne in mind that the Executive 
Yuan, especially after its leadership was taken over by Chiang 
Ching-kuo in 1972, though not an elected body, was the center of 
problem solving. It provided the impetus and leadership for build-
ing more responsiveness in government, representing mass interests 
and stamping out corruption. Chiang Ching-kuo brought a number 
of native-born Taiwanese into the highest echelons of the govern-
ment and the Party at that time-in fact in numbers exceeding their 
proportion of the population (beginning in 1972-1973). He also re-
cruited a number of young, American-educated Ph.Ds into high de-
cision making and technocrat roles. He established new procedures 
for citizens to petition the government primarily through the Execu-
tive Yuan. Individuals who perceived their civil rights were violated 
or who had grievances against the government (local or central) were 
given an avenue to reach government officials-who were ordered to 
20. For details on these trends in 1980 and 1981, see John F. Copper, "Taiwan in 
1980: Entering a New Decade," Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. I (January 1981), pp. 51-62, 
and John F. Copper, "Taiwan in 1981: Still with Friends," Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. I 
(January 1982), pp. 47-55. 
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reply to such cases within thirty days. Wasteful spending and cor-
ruption also came under attack. Chiang Ching-kuo even had one of 
his relatives jailed for corruption.2 1 
In December 1978 the government of the Republic of China 
suffered another blow. The Carter Administration announced the 
breaking of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and the 
establishment of diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China 
as well as the termination (after one year) of the U.S.-Republic of 
China Defense Treaty. These actions precipitated renewed mass 
concern regarding the government's policies in the context of contin-
uing diplomatic defeats. Concern was manifested in the form of de-
mands for mass participation in the decision making process, i.e., 
further democratization of the political system. 
What followed was a grave disappointment. A large segment of 
the citizenry asked for meaningful elections at a time when sched-
uled elections were cancelled because of the shock of the Carter Ad-
ministration's decision. Many also demanded increased political 
freedoms and civil rights. There was an atmosphere of feeling that 
something must be done to save the country. The population seri-
ously questioned whether the government was doing enough or in-
deed taking the proper actions. Many saw the choice as 
democratization or incorporation by the People's Republic of 
China-and very few wanted the latter. Yet because of the emer-
gency, caused by the loss of formal ties with the U.S., steps to accom-
modate the public demands were postponed. 
The government's decision to cancel the scheduled election-
also closing the stock market, and taking other measures to deal with 
the threat of political and economic instability-was no doubt a cor-
rect one given the circumstances and the threat of political instabil-
ity. Still, public demand for greater participatory democracy was 
founded upon an irrefutable logical argument: that Taiwan, in order 
to survive as a nation-state, had to get support from the international 
community and democracy was one of the keys to accomplish this. 
The Republic of China had just lost formal diplomatic ties with its 
most important friend and its only military alliance treaty with a 
global power. Taipei had to parry offers and cope with threats from 
the People's Republic of China. Nearly everyone in Taiwan felt that 
refusing to talk with Peking was the correct choice, though admit-
21. Wang Cheng-yi, Head of the Personnel Administration Bureau of the Executive 
Yuan, was found guilty of accepting bribes in connection with several construction 
projects. He was sentenced to life in prison. 
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tedly for different reasons: Taiwanese because they perceived Tai-
wan to have only tenuous cultural and historical ties to China; 
Mainland Chinese because they know they were not in a position to 
negotiate with Peking and had bad experiences dealing with the 
Communists in the past and had no reason to trust any deal made by 
Peking now; both because of the loss of standard of living and polit-
ical and other freedoms they would lose in the process. 
In refusing Peking's offers, Taiwan had to present proof to the 
international community that it was not an authoritarian dictator-
ship. It had to prove it had made significant progress toward estab-
lishing democracy and would continue to democratize in the future. 
In short, Taiwan had to present a case for nationhood based on de-
mocracy and self-determination in order to avoid being sacrificed. 
Washington and even Peking were watching world public opinion. 
Over the ensuing months leftist and anti-government groups or-
ganized and pushed for reforms that the government felt it could not 
make in the context of the threat of chaos domestically and an exter-
nal threat in the form of Peking's claims to use force to resolve the 
"Taiwan issue." Thus Taiwan's domestic political scene saw in-
creased public demand to change the political system through mass 
participation-accompanied by a polarization of attitudes in terms 
of how and of what speed to accomplish this. The process saw 
Taiwanese to a considerable extent lining up nominally against the 
government and Mainland Chinese supporting government policies 
that represented resistance to change. 
The crisis this caused is described in further detail in Chapter 5. 
It is, however, important to note here that both sides came to realize 
more clearly that Taiwan had a future only as an independent na-
tion. This meant that the government's official stance regarding one 
China had to be discarded-though this it was generally agreed 
should be done de facto, not de jure, and gradually, not formally in 
one step. In contrast, it also meant the realization by those opposed 
to the government's authoritarian practices, that political instability 
would constitute an opportunity, if not an invitation, for Peking to 
intervene and incorporate Taiwan and in the process destroy the 
progress already made in establishing a democratic system-not to 
mention economic progress and a vastly higher standard of living. 
Almost no one in Taiwan wished for this. 
Finally it meant the realization of all concerned that Taiwan 
had to continue to make an appeal to the U.S. and the world com-
munity for its right to survive. This translated into implementing 
democracy as quickly as possible without engendering political in-
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stability. It also dictated a foreign policy of making the Republic of 
China's autonomous status and its right to exist known to the global 
community. Indeed this has happened, though it has generally been 
subtle and gradual. The world community's call for democracy, per-
sonal freedoms and civil and human rights, while not heeded by the 
political elites of most developing countries, constitute continued 
pressure on Taiwan to democratize due to its need for global sympa-
thy and support relative to its survival. Taiwan's legitimacy as a 
nation-state will no doubt in future years continue to be challenged 
by the People's Republic of China and this will continue to be an 
impetus to make the system democratic and keep it that way-in 
order to present the argument that concerning Taiwan's sovereign 
status, the people should decide. 
40 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
CHAPTER 4 
ELECTIONS IN TAIWAN TO 1980 
In order to understand the rapid progress made in political de-
velopment in the Republic of China as a result of the national elec-
tion in 1980 and three local elections and another national election 
since then, it is necessary to first examine the elections prior to 1980 
and the progress made in political participation from 1950 to 1980. 
1980 witnessed marked, perhaps revolutionary, change in the open-
ness and style of campaigning and holding an election. In some 
ways, however, the new situation in electioneering in 1980 reflected 
years of gradual progress-a two steps forward, one step back, kind 
of development-prior to that date. 
Political participation in Taiwan including what political devel-
opment theorists call interest articulation and interest aggregation, 
has occurred in four major areas: local elections and local govern-
ment, national elections and the national government, membership 
and participation in decisions made in the Nationalist Party or 
KMT, and finally a political opposition in the form of independents 
of "dang wai" (outside the party) candidates. In other words, to 
assess the election of 1980 and where Taiwan is now going it is nec-
essary to give adequate credit to past political participation in Tai-
wan and the milieu in which political modernization transpired 
during several decades previous to 1980. 
Under Japanese rule no island-wide elective body was allowed 
in Taiwan, though in 1935-after several years of Taiwanese polit-
ical agitation--elected assemblies in prefectures, counties and towns 
were permitted. The democratic process, however, was very limited 
as several facts indicate: only half of the assembly delegates were 
elected; half were nominated (by the Japanese colonial administra-
tion); elections were arranged and overseen by the Japanese police 
establishment; and of the first group of 172 assembly representatives, 
109 were Japanese and only 63 were Taiwanese. 1 
More Taiwanese were elected in subsequent elections, but this 
did not represent significant progress in terms of political develop-
ment. At the close of World War II when defeat was certain, addi-
tional efforts were made by the Japanese to tum over political power 
to the Taiwanese; but generally this was improvisation, haphazard 
and too late. More than offsetting this in terms of political moderni-
zation of the democratic kind was the fact that the Japanese colonial 
l. Hyman Kublin, "Taiwan's Japanese Interlude, 1895-1945," in Sib (ed.), supra 
Chapter 2, note 9, p. 324. 
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government left in mass and with haste in the fall of 1945, creating a 
vacuum in terms of political authority and public administration. 
More than four hundred thousand Japanese departed-leaving a 
void in the areas of political leadership and administration, police 
control, economic management and social services.2 
To make matters worse, the government of the Republic of 
China, which inherited Taiwan as a result of the Cairo and Potsdam 
Declarations, was at war with the Communists from 1945 to 1949. 
This meant that problems in Taiwan were not given a high priority 
and little was done to avoid corruption and mismanagement when 
the political vacuum left by the Japanese evacuation was filled. Tai-
wan was also regarded by the Nationalist Chinese on the mainland 
as an area that should serve as a supply area in the war effort. (The 
Communist Chinese had no interest at all in Taiwan.3) Taiwanese 
were also viewed to some extent as collaborators because they had 
done little during the war to resist Japanese control. Thus from 1945 
to 1949 Taiwan was ruled to a considerable degree by and after the 
fashion of carpetbaggers. Democratization was given a low priority 
or no priority at all and political administration and economic con-
trol were handled very poorly.4 Finally, the governorship was given 
to an incompetent, cruel and selfish individual who had little con-
cern about the people he ruled and even less about building 
democracy. 
As a consequence of misrule and a faltering economy, riot 
broke out in February 1947 against the Nationalist-run government. 
Military forces suppressed the revolution, which resulted in the kill-
ing of ten to fifty thousand Taiwanese. This created a legacy of ha-
tred and distrust of the Nationalists by the local population which to 
some extent persists to this day. Political opposition, however, failed 
to form because of lack of training in politics under Japanese rule, 
no unity among the local population, the absence of Taiwanese with 
military training and the monopoly of the instruments of force held 
by the Nationalists.5 
In late 1949 when the Nationalists were defeated on the main-
land, they withdrew to Taiwan to regroup. The influx of over a mil-
2. Yung Wei, "Political Development in Taiwan: Reflections and Projections," in 
Yung-Huan Jo (ed.), Taiwan's Future (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1974), p. 13. 
3. Interestingly, at this time Mao and other communist leaders regarded Taiwan as 
a foreign country. 
4. For further details, see George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1965), esp. Chapters V. and VI. 
5. Ibid, p. 452. 
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lion people worsened the already deteriorating economic situation 
and caused additional problems of adjustment in terms of Main-
lander Chinese-Taiwanese relations. There was a shortage of hous-
ing, resulting in the military often times confiscating houses or land, 
squatters living where they could, and government officials buying 
property using force of duress or outright stealing it. Taiwanese 
were in other ways cheated and treated as second class citizens.6 
This situation, however, was offset to some extent by subsequent 
remedial or corrective actions. The governor of Taiwan, who had 
misruled the island up to 1947, was executed in 1951. The National-
ists had learned many lessons from their defeat on the mainland and 
were determined to reform. They were especially conscious of the 
need to build mass support for their policies. The departure of the 
Japanese and the fact that what Taiwanese leadership existed with 
political and administrative abilities, or even economic mismanage-
ment talent, was largely decimated in the February 1947 military 
suppression, meant that the administrative talent the Nationalists 
brought to Taiwan in 1949 was sorely needed. Finally, fortunately 
for everyone, only the most loyal and least corrupt of Nationalist 
officials went to Taiwan; most of the others stayed behind or went to 
Hong Kong or elsewhere.7 
For the paramount reason of trying to succeed after having lost 
the mainland as well as for two other important reasons-the fact 
that the Nationalists, especially through the Party, could serve as a 
broker or mediator (somewhat resembling the role of the magistrates 
in pre-revolution China) between local factions, and because of pres-
sure coming from the dependency relationship with the U.S.-the 
Nationalists made serious efforts to establish democratic institutions 
locally. Efforts went so far as to hold meaningful local elections al-
most immediately after their defeat on the mainland notwithstand-
ing the fact that these elections to some degree challenged the 
authority of the Nationalist Party and made the facade of democracy 
at the top appear hypocritical. 
Regarding the development of democratic institutions at this 
time two other important facts need be mentioned. First, Chinese 
have always regarded local government as more meaningful than the 
national or central government. The high level of political participa-
tion in local politics under the Japanese-higher than in national 
6. Ibid, Chapter IX. 
7. See Richard Walker, ''Taiwan's Movement in Political Modernity," in Sih (ed.), 
supra Chapter 2, note 9, pp. 362-68. 
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politics-reflected this fact. And this remained true after 1945. 
Thus, while the view is warranted that political development, espe-
cially the democratization process, has occurred in Taiwan from the 
bottom up, this should not be considered unusual. Furthermore, 
while local elections are never considered as important by Ameri-
cans and many other Westerners as national elections, the fact that 
local elections in Taiwan are considered important should not be 
considered something out of the ordinary. The same situation 
prevails in Japan and some other Western democracies. 
Second, while democracy was implemented earlier and more 
extensively in local politics than in national politics, many National-
ist officials viewed local politics as characterized by excessive corrup-
tion, infighting and undemocratic practices and have thus been 
appalled in more than just a self-righteous sense at the workings of 
local government. This is especially true when thinking in terms of 
how Sun Yat-sen had hoped Chinese democracy would develop. 8 
Hence, because democracy was already established in local govern-
ment to a considerable degree and because central government au-
thorities were not threatened (due to their important mediator role) 
and not embarrassed by it (since they perceived it as a poor represen-
tation of democracy in practice and felt they could ultimately do bet-
ter), meaningful local elections were held in 1950--just a year after 
the Nationalists fled to Taiwan.9 Local elections continued to be sig-
nificant and democratic, while playing an important role in the polit-
ical system. 
Besides overseeing democratic elections at the local level, the 
central government in two important respects adopted related poli-
cies which made political participation at the local level much more 
significant than they would have been otherwise. One of these was 
land reform. Already cited as one of the most successful land reform 
programs in history in terms of its administration and economic ef-
forts, Taiwan's land reform policies also made local democracy more 
meaningful inasmuch as it instilled the farmers with an interest in 
politics and a feeling of being able to control their future. It also 
removed them from the control of landlords and thereby made genu-
inely free voting possible. 
8. See Arthur J. Lerman, "National Elite and Local Politicians in Taiwan," Ameri-
can Political Science Review, Vol. 71, No.4 (December 1977), pp. 1406-22. 
9. In July 1950 the Nationalists supervised local elections in eight counties plus nine 
city mayorships and city councils for a total of 814 office holders. See Taiwan Kuangj"u 
Shih-nien (Ten years after Taiwan's restoration) (Taipei: Government Information Of-
fice, 1955). 
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Second, the national government took steps island-wide to es-
tablish various kinds of organizations-farmer, professional, wo-
men, social and others-which subsequently came to play an 
important role in local politics. Most of them remain active and be-
came important forces in the operation of local and national govern-
ment. These groups are especially important in election campaigns 
and have done much for the development of participatory democ-
racy in Taiwan. They also play a major role in what political devel-
opment theorists call interest articulation. These "interest groups" 
will be mentioned again in later chapters in connection to a similar 
role they play at the national level and as an institutionalized part of 
the election process. 
The 1950 elections included voting for Hsien (county) and City 
councils and for magistrates (county mayors) as well as city mayors 
in sixteen counties and five cities. Smaller townships (chen) and ad-
ministrative villages (hsiang) also elected representative councils and 
village or town chiefs. Campaigning was limited to ten days prior to 
the election and a number of other restrictions were placed on candi-
dates and campaign activities. In short the election was not as free 
and open as those in Western democracies. However, electioneering 
was spirited and participation widely based. Moreover, important 
precedents were set. Since the first election in 1950, local elections 
have been held with regularity and voter turnout has been high-
never less than 70 percent and in some cases more than 80 percent. 
(See Tables 3-1 and 3-2 for figures on the number of candidates, 
offices filled and voter turnout in local elections between 1950 and 
1980.) 
In December 1951 the first election was held for the Taiwan 
Provincial Assembly-constituting the first island-wide election ever 
held. This marked the beginning of self-rule for Taiwan, though, as 
we will see below, the Provincial Assembly has not gained much in 
political importance, particularly vis-a-vis the central government. 
On the other hand, central government authorities delegate decision 
making power to the Provincial Assembly and emulated it in various 
ways in terms of dealing with local issues (which in most respects are 
identical with national issues since the Republic of China has had no 
contact with much less exercising any control over the mainland). 
The 1951 provincial election too has been followed by regular elec-
tions and voter turnout has been consistently high-falling below 70 
percent only once while on one occasion exceeding 80 percent (see 
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Table 3-3). 10 In 1959 the Organic Law of the Taiwan Provincial 
Assembly formalized the election of assembly members for renewa-
ble terms for four years by direct popular vote. Provincial Assembly 
elections have been held regularly ever since. 
What is the importance of local government? The "govern-
ment" in Taiwan in the past was really only a number of diffused 
local governments. The island was never completely unified under 
early local aboriginal Taiwanese or Chinese (who came from the 
Mainland and ruled Taiwan after the fall of the Ming Dynasty in 
1644) control. The Japanese brought a feudal system of government 
when they ruled Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. Hence, the Taiwanese 
of the 1950s (and still to this date to a considerable extent) generally 
thought of local government as being important and affecting them 
on the individual as well as family level. They still regard their rela-
tionship with local politicians as a personal one and feel a strong 
sense of obligation to support their favorite candidate by voting. 
These same views have been transferred to national politics, though 
sentiments toward the central government and national elections 
tend to be less strong. This explains both the greater importance of 
local government and the higher voter turnout in local elections. 
Another factor explaining high voter turnout is the fact that 
when the Nationalist Chinese established political control over Tai-
wan they established a national identity card system giving every 
citizen a card he or she carries. This card is used as identification 
when voting and is marked to prevent one from voting twice. These 
marks are left on the identity card permanently. No marks connote 
a non-voter, and this is noticed by others later whenever he shows 
his identity card. This can be the cause for embarrassment since the 
majority of the population feels that voting is a duty. The govern-
ment, however, applies no coercion to vote. For the most part, vot-
ers go to the polls because of an interest in politics and a belief that 
they can contribute and make change happen. 
While the national government has used its authority to control 
or manipulate local political activities in a number of ways, the elec-
tions held in 1950 and 1951 were. on the whole considered generally 
fair by those who participated. They accurately reflected public con-
cern about important issues in local politics. They promoted polit-
ical participation and democracy. And this remained true of 
10. A number oi scholars believe the National Assembly elections were meaningful 
in creating the basis for expanded elections and democracy on Taiwan even though the 
body did not become politically powerful. See, e.g., Ramon H. Myers, ''The Contrast 
Between Two Chinese States," Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 4 (April 1983), p. 546. 
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subsequent local elections. Local elections also served as a means of 
selecting able personnel for important jobs and through this process 
deciding issues. The importance of local elections, including provin-
cial assembly elections, also stems from rapid growth of the duties 
and functions assumed by local government as the society bloomed 
and became more complex. This phenomenon is mirrored, for ex-
ample, in the magnitude of the increases in expenditures of local or-
gans of government. In 1950 the Taiwan provincial budget was U.S. 
$9.16 million; in 1959 it was U.S. $77.7 million; in 1972 it was U.S. 
$472.50 million. 11 
However, this is not to suggest that the Republic of China in the 
1950s was a true functional democracy because of democratic 
processes at the local level. The national government controlled lo-
cal democracy by making local government clearly subordinate to 
the national government. This, however, is characteristic of all uni-
tary systems of government. Authorities in the central government 
also maintained control through the Party, though this did not spe-
cifically impede the development of democratic practices except in 
the sense that no new parties were allowed, except the existing 
Young China Party and the China Democratic Socialists Party, so 
party competition was lacking. 
In still other ways, central government authorities impeded the 
growth of both local and national democracy. National government 
authorities maintained tight control over local elections through pre-
scribed election procedures and the timing of elections. They took 
special measures to prevent local politicians from becoming national 
figures. When this did occur the Party sought to bring them into the 
Party (and thus preempt them), or discredit them and limit their 
influence. 
Also National Assembly elections were not so meaningful, or 
were much less so than local government elections. Leadership posi-
tions in the National Assembly were generally appointed positions. 
As a result the National Assembly never evolved into an important 
institution in terms of either political power or representative democ-
racy. The same thing happened with the mayorships of Taipei and 
Kaohsiung after a non-Party politician Kao Yu-shu won the Taipei 
mayorship in 1964 as an independent, following a campaign which 
had anti-KMT overtones. 
The national government has exercised still other prerogatives 
II. Walker, "Taiwan's Movement into Political Modernity," in Sib (ed.), supra 
Chapter 2, note 9, pp. 362--{;8. 
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to ensure that local democracy does not produce leaders that can rise 
to the top too quickly. For example, central government officials 
often change the ground rules for electioneering immediately pre-
ceding an election. And as a rule all or most local elections are 
scheduled at the same time or within a short period of time so that 
local non-Party candidates cannot help each other or spread their 
influence or reputation outside of their own local area by getting in-
volved in other elections. 12 
On the other hand, Central government oversight has furthered 
the development of democracy by dampening tension in local poli-
tics resultant of strong factional tendencies that existed in Taiwanese 
communities. Similarly it encouraged compromise-a necessary in-
gredient of working democracy. And it alleviated corrupt practices. 
In fact, one might argue that centrifugal and factional tendencies 
might have gotten out of hand and destroyed the democratic system 
at the local level in Taiwan had it not been for the oversight role of 
the central government authorities. 13 This did happen in many de-
veloping countries at the time. 
In any case the point made earlier is especially salient: there 
was and still is much more political participation and democracy at 
the local level than in national politics. In fact, allowing a consider-
able amount of democratic political participation at the local level 
while patently not doing so in national politics has created a gap in 
the Republic of China's polity. Decision-making indeed suffers in a 
system wherein democratically chosen leaders cannot easily rise to 
the top and where there is considerable overlap in the levels of gov-
ernment (which at times is unclearly designated). The existence of a 
dual or two-tiered decision making process has also noticeably led to 
excessive red tape and greater cost in government. 
The gulf between local politics and the central government has 
given rise to still another problem. It has fostered controversy stem-
ming from the fact that the democratization of local politics seems to 
be leading to an independent Taiwan, while restricting the growth of 
democracy at the national level (which was justified by the return to 
the mainland policy and the claim to represent all of China) reflects 
12. Edwin Winchler, "Modernization and Participation in Taiwan," Reference Aid 
INR/REA, U.S. Department of State, October 1978. 
13. The intermediary role of KMT leaders has already been cited. For further infor-
mation on their role in encouraging political participation, see Yung Wei, "Political De-
velopment in the Republic of China on Taiwan," in Hungdah Chiu (ed.), China and the 
Taiwan Question (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 96-97. 
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quite a different perception of the future. And the two seem to be on 
a collision course. 
These problems, however, have to a considerable extent been 
minimized by a growing concern for efficiency in government in re-
cent years. Effective government has produced policies and person-
nel selection at the top that have worked to eliminate waste and red 
tape and bring local and national systems into harmony. So has the 
important national objective of promoting economic development. 
The lag in terms of participation at the national level is also compen-
sated for to some extent by the fact that a spirit of democracy has 
remained extant at the top in the form of the government's official 
ideology-Sun's Three Principles-even if it has not been imple-
mented to any meaningful extent and authoritarianism has generally 
characterized the decision-making process in the national 
government. 
Also it is important to note that important changes have tran-
spired in Taiwan in terms of the types of people running for local 
office since the 1950s. Educated professionals dominated local poli-
tics during the 1950s, giving way to local politicians in the 1960s, and 
young businessmen in the 1970s. The second decade of local politi-
cians tended to be realists and they learned how to live with the con-
tradictions or conflicts mentioned above. 14 The young businessmen 
who dominated local politics during the 1970s, or at least were at the 
forefront in terms of political change, formed a kind of opposition to 
the Kuomintang, yet retained respect for the national government 
based upon its successful engineering of economic growth. They 
also derived a . working relationship with the national government 
and an understanding of the rules that had to be observed and ac-
commodations that had to be made if further progress in competitive 
elections was to be possible. 
All of this is not to say that local elections during the period 
before 1980 were competitive and meaningful and the opposite was 
true of national elections. Some changes are observable in the years 
leading up to 1980 which suggest that at the national level democ-
racy was evolving and some permanent trends favoring mass polit-
ical participation and meaningful elections were developing. 
At the national level government officials holding elective office 
in 1950 consisted mainly of those who were elected when the Nation-
alist government controlled the mainland. Subsequently, and for a 
14. See Bruce Jacobs, "Recent Leadership and Political Trends in Taiwan," China 
Quarterly, No. 45 (January-March 1971), pp. 129-154. 
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host of reasons, very little new blood was added. The most frequent 
reason formally given was that a state of war existed between the 
Nationalists and the Communists. Therefore, like most political sys-
tems at war, emergency provisions were in force and democracy (in 
this case progress toward democracy) was put on hold. 
As time passed it became evident that a return to the mainland 
was unlikely if not impossible in the immediate future, if ever. Still 
the problem of Mainlander-Taiwanese antipathy and distrust and 
the fact that the Mainland Chinese minority controlled the central 
government made it necessary to maintain the return to the main-
land policy, the legal state of siege or emergency tied to that policy 
and martial law, lest democratization bring precipitous "Taiwaniza-
tion." This would have for all attempts and purposes destroyed the 
government and the Nationalist Party at the top. This, needless to 
say, would have led to serious instability if not a complete collapse 
of political authority. Thus policies which impeded participatory de-
mocracy made sense in terms of preserving domestic political stabil-
ity even though the return to the mainland theme which formally 
justified them had become a myth. 
However, some saw the situation quite differently. In fact, 
many observers perceived during the 1950s and 1960s a polarizing of 
Taiwan's politics on the issues of Taiwanese versus Mainland Chi-
nese political power and local versus national power. 15 In retrospect, 
the seriousness of these problems was exaggerated. By the late 
1970s, the question was not so much one of anticipating a govern-
ment run by Taiwanese at the top or more likely a jointly run gov-
ernment wherein Mainlander-Taiwanese differences are irrelevant, 
but rather one of asking when this would occur. Controversy over 
the timing of "Taiwanization," as already noted, was defused or re-
duced in importance by actions taken at the top, particularly by Chi-
ang Ching-kuo, to recruit Taiwanese into positions in the national 
government bureaucracy and the KMT. On the other hand, until 
1980 the progress in democratizing the national government through 
electing new representatives to the democratically elected organs of 
the national government (most of which would naturally be 
Taiwanese) was very slow. Taiwanese had for some time assumed 
non-elective and Party jobs at a rate equal to or exceeding their ratio 
of the population. But unti11969 there were no national elections to 
accomplish this same process in the National Assembly or the Legis-
15. See, e.g., Hung-mao Tien, "Taiwan in Transition: Prospects for Socio-Political 
Change," China Quarterly No. 64 (December 1975), pp. 615--M-4. 
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lative Yuan. And when elections were finally held they were for 
only a small portion of the seats in these two organs plus the Control 
Yuan. 
The need for a broad national election in which the number of 
seats up for election was increased was thus pressing. The gap be-
tween truly representative institutions at the local level and unrepre-
sentative institutions at the national level had indeed become a more 
serious problem. Pressure for greater political participation due to 
economic growth and its accompanying social change was also a fac-
tor. So was the U.S. Americans generally failed to notice democ-
racy at the local level in Taiwan; rather they noticed the absence of it 
at the national level (in part because of the greater importance of 
national elections in the U.S. and partly because the liberal press in 
the U.S. was generally antagonistic toward the Republic of China). 
There was still another important reason: the number of representa-
tives in these elective bodies began to decline due to old age and 
attrition and there was opposition to the illogical and undemocratic 
policy of simply appointing Mainland Chinese who ran for election 
in 1946 and lost as replacements. 16 There were also complaints re-
garding the fact that delegates to the "democratically" elected bodies 
were receiving rather substantial salaries for doing very little-in 
some cases little more than attending a meeting once every six years. 
Finally, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Kuomintang temporized by 
making only a small number of appointments to fill vacancies in the 
representative bodies of the national government leaving many va-
cancies. This had the effect of reducing the size of two major 
branches of government and the National Assembly to somewhere 
around one half of their size as provided by law in 1947. Thus by 
the late 1960s a kind of constitutional crisis existed. 17 
Rather than continue making appointments to solve the prob-
lem of attrition and in order to provide some semblance of political 
participation, supplementary elections were held in 1969. Fifteen 
new delegates representing Taiwan Province and the special munici-
pality ofTaipei were elected to the National Assembly, plus 11 to the 
Legislative Yuan and 2 to the Control Yuan. This was a beginning, 
though it was not very meaningful in terms of numbers since the 
16. Walker, supra note II, p. 374; Wei, "Political Development in the Republic of 
China on Taiwan," in Chiu (ed.), supra note 14, p. 99; Clough, supra Chapter 2, note 7, p. 
36. 
17. See Joyce K. Kallgren, "Nationalist China: Political Inflexibility and Economic 
Accomodation," Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. I (January 1964), pp. 639-40. 
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newly elected delegates comprised only about 1 percent, 3 percent, 
and 3 percent respectively of the three organs of government. 
The process was repeated in 1972 and again in 1975 for the Leg-
islative Yuan. In 1972, 53 new members were added to the National 
Assembly, 51 to the Legislative Yuan and 15 to the Control Yuan. 
In 1975, 52 more were added to the Legislative Yuan. The fact that 
the newly elected delegates were younger and more energetic, while 
many of the older members were incapable of debate and some did 
not even have the strength to attend meetings, tended to make these 
bodies both more representative and more democratic than the num-
bers of those elected to represent Taiwan province actually reflected. 
This was particularly true of the Legislative Yuan. Furthermore, al-
most all of the newly elected representatives were Taiwanese-87 
percent. This helped reduce the ethnic imbalance in these elective 
bodies. Meanwhile those elections made another positive contribu-
tion by raising the level of education in government: 50 percent of 
the newly elected were college graduates. 18 
The addition of new elective seats also had an impact in terms 
of convincing the populace of the sincerity of the democratization 
processes. This was noticeably reflected in voter turnout. In 1969 
voter turnout was 54.9 percent; in 1972 it was 68.35 percent and 
75.97 percent respectively. 19 
On the other hand, competition at the polls between the Party 
and independents was still limited due to the advantage the KMT 
had in recruiting and electioneering and restrictions on non-party 
candidates in the "Temporary Provisions." In 1972, 73 percent of 
the victors were KMT candidates. A similar situation obtained for 
the 1975 election of Legislative Yuan delegates. Hence, election 
competition still consisted largely in winning the Party's nomination 
after a fashion of one-party dominant states in the U.S. and in safe 
districts elsewhere in the U.S. and in other Western democracies. 
Change was clearly underway though its impact was not yet to be 
realized. 
Understanding the election process in Taiwan and the situation 
in 1980 when the first truly competitive national election was held 
also requires appreciating the role and the importance of the Nation-
alist Party or Kuomintang in both local and national politics. There 
18. For these and other statistics on Taiwan's elections see Annual Review of Govern· 
ment Administration-Republic of China, 1981-1982 (Taipei: Research, Development 
and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuan, 1983), pp. 23-28). 
19. Ibid, p. 24. 
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are two other legal political parties in the Republic of China, but, as 
already noted, they are small and generally unimportant. The KMT 
is essentially a monopoly or dominant party in a one-party system. 
As a consequence, important political decisions in many realms are 
made in the Party rather than during the convening of governmental 
bodies elected or other. Hence, political development is a realm 
where Party decisions and actions are very important. This is espe-
cially true of elections. 
The fact that the Party owns and operates the country's only 
new service, a major newspaper, the Broadcasting Corporation of 
China, the Central Motion Picture Corporation and has oversight 
and censorship powers over all forms of the media reflects the im-
portance and pervasiveness of the KMT in Taiwan's politics. It also 
runs the China Youth Corps and engages in various types of social 
work and assistance to the poor, disabled, unemployed and retired.20 
In short, the KMT has played an important role in promoting inter-
est aggregation and interest articulation-typical of political parties 
in one-party systems. Its future role in these realms is subject to 
question. 
The KMT has been and remains a broadly based, large mem-
bership party. In fact it became more a mass party in the 1960s. In 
1952, Party membership was 282,000. During the 1950s, in order to 
more firmly establish political control and integrate all citizens into 
the political system, the Party put a strong emphasis on recruiting. 
By 1963 the Party had 667,000 members-one in nine inhabitants of 
voting age. By 1976 the Party had 1,570,000 members or 20 percent 
of all inhabitants over 19 years of age and over one-third of all adult 
males. The Party was truly a mass party at this time and the system 
was clearly a one-party system.21 
The _KMT's strength in most elections in Taiwan during the 
1960s and 1970s was proportional to its size and the scope of its other 
political activities. Generally membership guaranteed a better than 
75 percent chance for a candidate to win in a local election. Accord-
ing to its own publications, Party candidates during the early 1960s 
elections won between 78 and 92 percent of elected positions con-
tested at both the local and nationallevels.22 Thus membership in 
the Party was desirable for anyone with political aspirations regard-
20. For a list of Party activities, see Republic of China: A Reference Book, supra 
Chapter 2, note 14, pp. 115-16. 
21. Walker, supra note II, p. 367. 
22. Clough, supra Chapter 2, note 7, p. 50. 
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less of the level of government and regardless of whether the candi-
date was Mainland Chinese or Taiwanese. 
Since the KMT was from its inception a mass party with a 
broad spectrum of mass support, it has long made special efforts to 
recruit Taiwanese members even though the Party was ruled from 
the top by Mainland Chinese in a traditional authoritarian fashion. 
There was reluctance on the part of the Taiwanese to join for that 
reason. However, recruitment of Taiwanese was successful even in 
the 1950s due to the Party's special role in the political process and 
the fact that most Taiwanese viewed the Party as one of the few ave-
nues to success in politics, or as an organization that would eventu-
ally be dominated by Taiwanese, or both. The process of recruiting 
Taiwanese (Mainland Chinese generally joined the Party without 
being recruited) was accelerated during the 1970s at Chiang Ching-
kuo's behest. At the lOth Party Congress in 1968, it was reported 
that Taiwanese membership was up more than 10.2 percent from the 
9th Congress held six years earlier. In 1972 paralleling the efforts by 
Chiang Ching-kuo to place more Taiwanese in high political posi-
tions, the Party's Central Committee elected Taiwanese to occupy 3 
of 16 top Party positions.23 By 1976 Taiwanese membership in the 
Party was 70 percent of the total membership and five Taiwanese 
were members of the Party's highest decision making organ, the 
Central Standing Committee.24 According to a recent Party publica-
tion, Taiwanese are still being recruited into the Party at a rate ex-
ceeding their proportion of the population and will soon be 
represented proportionally in the Party. 
The goals of the Party, as reflected in the Party platforms, have 
also shifted in ways that reflect greater concern with political devel-
opment and democratization. This is especially noticeable in the 
Party's deemphasis on counter-attacking the mainland and sponsor-
ing anti-Communist rallies commensurate with greater attention to 
local problems, welfare, poverty alleviation, or safety, crime, water 
control and other more immediate and practical problems. There 
has also occurred a decline in the military membership and influence 
in the Party as well as a decrease in the average age of Party mem-
bers. This indicates that the Party is trying to adapt to a new polit-
ical situation in Taiwan as well as to new international realities. It is 
now much more a party of Taiwan in terms both of representation 
and policies. 
23. Walker, supra note 11, p. 368. 
24. Clough, supra Chapter 2, note 7, p. 51. 
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Still, the Party faces some difficulties in terms of future political 
change and modernization. This is particularly true if the political 
system is to become truly competitive in terms of democratic elec-
tions. The Party is not used to competition; thus, there will be an 
adjustment crisis, if indeed this does not exist already. The fact that 
the KMT is identified with the government exacerbates the situation. 
As the system allows more open discussion and criticism the Party 
will likely be the brunt of considerable public derision regardless of 
its performance. In short, as political debate increases in Taiwan the 
Party's aloof position will be challenged. It will have to accept criti-
cism. It may need to shed some of its responsibilities that belong to 
the government. This will entail giving up some of its important 
means of political control. 
Second, the Party still suffers from being viewed as a party of 
Mainland Chinese. Most non-party or dang wai candidates have 
been Taiwanese. This is true and may be so in the foreseeable future 
in spite of the Party's continued success in recruiting Taiwanese. 
Third, the Party faces contradiction in appealing to intellectuals, 
and, hence, is and will probably continue to be the object of intellec-
tual sniping and criticism. This is so in spite of the fact that those 
with higher education generally tend to favor KMT nominees over 
independent candidates-true even of Taiwanese.25 Though per-
haps a contradiction, this seems to be the nature of politics in Tai-
wan, not unlike many other countries, where intellectuals as a group 
tend to be anti-establishment in terms of sentiment while still sup-
porting the government or majority party. 
Fourth, the Party has suffered in recent election contests where 
open campaigning was allowed because of its mass party nature. 
Even before 1980 a sizeable number of KMT candidates bolted the 
Party or did not receive Party nomination and decided to run any-
way. Smce 1980 this has become a problem that seriously concerns 
the Party leadership. The Party, due to its size and desire to main-
tain its mass party character, faces difficulties in imposing party dis-
cipline. Some of the Party's leaders, in fact, advocate Party elitism. 
However, to cut its ranks and membership will be a hard decision 
and one that contradicts many of the basic tenets of the Party's ideol-
ogy.26 It thus seems unlikely to happen. 
25. Yung Wei, supra note 2, p. 21. The author cites a survey done by Tien-chung 
Huang. 
26. In several recent interviews with high KMT officials, this was frequently cited as 
a dilemma or "sticky question" for the Party leadership. 
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Finally, one cannot fully understand the elections during the 
period before 1980 without some analysis of the development of 
non-Party forces and genuine competition in elections. This is par-
ticularly true if one assumes that participatory democracy depends 
upon party competition or something of the order of party competi-
tion in elections. It is also true if one assumes that during the 1980 
election non-party candidates behaved collectively as a political 
party and will ultimately become an alternative or competitor to the 
Kuomintang to the degree of creating a two-party or multiparty sys-
tem in Taiwan. 
As already noted, the KMT has controlled, regulated, manipu-
lated and dominated elections in Taiwan both at the local and na-
tional levels since 1950. Yet there were always independent 
candidates. The fact that the KMT did not completely prohibit com-
petition may be interpreted as tokenism. However, it may also be 
seen as reflecting the view that competition in elections must eventu-
ally be institutionalized for full democracy to be attained. Most Chi-
nese leaders, in fact, have accepted this premise, even if they have 
done little to realize it. Many are committed to it. 
Beginning in the early 1960s, there were some efforts made to 
establish a genuine opposition party based upon the presumed need 
for political change to keep pace with economic modernization. In 
September 1960, the editor of a local political magazine was arrested 
for attempting to form an opposition party-though this was not the 
official reason given for his arrest. The formal charge was not re-
porting a friend of his who supported Communism in Taiwan.27 
Many interpreted this as a signal by the government that political 
opposition could form, but that its demands must be restrained. 
Subsequently others made demands that the system be modernized 
by allowing for other political parties and true competition in elec-
tions. The government and the KMT in all cases rejected these bids, 
though in almost every case party competition per se was not made 
the issue. 
The 1970s saw the beginning of student activism in Taiwan par-
ticularly after April 1971 when a _large group of students protested 
the U.S. transfer of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Tiao-yii-
tai in Chinese) to Japan (along with Okinawa). These small islands 
had been used by Taiwanese fishermen and were territory over 
which Taipei felt it had legal territorial claim. Later student and 
intellectual debate, which had become more organized, turned to 
27. Yung Wei, supra note 2, p. 15. 
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other issues. After Taipei's expulsion from the United Nations in 
late 1971, it focused on Taiwan's status in the international commu-
nity and its status and future as an independent nation. 28 
Subsequently further losses on the diplomatic plane seriously 
undermined the position of those in the Kuomintang and in the gov-
ernment who resisted change, especially democratization of the 
political system. In fact, largely as a result of these diplomatic set-
backs and the public concern and organized protest that underscored 
the danger of not acting to win support from the international com-
munity for the Republic of China's nation-state status, the top Party 
leadership changed its position on the issue of expanded democrati-
zation of the political system through party competition. KMT lead-
ers also moved to make Party rules more democratic in order to 
dampen the demand for additional parties. It also began a recruit-
ment drive aimed at bringing more Taiwanese into the Party. 
After 1975, when Chiang Ching-kuo assumed the mantle of 
power following his father's death, the younger Chiang made public 
statements or promises to the effect that a real opposition would be 
allowed in future elections. In response, leading up to the November 
1977 local and provincial elections a number of activist politicians 
challenged the government and KMT to allow "genuine" (i.e., party-
style) competition in the election. In view of his campaign to get 
more Taiwanese into government and to present the image of de-
mocratization abroad, Chiang Ching-kuo had to concede.29 Perhaps 
this is what he wanted anyway. In any event the 1977 election wit-
nessed for the first time real competition between the KMT and non-
party candidates. 
The KMT fared quite well in this new environment, winning 16 
of 20 county (or hsien) executiveships, 43 of 45 seats on the Taipei 
city council, 56 of 69 seats on the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, 293 
of 363 borough and township executiveships and 711 of 928 seats on 
borough and township councils. On the other hand, its share of the 
popular vote dropped from 69.1 percent (in 1972) to 64.2 percent.30 
After the elections both sides seemed to have cause for rejoicing. 
The KMT won in spite of more open competition. It managed, in 
fact, to do better than during some so-called surprise elections dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s. Non-party politicians won some important 
28. Clough, supra Chapter 2, note 7, p. 64. 
29. See Hung-mao Tien, supra note 15, p. 619; Clough, supra Chapter 2, note 7, pp. 
65-66; Copper, supra Chapter 1, note 5. 
30. Winchler, supra note 12, p. 14. 
TAIWAN'S ELECTIONS 57 
seats and as a group won a bigger portion of the popular vote than 
had been the case for some time. 
However, the outbreak of riots in Chungli after a ballot marked 
for an opposition candidate was invalidated by election officials 
scarred the election. As it turned out, it appeared that the procedure 
was justified and that the election officials had been wrongfully con-
demned. The government subsequently showed leniency toward 
those who had violated criminal codes, and the case, while it at-
tracted international attention due to the outbreak of violence at the 
time, did not remain an issue of contention for long. Later the KMT 
demoted a high Party official responsible for the Taiwanization pro-
gram, making him a scapegoat for the problem. No actions were 
taken against candidates; nor was economic pressure applied against 
the businesses supporting the candidates that opposed the govern-
ment and in whose name the rioting took place. In short, future 
election competition was encouraged notwithstanding the one vio-
lent incident. 
Table 3-1 Elections of Hsien and City Councils 
Date Number of Candidates Number elected Voter Turnout 
July 1950 1,827 814 80.73% 
December 1952 1,620 860 79.72 
December 1954 1,437 928 78.88 
January 1958 1,453 1,025 78.31 
January 1961 1,467 929 73.83 
January 1964 1,563 907 76.76 
January 1968 1,054 847 78.02 
March 1974 1,480 850 73.30 
November 1977 1,081 857 80.47 
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Table 3-2 Elections of Magistrates and Mayors 
Date Number of Candidates Number elected Voter Turnout 
October 1950 90 21 79.61 
April 1954 38 21 74.25 
April 1957 40 21 78.20 
April 1960 35 21 72.49 
April 1964 47 21 69.05 
April 1968 43 21 74.26 
December 1972 39 20 70.31 
November 1977 36 20 80.39 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Interior of the Republic of China, 1982 (Ministry of 
Interior). 
Table 3-3 Elections of Taiwan Provincial Assembly 
Date Number of Candidates Number elected Voter Turnout 
November 1951 140 55 
April 1954 llO 57 74.40 
April 1957 118 66 78.20 
April 1960 126 73 72.52 
April 1963 137 74 69.26 
April 1968 129 71 74.28 
December 1972 121 73 70.33 
November 1977 125 77 80.40 
Source: Statistical Abstract of Interior of the Republic of China, 1982 (Ministry of 
Interior). 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE 1980 "WATERSHED" ELECTION 
Prior to 1969 there was no general election of delegates in any 
of the Republic of China's elective branches of government. Supple-
mental elections were held in 1973 and 1975, but these elections ad-
ded only a small number of representatives to the elected bodies of 
government. Nor were these elections very competitive: competi-
tion took place primarily within the KMT though a few independ-
ents ran. Hence, the first real case of party /non-party competition in 
elections in Taiwan occurred in local elections in 1977. However, 
neither this election nor any other prior to 1980 truly set a precedent 
for future elections or represented a transition to competitive party 
elections. 
The 1977 election was not a national election and too little was 
at stake. Furthermore, the violence that broke out in the city of 
Chungli during these elections caused many to perceive that elec-
tions could not be cited as proof of the compatibility of competitive 
campaigning and political development of a non-destabilizing na-
ture. In fact, during 1978 and 1979 there was strong opposition 
within the government and the KMT to increasing the number of 
seats contested in future elections or allowing candidates more lati-
tude to campaign. 1 
Despite this, the Republic of China's top leadership-Chiang 
Ching-kuo and his close associates-planned a national election for 
1978 that might have introduced competition into electoral politics 
in Taiwan at the national level. More seats in the elective bodies of 
the national government were to be filled by the electorate. Restric-
tions on campaigning were lifted. This might have been a watershed 
event in terms of creating mass participatory democracy in Taiwan. 
As it turned out, just days before the election President Carter an-
nounced that he had decided to derecognize the Republic of China 
and would transfer formal diplomatic ties to the People's Republic 
of China. The U.S. being Taipei's only military ally and the most 
important country with which it had diplomatic ties, the decision 
was a shock for Taipei. As a consequence the election was post-
poned indefinitely. 
Following the loss of formal ties with the U.S., "diehard" ele-
ments in the KMT and government strengthened their position as 
well as their resolve to suppress the movement supporting democra-
I. See J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwan 1979: 'Normalcy' After 'Normalization,'" Asian 
Survey, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January 1980), p. 85. 
60 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
tization at a more rapid pace, independent or non-party candidates 
and competitive elections. As a result, in the following months there 
occurred a wave of suppression of free publishing and free speech 
and a general clamp down on dissent that in any way challenged the 
government. In fact, anything that might be construed as a threat to 
the nation's security was seen with suspicion by the government, and 
for a time a significant portion of the population agreed. 2 
This situation, however, did not last long. Progressive elements 
fought back arguing that diplomatic defeat increased the need for 
genuine participatory democracy. Only in this way, they contended, 
could Taiwan impress other countries of the fact that it was truly a 
nation-state deserving to remain sovereign-not deserving to be sold 
out to the People's Republic (which had already made its intent 
known to incorporate Taiwan). Progressive forces similarly asserted 
that Taiwan must also push ahead with plans to democratize the sys-
tem in order to maintain a good image in the U.S.-a nation that 
still remained a friend despite establishing diplomatic relations with 
Peking.3 
In the spring of 1979 Congress passed the Taiwan Relations 
Act, which in essence gave Taiwan nation-state status under U.S. 
law. Of equal importance also was the fact that despite the breaking 
of diplomatic links, the U.S. did not sever trade and other ties, 
which, continued to grow. Thus, notwithstanding derecognition, the 
U.S. still held the key to Taiwan's security and to its future in gen-
eral. This was an argument in favor of the progressives who looked 
to the U.S. as a model for political development and democratiza-
tion. Moderate forces in the government and much of the popula-
tion were thus swayed by the progressives' admonitions. 
In the spring and summer of 1979, progressive forces once again 
began to organize. Now, however, for a variety of reasons, including 
the fact that it was perceived that the government's credibility had 
been utterly destroyed by U.S. derecognition and that the situation 
for Taiwan was desperate, the movement quickly escalated its de-
mands. Moreover, radical activists gained control over the progres-
sive movement-including some who were revolutionaries and who 
compared Taiwan's situation to Iran's. Opportunists also joined the 
2. See Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Taiwan's Future," Current History, Vol. 77, No. 449 
(September 1979), pp. 71-73, 83-84, for funher details regarding the difficulties caused to 
Taiwan by the U.S. decision to break diplomatic relations. 
3. See Hung-mao Tien, "Uncertain Future: Politics in Taiwan," in Roben B. 
Oxnam and Richard C. Bush (eds.), Cltina Briefing 1980 (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 
1980), pp. 87-94. 
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movement seeing a chance for themselves to gain political influence. 
Some with criminal records joined.4 
Government indecision on some major policy matters and a 
specific decision at the top to allow greater press freedom also stimu-
lated activism. Thus press control laws were relaxed, allowing oppo-
sition groups and even individuals to print and publish anti-
government statements which would not have heretofore been al-
lowed. Precisely why press freedom was expanded so much at this 
time is not known. Perhaps Chiang Ching-kuo felt that it was neces-
sary in order to fully assess the nation's predicament; perhaps he 
wanted to promote the kind of rapid political change that was neces-
sitated by events--especially elections and his "Taiwanization" pro-
gram. Or Chiang may have perceived that public debate on vital 
issues would help him outmaneuver Party hacks and government 
diehards who wanted a permanent crackdown on protest and censor-
ship of a genuinely regressive sort. In other words, compromise 
seems to have been difficult or impossible at this juncture and the 
President seems to have perceived that he had to ride out the storm.5 
During the summer and fall, progressive forces became more 
organized and politically even more active. As this happened right-
ist opposition made up in large part of veterans and veterans groups 
formed, resulting in several violent conflicts between "opposition" 
groups and "loyalists." Rightist forces were outnumbered; yet they 
were well organized and had the support of many government and 
KMT officials, including several police organizations. 
In December 1979, the conflict between progressives (joined by 
opportunist and criminal elements) and pro-government forces 
(joined by reactionary veterans and other rightist organizations) 
turned into violence during a mass demonstration commemorating 
Human Rights Day in the southern city of Kaohsiung. The demon-
strators, after being cordoned off from onlookers and surrounded by 
police who feared loss of crowd control, attacked the police. 
It is uncertain whether the demonstrators reacted in fright or 
according to plan. (The latter was the case according to those who 
later argued that the fact they carried clubs and other weapons in-
dicted them). There remain many unknowns about the incident. It 
is known, however, that local gangs infiltrated the ranks of the dem-
4. For further details, see John F. Copper, "Taiwan in 1980," supra Chapter 3, note 
20. 
5. See John F. Copper, "Taiwan's Recent Election: Progress Toward a Democratic 
System," Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 10 (October 1981), pp. 1032-33. 
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onstrators perhaps at the behest of the police (to make a police 
crackdown justified), or they acted on their own (in order to take 
revenge on police who had cracked down on gang activities and had 
displaced certain underground organizations). It is also certain that 
news of the incident reached President Chiang. Prior to the out-
break of violence he ordered detainees released (who had ostensibly 
been beaten while in police custody) and police restraint, probably 
against the wishes of local authorities. In any event a number of 
policemen (183 according to the official count, which was probably 
inaccurate or exaggerated because it included such things as 
scratches and broken fingernails) were injured. Only one demon-
strator was hurt.6 
Subsequently, government authorities arrested leaders of the 
Formosa Magazine group that had organized and led the demonstra-
tion. In the Spring open trials were held and eight defendants were 
given prison sentences ranging from 12 years to life. The defendants 
were allowed attorneys and the right to speak for themselves at the 
trial. The press, both foreign and local, was allowed to report freely 
on the trials. According to a number of foreign observers, the gov-
ernment didn't present a very convincing case on issues of demo-
cratic principles or political freedoms, or on issues that related to the 
future of the nation.7 
On the other hand, it was clear that the "Kaohsiung Incident" 
as it was now referred to, drastically altered public opinion regarding 
the progressives. Before the incident a large segment of the public 
sympathized with the anti-KMT, anti-government opposition at 
least in principle. In fact, it was widely perceived that the govern-
ment should not continue to regard itself as being beyond criticism 
and that some drastic steps needed to be taken to deal with Taiwan's 
eroding diplomatic isolation resulting from the loss of U.S. recogni-
tion. Most felt that one answer was a more democratic system which 
would justify support by the international community for Taiwan's 
continued autonomy and the Republic of China's sovereignty. 
However, after the "Kaohsiung Incident," public opinion 
turned against the demonstrators who were now seen as promoting 
6. See Copper, "Taiwan in 1980," supra Chapter 3, note 20 for further details. This 
was the account that was given in the foreign media at the time. 
7. This was true in part because several of the defendants were rather formidable 
intellectuals and were able to present a cogent case in defense of their actions. At the 
same time the government did not seem to be prepared or did not care to engage in 
debate on the moral and philosophical significance of the event. See Hung-mao Tien, 
supra note 3, p. 89 for further details. 
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violence which threatened economic development as well as the na-
tion's well being. In fact, the public's sudden change in attitudes 
surprised many foreign observers in Taiwan. However, this is easily 
explicable knowing that the Chinese view of violence differs consid-
erably from the Western perspective and that political stability is 
viewed by Chinese as a sine qua non of the nation's survival. This 
was compounded by a general feeling of insecurity in Taiwan re-
garding the nation's economic success, which had been attained so 
quickly. The populace generally espoused the view that Taiwan's 
economic "miracle" was fragile and it could be lost if care was not 
taken to preserve the conditions which contributed to it-including, 
and perhaps most important of all, political stability. It was also 
widely believed that the People's Republic of China would quickly 
exploit any problems on Taiwan and was looking for an excuse to 
intervene with military force-which, of course, to the population of 
Taiwan would mean an end to their international status not to men-
tion deprivation and the loss of political freedoms gained up to that 
point (which everyone knew far exceeded those provided by the gov-
ernment of the PRC).8 
By May, progressive forces in the government and opposition 
groups began to work on compromises and a modus vivendi. This 
took the form of writing new election laws. It also meant planning 
an election for the end of 1980. The mood was one of seriousness: 
the nation's future was at stake and agreements and understandings 
had to be hammered out. A democratic election had to be held and 
managed smoothly. 
New election laws had been debated in political circles and by 
scholars and the press for some time. Thus issues simply had to be 
prioritized and the debate organized. In early 1980 the government, 
calling on scholars and the populace to participate, sponsored special 
meetings and debates. Government officials took part, legal and 
constitutional scholars were invited from abroad, and the press was 
asked to report on the discussions in order to engage public partici-
pation. The final result, officially adopted on May 14, 1980, was the 
new "Public Officials Election and Recall Law."9 
The new set of regulations, or the new "Election and Recall 
8. See Harry Hsin-i Hsiao, "Political Development in Taiwan Since the Normaliza-
tion of the Sino-U.S. Relationship," in Hung-mao Tien (ed.), Mainland China, Taiwan 
and U.S. Policy(Cambridge, Ma.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain Publishers, Inc., 1983), 
p. 163. 
9. See The Public Officials Election and Recall Law, Republic of China (Taipei: 
Hwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1980), in the end of this book. 
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Law" as it was called, contained 113 articles, and was widely viewed 
as a market improvement over the previous existing set of election 
laws. This was particularly true in terms of making the system more 
democratic. The rights of candidates and restrictions on campaign-
ing were made clear and specific. The new set of laws provided for 
much greater freedom in campaigning and electioneering. On the 
other hand, the new laws did not contain provisions allowing for 
additional parties. This left the opposition with the choice of joining 
one of the already existing political parties, which to the overwhelm-
ing majority was not a real choice at all, or remaining a loosely or-
ganized group of independent or dang wai candidates, formally or 
officially not organized at all. Most opposition candidates accepted 
this as a "rule of the game," some noting that they could not com-
pete very well as an organized group anyway due to the vastly supe-
rior organizational and financial capabilities of the KMT, plus the 
fact that opposition politicians were not united. Opposition candi-
dates were, it should be noted, made up of various local factions 
which below the surface, and sometimes openly, disagreed ada-
mantly on many issues of importance. 
However, independent politicians found objectionable and 
openly criticized two provisions in the Election and Recall Law. 
These were: (1) a provision that specified that handbills and other 
written materials for dissemination during the campaign required a 
stamp bearing the printer's name and address, and (2) the fact that 
the campaign was divided into two parts: candidate-sponsored 
meetings and election commission-sponsored meetings with the lat-
ter occupying the last few days of the campaign. (As will be seen in 
subsequent pages steps have been taken to deal with these com-
plaints.)10 Some other provisions of the election law drew specific, 
though less animated, complaints. 
On the positive side, the election laws took the supervision of 
elections away from the government, placing it in the hands of a 
relatively independent Central Election Commission. Also since the 
election laws tightened procedures and proper conduct was defined 
much more clearly, there was less chance of the government, KMT, 
non-party candidates or anyone else committing irregularities. This 
meant less chance for election tampering, fewer opportunities for 
cheating by candidates and a generally improved voting process. 
In addition to the formal laws and regulations promulgated, 
there were also gentlemen's agreements or understandings reached 
10. See Chapter 7. 
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behind the scenes. In fact, these were as important or more impor-
tant than the formal election laws. These understandings consisted 
of promises by the non-party, opposition candidates not to advocate 
or support either Communism or the Taiwanese Independence 
Movement. Non-party candidates also agreed not to state that they 
were representing any of those prosecuted (and in jail) as a result of 
the Kaohsiung Incident. The government in tum promised that the 
opposition candidates could otherwise have complete freedom of ex-
pression. In fact, non-party candidates were guaranteed that the 
government would control, or, if need be, suppress veterans and 
other groups that might interfere with their activities. Taiwan's po-
lice organizations were ordered to protect and not in any way harass 
independent candidates. 11 
In short, before December 1980 the groundwork was laid for the 
most open, competitive and meaningful election in Taiwan's history. 
Legal and extralegal election procedures had been worked out. And 
an unprecedented number of seats in the elective bodies of govern-
ment were allocated to the territory under the control of the Repub-
lic of China. A total of 205 seats in the National Assembly, the 
Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan were to be filled by open 
competitive elections: 76, 97 and 32 positions respectively. The 
number of delegates to be elected to the National Assembly was five 
times the number elected in 1969 and approximately half again as 
many as elected in 1973. The number to be picked by the electorate 
to the Legislative Yuan was slightly less than double the number 
elected in 1973 and 1975. The number of seats to be contested for 
the Control Yuan was sixteen times that elected in 1969 and more 
than double the number elected in 1973. 
In assessing the significance of the number of seats put up for 
election, one must again consider the fact that many of the members 
of these bodies then serving were too old to actively participate in 
debate and their attendance rate was low. Furthermore, with the 
high rate of attrition due to death or serious illness, the elected can-
didates though still in a minority had the advantage of time on their 
side. This was, of course, offset to some extent by the fact that the 
Overseas Chinese (28 percent of Legislative Yuan and 17 percent of 
Control Yuan seats) "elected" some additional seats rather than the 
local population. The Kuomintang in reality picked "elected" repre-
sentatives of the overseas Chinese. Also, members of the Control 
Yuan were still elected indirectly, and the National Assembly re-
II. For details, see Copper, "Taiwan's Recent Election," supra note 5, p. 1035. 
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mained in most respects a less than dynamic decision-making body 
in terms of wielding political power. 
The campaign took place in an exhilarating atmosphere. The 
KMT claimed to represent policies of successful economic growth, 
material benefits and a safe, secure and peaceful society. The KMT 
also took credit, generally justifiably, for social welfare and pro-
grams for the poor, better housing, health insurance and unemploy-
ment benefits-issues which independents and dang wai candidates 
also made campaign issues. 12 
While the opposition was not unified, either formally (since that 
was illegal) or in spirit (due to factionalism), they generally agreed 
on enough issues to write a dang wai candidate platform. This plat-
form included the following demands or suggestions: (1) more seats 
in the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan 
should be placed up for election; (2) popular elections should be held 
for the governor of Taiwan province, and the mayorships of Taipei 
and Kaohsiung; (3) more Taiwanese should be appointed to govern-
ment positions; (4) new political parties should be allowed to form; 
(5) the scope of freedom of press, speech, assembly, etc. should be 
broadened; (6) campaigning for elections should be less restricted; 
(7) the "Temporary Provisions" and particularly the provisions for 
martial law contained therein should be abolished; (8) earlier polit-
ical trials should be reviewed and most or all political prisoners re-
leased; (9) the KMT should relinquish many of the powers and 
prerogatives that in other political systems belong to the government 
and not to a political party. 13 
During the campaign some dang wai candidates vociferously as-
sailed the government and KMT on issues such as bribery, graft, 
corruption and special privileges. Many chided the establishment 
for allowing overpaid, senile delegates to hold positions in important 
elected bodies of the government. Some even compared the KMT to 
the Chinese Communist Party and complained of the Republic of 
China's human rights record as well as the human rights records of 
12. Dang wai candidates generally advocated more social programs, welfare and 
higher taxation, especially of higher incomes. This had less voter appeal than was 
thought apparently for two reasons: it contradicted the dang wai candidates view that the 
government already interfered in individual activities too much and the government had 
already instituted a host of welfare programs while a shortage of labor had a strong 
income leveling impact. 
13. See various issues of Po-shih Nien-tai (The Eighties), published by dang wai 
leader Kang Ning-hsiang. Cj, Jurgen Domes, "Political Differentiation in Taiwan: 
Group Formation within the Ruling Party and the Opposition Circles, 1979-1980," Asian 
Survey, Vol. 21, No. 10 (October 1981), p. 1017. 
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nations with which Taipei had diplomatic recognition. 14 Many as-
sailed the government for an ineffective foreign policy, mentioning 
specifically the loss of diplomatic ties and the new unofficial relation-
ship with the United States. 
Local citizens were literally flabbergasted at the candidness and 
vitriolic statements made during the campaign. In fact, during the 
several weeks before the election there were numerous citizen com-
plaints, both from opponents and supporters of the independent can-
didates, asking why the police were not arresting the most 
provocative candidates for threatening public order. Some observers 
predicted that unrestrained campaign activities would lead to anar-
chy. Others expressed delight at what they described as a free-for-all 
campaign and the sudden democratization of the political process. 
Observers could notice citizens attending political rallies spon-
sored by the most extreme candidates often looking behind them and 
to the side expecting the police to close in at any moment to stop the 
speeches. But this didn't happen. Many wondered why veterans or 
other right wing groups did not try to break up public gatherings or 
speeches given by the most outspoken, anti-government candi-
dates. 15 The answer to both questions, of course, was that under-
standings had been reached among the competitors and they were 
generally kept. 
Some dang wai candidates complained that police were harass-
ing them, but in almost every case it was apparent that if the police 
were intent upon obstructing their campaign or preventing them 
from saying what they were saying, they would have been silenced 
or dragged off to jail before the campaign activities reached the tense 
pitch that they did. Hence, few believed charges of police interfer-
ence or harrassment; most often they were seen as an effort by dang 
wai candidates to win sympathy from the masses and condemn the 
government. 
A number of independent and dang wai candidates made issue 
of the unfairness of the nation's capitalist system. They immediately 
discovered, however, that this was not an issue that had a base of 
support. There was no public interest in changing the economic sys-
14. These charges were made in public speeches and on posters at various campaign 
headquarters. The most noticeable were at the campaign headquarters of dang wai can-
didate Huang Tien-fu on a main street in Taipei and an area frequented by foreign 
tourists. 
15. This observation is based upon interviews in Taipei and several other cities in 
Taiwan at the time. Most people obviously did not know about the compromises and 
gentleman's agreement made between the government and the dang wai. 
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tern. Moreover, a number of noted scholars offered quantitative, 
empirical evidence in rebuttal, showing that Taiwan's economic 
growth had provided a more equitable distribution of incomes and 
material goods than most Western countries. 
Opposition candidates also tried to make political capital of 
Taiwan's serious environmental problems. The electorate generally 
regarded the issue of environmental destruction as a problem; but it 
was not one that generated much excitement. The large majority of 
the population felt that economic growth was more important, at 
least for the moment, than environmental concerns, or that the gov-
ernment was doing all it could to deal with the most serious 
problems-air and water pollution. Some dang wai candidates also 
condemned the use of nuclear energy; but they found few listeners. 
The same was true for the critics of high defense expenditures. Most 
of the population perceived that a strong defense was necessary to 
protect Taiwan from external threat. The People's Republic of 
China had in recent months provided grist for this argument in the 
form of threats to use force to "bring Taiwan back into the fold." 
The KMT officially entered only 42 candidates for the National 
Assembly contest and 38 for the Legislative Yuan competition. 
Since 402 candidates ran in total (5 were disqualified), independents 
(some of which were former KMT members) dang wai candidates 
were given a good opportunity for victory in terms of numbers of 
candidates fielded. On the other hand, the large number of candi-
dates-while it reflected a greater interest in the election and a genu-
ine feeling of competition-meant that the average number of 
candidates per seat was larger: 2.76 as opposed to 1.48 for the by-
election held in 1972 and an average of 1.77 for seven elections for 
the Taiwan Provincial Assembly held between 1954 and 1977. This 
meant that good organization was more crucial to victory than in 
previous elections. 
The election took place with no serious irregularities or even 
credible accusations of rigging, stuffing ballot boxes, or intimidation. 
Election officials made greater efforts than usual to be certain that no 
one voted twice and that no ballots had to be invalidated unless the 
voter wanted to cast a blank or protest vote. Ballot boxes were trans-
lucent and vote counting was done in the eyes of the public. Final 
tallying was done on television, with local figures telephoned in by 
each precinct. 
Voter turnout was somewhat less than in previous elections due 
to the bad weather on voting day. 66.43 percent cast ballots for dele-
gates to the National Assembly; 66.36 voted for Legislative Yuan 
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representatives. Voter turnout was lowest in Taipei and below aver-
age in other large cities; it was higher on the offshore islands. In 
terms of voting groups of blocs, professional and women's associa-
tions recorded the highest turnout: over 77 percent. 16 
Deciding the victor after the election was difficult. The KMT 
won 63 of76 seats in the National Assembly contest for a score of82 
percent of the seats up for election. This, of course, was facilitated 
by Overseas Chinese and organizational voting which gave over-
whelming support to the KMT. In the Legislative Yuan competi-
tion, the KMT won 56 of 70 seats giving them 80 percent victory 
margin. 
Though dang wai candidates did not make a good showing in 
terms of the percentage of their candidates winning, they could still 
boast of victory for several reasons. First, several dang wai candi-
dates were among the biggest victors in terms of the number of votes 
won by a single candidate. Moreover, some of these were the most 
controversial and the most critical of the govemment. 17 Also dang 
wai candidates did better than in previous elections, thereby demon-
strating a favorable trend. Similarly, of considerable significance 
when projecting ahead, was the fact that a number of KMT candi-
dates bolted the Party and joined the ranks of the independents. 
This had the effect of weakening KMT party discipline. Finally, the 
public generally seemed sympathetic toward dang wai candidates 
and their platform and did not negatively associate them to the de-
gree of just a few months before with the violence of the "Kaohsiung 
Incident." 
KMT officials were generally delighted with the election results 
in spite of dang wai candidates' claim of victory and what from an 
objective point of view seems to have been an election where there 
was no overall winner. The KMT did well in Taipei and other large 
cities, giving evidence that the rural-urban shift, which some sociolo-
gists had argued was hurting the Party's base of support, was not a 
factor working against the Party. Social alienation as a result of ur-
banization and a rising material culture was not a serious problem. 
Nor did the KMT suffer from lack of unity in the context of new 
planks in the party platform. Most important, the Party fared well in 
spite of the unusual freedom allowed during the campaigning and 
16. Annual Review of Government Administration, Republic of China, 1981-82, supra 
Chapter 4, note 19, p. 24. 
17. In fact, a number of those connected with the "Kaoshiung Incident" in 1979 were 
elected including relatives. 
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what amounted to permitting party-type organization on the part of 
dang wai candidates. 
Another factor of great significance was that some of the most 
anti-KMT opposition candidates were repudiated by the electorate. 
So were some of the dang wals most important campaign issues. 
Lastly, the KMT ran with a majority of Taiwanese candidates; this 
gave the impression (though this was challenged by the dang waithat 
was almost exclusively Taiwanese) of successfully bridging the gap 
between Taiwanese and Mainlander while changing the Party's im-
age of being Mainland Chinese-dominated. 18 
Generally the election was a credit to the nation's political de-
velopment and to an informed and enlightened electorate. Most of 
the victorious candidates, whether KMT or dang wai, were 
Taiwanese-thereby further rectifying the Taiwanese-Mainlander 
imbalance in elected government organs. The level of education of 
candidates was high: Of candidates winning seats in the National 
Assembly four held Ph.D. degrees, six M.A. degrees and 45 B.A. de-
grees; in the case of the Legislative Yuan the figures for academic 
degrees was eight, nine and forty-two respectively. This upgraded 
considerably the level of education of these two bodies. The age of 
victorious candidates was also low: an average of 45 for the Na-
tional Assembly and 44 for the Legislative Yuan. 19 
Most winning candidates were businessmen, who, according to 
some observers, would guarantee continued close ties between gov-
ernment and the business community and ensure continuity in do-
mestic policies. It may also facilitate stability in politics in general 
since businessmen were generally winners in local elections during 
the 1970s and appear to be the group most interested in politics and 
most capable of providing the type of leadership needed by the na-
tion. On the other hand, a less pro-business viewpoint is apparent 
among victorious dang wai candidates, signifying to some extent a 
new, and perhaps growing, concern with social welfare, workers' 
rights and environmental problems. 
Ideologues fared poorly in the election. Many candidates 
deemphasized their ideological views-especially if strong, or if 
identified with a specific ideological stand. Most who campaigned 
on a platform of ideology lost. A number of candidates employed 
sensationalist techniques in their campaign, several hiring movie 
stars and other celebrities. These candidates were not very success-
18. Over 90 percent of the KMT candidates in this election were Taiwanese. 
19. "KMT Wins Elections," China Post (Taipei), December 8, 1980, p. l. 
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ful. A sizeable portion of candidates followed public opinion polls 
in building their platforms, or simply took a stand on many issues 
that seemed to be favored by the electorate. Others took an extrem-
ist or critical stand on some issues, in many cases even when it was 
obvious that if victorious they would not be able to rectify the 
problems discussed~r at least do so quickly or alone. The electo-
rate was generally skeptical of both these categories of candidates, 
thereby proving these tactics to be less than effective.20 
In terms of less positive trends, those with money, and particu-
larly those willing to spend high sums in the campaign, were gener-
ally winners. The average candidate spent around U.S. $500,000 
during the campaign.2 1 Personal fortunes in many cases were used, 
but many candidates made promises of favors to contributors if 
elected. The problem of "money politics" will be discussed again in 
later chapters. Needless to say it is a rapidly emerging problem. 
Those with personality and charisma fared better in the elec-
tion, though this had to be combined with local support and influ-
ence for it to be meaningful. Oratory ability and good looks helped 
candidates, but obviously less so than in most Western elections; in 
fact, some candidates made no public speeches, having others give 
speeches on their behalf, and still won. 
Education was a qualification to boast about-in fact, very 
much so. It was a factor of considerably more importance than in 
past elections or in elections in Western democracies. Experience 
was also valuable, but it counted no more and probably about the 
same as in elections in Western countries. A high level of loyalty 
toward the constituency was considered important by voters, as was 
an ability on the part of the candidate to maneuver effectively in 
politics so as to influence law making and other decisions to the ben-
efit of his or her constituency. 
When the election was over, government officials moved 
quickly to remove campaign posters, close candidates' headquarters 
and end the "political holiday." On the other hand, the end of the 
campaign did not mean that no new precedents had been set or that 
the degree of freedom to criticize the government witnessed during 
the election was nothing more than a temporary phenomenon. Nor 
did it mean that in future elections the same openness and competi-
tiveness would not prevail. In fact, while things seemed to return to 
20. For further details, see Copper, ''Taiwan's Recent Elections," supra note 5, p. 
1037. 
21. Ibid. 
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normal in terms of excitement and intense public debate, there were 
certainly no warnings or repression carried out to make sure that 
progressive politicians and the public understood that the "holiday" 
had ended. On the contrary the public was to some extent enervated 
by the election "ordeal" and wished to return to pre-election quiet 
and calm. Clearly, in terms of competitive elections, a foundation 
was built. In short, the 1980 precedent-setting election appeared to 
mark a transition from what theorists would call an authoritarian-
technocrat system to a democratic-development one. 
The impact of the December 1980 election upon the political 
process can (and this will be discussed in great detail in the next 
chapter) also be illuminted by examining how it affected subsequent 
elections and by putting this and subsequent elections in the perspec-
tive of democratization and political development (as will be done in 
Chapter 7). First, however, it is necessary to look at the political 
issues in Taiwan that survived this momentous election and the im-
mediate implications of the 1980 election. 
It is clear that although dang wai candidates generally stressed 
the issues mentioned earlier as constituting the dang wai candidates' 
program, there was a great deal of difference in terms of the empha-
sis given to each tenet of the so-called "platform." Many candidates 
failed to mention some of them. Others emphasized only one or two. 
Obviously not all tenets of the "platform" were as popular with the 
public as most dang wai candidates assumed or an objective observer 
might think when reading the list of issues. It is also apparent that 
beneath the superficialities, the dang waiproposals in many ways dif-
fered very little from the KMT platform, or at least as the latter was 
emphasized by most KMT candidates. 
Generally, there was little public support for abandoning the 
''Temporary Provisions" and getting rid of martial law. Although 
this appears to be more clear after subsequent elections, candidates 
who stressed opposition to either in their speeches received acclaim 
from only a small portion of the electorate and in only a few cases 
did it help their campaign. The same is true of the proposals to re-
view the cases of political prisoners and give greater attention to 
human rights concerns. The reasons these issues were not as popular 
as dang wai candidates anticipated is that they contradicted the pub-
lic's strong concern about maintaining public security and social and 
political stability. It also seems that in the minds of the voters asso-
ciated these issues with excessive Westernization, an increase in 
crime and other social problems, and the government overly heeding 
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the advice of foreigners. 22 In short, a feeling of nationalism con-
flicted with these issues. 
While it seems clear that there was deep concern for reforming 
the political system, public support for this was generally limited to 
democratic reforms promised by the government within the rubric of 
the Constitution and Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People (al-
though as earlier stated ideology itself was not a popular issue), 
rather than any Western model of solution. In other words, public 
seemed to support rather sweeping improvements in the political sys-
tem, yet also saw this as conflicting with stability; this indeed was a 
dilemma or contradiction for the voters. 
Also, albeit the loss of diplomatic ties with the U.S. which fol-
lowed a long series of diplomatic defeats from 1969 to 1978, seemed 
to precipitate demands for change, no foreign policy issue was im-
portant during the election. In fact, it was quite apparent that for-
eign policy played only a small role in influencing either candidates 
or voters. Relations with other nations were mentioned only infre-
quently by candidates and seemed not to be an issue area to use to 
get voter attention. However, one exception may be cited. If the 
issue of "Taiwanizing" the government can be seen as a foreign pol-
icy issue, then foreign policy was important. Obviously the electo-
rate wanted a government that concerned itself with Taiwan's 
problems and opposed perpetuating the myth of ruling all of China. 
If one translates this into a two-China or a one Taiwan, one China 
policy, or separatism, then that was one foreign policy issue that was 
of concern. 
In the domestic arena the public displayed strong support for a 
free market economy and capitalism. Some dang wai candidates ad-
vocated socialism or socialist-like programs; this attracted little sym-
pathy. In fact, it alienated a large number of voters. It might have 
been a different case had not the government during the several 
years prior to the election expended considerable effort in the realms 
of health insurance, low cost loans for workers to buy houses and 
apartments, unemployment benefits, and job safety. The electorate 
seemed to perceive that sufficient progress had been or was being 
made in these areas. 
The same was also true of environmental problems, even 
22. There was a fairly widespread perception that the election was being held in large 
part for the benefit of the United States. This author was in Taiwan at the time and 
perceived that a fairly sizeable number of people resented this, although they did agree 
with the other reasons for the election. 
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though to the objective viewer they were quickly becoming critical. 
.Dang wai candidates were not able to make much of ecological con-
cerns, probably because they did not try hard enough and/or be-
cause economic growth was considered a higher priority by most 
voters. Both the KMT and the dang wai candidates can be faulted 
for not taking up an issue that should have been of considerable con-
cern. The same may be said of sanitation, flooding (including sew-
ers) and traffic problems. All of these things were of concern to the 
voter-but apparently not enough. And because of the newness of 
this kind of election the focus of attention was on other issues of 
immediate concern. 
Overall, dang wai candidates seemed to have made a good start 
in terms of assuming a new role in Taiwan's politics and in making 
the system a competitive one in terms of party versus non-party in 
electioneering. On the other hand, because a cohesive platform did 
not emerge from the campaigning of the dang wai candidates, future 
competition in terms of special issues that can be identified with one 
side or the other remained uncertain. This may be attributed to the 
fact that it was the first real experience in a competitive, open na-
tional election for the dang wai candidates and because they empha-
sized too many issues that were not as important as they thought. 
Alternatively dang wai candidates were too limited to local influence 
by virtue of the rules of the system. In the wake of the 1980 election 
it was clearly too early to predict how these questions would be dealt 
with. 
On the other hand, it appeared that the KMT also faced some 
fundamental problems which it showed no signs of dealing with ef-
fectively. One basic question related to the role of the KMT as a 
mass party. Should it continue to be a large party? The disadvan-
tage, namely that party discipline is difficult to impose, was very ap-
parent in this election. The inability to keep party discipline means 
that the Party has to contend with a problem of members who run 
for office without Party approval. In the 1980 election a significant 
number did this and a large enough number won to make this prob-
lem of concern. At the time, in fact, this portended to be a serious 
problem in the future. 23 
Another problem for the Kuomintang was that it is associated 
in the minds of the voters with the government to the extent that 
most errors made by the government, unpopular decisions and 
23. This view was expressed by a number of KMT leaders at this time, sometimes in 
public. 
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problems associated with red tape and bureaucracy are blamed on 
the KMT. In contrast, the Party does not generally get credit by 
association for government policies that are successful or beneficial 
to the public. This seems to be a factor of political behavior in the 
Republic of China that is not unlike most Western democracies: the 
political culture discriminates against the party in power. What, if 
anything, can be done to change this is uncertain. In anticipating 
future elections in 1980 it was a dilemma for KMT leaders. 
Sociologists and political analysts have predicted the problem of 
the Party losing support in the cities for some time and voting trends 
in earlier elections seemed to support this point. However, the Party 
dealt effectively with the problem in this election through good or-
ganization. It may be that the cynicism expressed toward KMT poli-
cies in the past, and which was the basis of predicting Party 
problems in the big cities, in addition, of course to the large number 
of younger and more restless voters, will be equally a problem for 
dang wai candidates as they organize into a kind of unofficial or 
pseudo party. Frequently during the 1980 campaign Taipei voters 
openly expressed disbelief that dang wai candidates would pretend 
they could solve problems when in office when, in fact, they would 
have no such authority or power over such issues. They also criti-
cized many who exaggerated their ability to change the system. In 
fact, some candidates made promises and statements which Taipei 
voters and the press immediately labelled ridiculous. 
One final observation: the two other legal parties fared very 
poorly in the 1980 election, particularly if one held any expectation 
that they would gain strength and win significant voter support 
thereby giving rise to a competitive party system without changing 
or circumventing the Temporary Provisions. Thus the 1980 election 
suggested that if independent or dang wai candidates were to con-
sider the alternative of joining one of the two smaller parties they 
should abandon this hope. Likewise, if one thought the dang wai 
people as a group might consider joining en masse one of the two 
small but legal parties, the prospects seemed very dim. 
More can be understood about the 1980 election and its impact 
on the political system by examining the subsequent elections. Since 
this was Taiwan's first truly open and competitive national election, 
subsequent elections reveal the importance of the precedents set and 
how established they are. They will also tell us how well the election 
process overall is working, particularly in terms of bridging the gap 
between local and national elections, and what role both will play in 
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the continued process of political development in the Republic of 
China. 
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CHAPTER 6 
"LOCAL" ELECTIONS DURING 1981 AND 1982 
From the national election of December 1980 up to the Fall of 
1983, there were three "local" elections in Taiwan. On November 
14, 1981 elections were held for seats on the Taiwan Provincial As-
sembly, the Taipei and Kaohsiung City Councils, County Magis-
trates and Mayors of cities under the jurisdiction of Taiwan 
Province. On January 16, 1982 elections filled positions on the 
county assemblies, city council members of cities under the jurisdic-
tion of Taiwan Province, town and village executiveships and may-
ors of cities under the jurisdiction of respective counties. On June 
12, 1982 elections were convened to pick town and village council 
members. 
Events prior to and during all three of these elections, especially 
the competitive, democratic spirit demonstrated during the 
campaigning, suggest that the progress made toward participatory 
democracy in the 1980 election was sustained. In short, local elec-
tions over the next two years continued the strides made toward 
competitive elections and citizen participation in picking govern-
ment officials up to 1980 and during the national elections that year 
-thereby refuting the notion that 1980 had been simply an "election 
holiday." In fact, the events of the three elections that will be as-
sessed in this chapter offer further proof that competitive democracy 
has been institutionalized in the Republic of China-though there 
were irregularities that were and remain of concern and the party 
system in Taiwan is still no doubt subject to considerable evolution-
ary change. More time and additional elections will be needed to 
say conclusively that democracy has its roots firmly planted. But, so 
far the evidence suggests that democratic processes are being regu-
larized in Taiwan and a democratic system is quietly but quickly 
evolving. 
Of the three elections mentioned above, the November 1981 
election was by far the most important. This election was provincial 
(in a sense national since it was nationwide) in scope, while the 
others were purely local elections. Each election will be examined in 
greater depth before some final conclusions are made at the end of 
the chapter that will relate the election process to political develop-
ment during this period. 
The November 1981 election was of special importance for sev-
eral reasons. First, it was the first election following the national 
election in 1980 and there were questions in the mind of both central 
government officials and the general public whether elections of the 
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1980 sort should or would be held again. Second, local elections are 
in fact national if Taiwan and the Offshore Islands are considered 
geographically synonymous with the Republic of China and in the 
sense that the Taiwan Provincial Assembly represents the entire pop-
ulation of the country. Hence this election may be regarded as a 
national election of sorts. Third, rather than just a portion of the 
seats in representative bodies being up for election, as was the case in 
the 1980 national election, the entire Provincial Assembly had to 
stand before the people. Fourth, the county magistrates and to a 
lesser extent the city councils and mayors elected are important offi-
cials that possess executive power in the areas where they preside. 
(The magistrates are the most important officials picked in any local 
election.) Fifth, many of the officials chosen in this election-and 
this is particularly true of the members elected to the Provincial As-
sembly and the magistrates-will bid for higher office later. They 
are the politicians of the future. Sixth, the officials chosen in this 
election have considerable power over budget and administrative 
matters. How effective they are in office is of great importance to the 
effective operation of the government of the Republic of China. 
As already noted, this election must be considered of impor-
tance because of its timing-following the precedent setting 1980 na-
tional election. After the election of 1980 there was considerable 
apprehension on the part of central government officials regarding 
future elections and the relationship between local and central gov-
ernments. In other words, top officials in the central government 
and the Nationalist Party expressed concern that democracy at the 
top was following the pattern of local democracy and that the central 
government's ability to lead and to give direction to political change 
was in doubt. Mostly, conservative KMT members and central offi-
cials raised this question; however, it was also an issue that was on 
the minds of other leaders at the top at this time. 
Given the fact that violence marred the last election of repre-
sentatives to the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and city magistrates 
(during the magistrate election in Chungli) and this was still on the 
minds of many, there was fairly widespread apprehension about this 
election, caused simply by the reminder of the last province-wide 
election. Another question was the expectation that the nation's 
Election and Recall Law would be violated; it had been in 1980 
though not very seriously. Would more serious violations occur? Fi-
nally, and perhaps more important, would dang wai candidates or-
ganize and behave like a political party? If they did, what about the 
violation of the ''Temporary Provisions" and the Election and Recall 
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Law? This was a major question that arose during the 1980 election 
and was not resolved. 
Regarding the last problem, dang wai candidates in the months 
and weeks preceding the November 1981 election set up various 
campaign organizations, and, in fact, behaved as a political party. In 
every election district dang wai candidates established consultation 
and recommendation committees to nominate candidates in a man-
ner very similar to that employed by the KMT. 1 A number of dang 
wai members of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly 
participated, thereby forming a leadership core of the dang wai poli-
ticians. Kang Ning-hsiang, the generally recognized leader of dang 
wai politicians, even held a meeting to pick official or "mainstream" 
dang wai candidates prior to the election.2 On the other hand, dang 
wai politicians were also cautious not to provoke central government 
officials or the Nationalist Party by so organizing. They took pains 
to stress the informal, ad hoc nature of their meetings. They also 
avoided adopting, or at least widely publicizing, antigovernment ten-
ets in their platform. Not only did they seek to avoid challenging the 
government on the "Temporary Provisions," but they had also 
learned from the last election that they needed to avoid radical posi-
tions, especially ideological ones, inasmuch as this wasn't effective in 
terms of winning the support of the electorate. Thus the dang wai 
group's slogan "check and balance and progress" was both represen-
tative of their mood and avoided provocation.3 
There were also various understandings or "gentlemen's agree-
ments" in effect prior to this election concerning what the dang wai 
politicians could say and do during the campaign. Advocating com-
munism or negotiating with Peking were two issues that were clearly 
offlimits. Neither of these, however, was an issue that dang waipoli-
ticians wanted to talk about and neither had public appeal. Some 
dang wai candidates mentioned them simply to see how far they 
could go, but this caused no real controversy. Claiming to represent 
any of those convicted and imprisoned after the "Kaohsiung Inci-
I. Robert King, "Taiwan Opposition Shows Strength in Unity," Asian Wall Street 
Journal, November 18, 1981, p. 6. 
2. Andrew Tanzer, "Come to the Party," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 114, 
No. 45 (October 30, 1981), p. 15. 
3. Observers, including this writer who was on the scene during the 1980 election 
and a subsequent local election, perceived that the "understandings" regarding campaign 
behavior were generally unchanged from 1980. It should be pointed out that there is 
little tendency for politicians to assail the President personally or to represent factions of 
the Taiwanese Independence Movement in the U.S. or Japan anyway. 
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dent" in 1979 or supporting the Formosa Magazine group that had 
organized the demonstration that led to the violence in Kaohsiung 
on that occasion, were also taboo. Finally it was generally under-
stood that dang wai candidates would not personally attack President 
Chiang Ching-kuo or other top central government leaders, or advo-
cate Taiwanese independence. 
In reaching these understandings regarding ground rules it was 
uncertain to what extent pressure or assumed punishment served as a 
deterrent. The fact that these issues were not directly relevant to the 
campaign and there was no mass support for an anti-government 
position per se, candidates were dissuaded to some extent by public 
opinion. Even radical politicians admitted that dwelling on these is-
sues would brand a candidate "an extremist" causing him or her to 
likely lose the election. The fact that ground rules made the 1980 
election a successful one while most radical positions taken during 
that election evoked a negative reaction from the electorate were 
likewise instructive to candidates in this election and helped to make 
the style of campaigning and the issues presented acceptable to both 
sides. 
As in 1980, the Election and Recall Law restricted the period of 
campaigning to ten days before the election, with only government 
sponsored meetings allowed the last five days. .Dang wai candidates, 
however, circumvented this regulation by celebrating birthdays and 
other events and by holding tea parties and garden parties for a 
month or more prior to November 14.4 These occasions were used 
to recommend potential candidates and even to introduce those 
nominated as "official" dang wai candidates and to discuss election 
strategy. They were also employed to solicit campaign funds. 
The police ignored most indoor meetings. Some outdoor get-
togethers were dispersed. On one occasion Kang Ning-hsiang held a 
tea party in a public park in Taipei to introduce "official" dang wai 
candidates for positions to the Taipei City Council. The police 
came, but before taking any action each candidate was allowed a ten 
minute speech (that included political messages, the candidate's po-
sition and an explanation to the crowd concerning why the gathering 
was illegal), then the rally was cancelled.5 This was generally repre-
sentative of the mood (cum understandings) of dang wai politicians 
and the police. The dang wai candidates were allowed to organize 
and technically to violate the Election and Recall Law in terms of 
4. Tanzar, "Come to the Party," supra note 2. 
5. Ibid 
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organizing and campaigning as long as they did not do it too bla-
tantly or provoke violence or disturbances in doing so. 
Regarding substance, the dang wai program and the Nationalist 
Party's platform differed in few respects. In the cities the majority of 
candidates of both sides talked about air pollution, traffic, public 
housing, flood control and clean drinking water. In the rural areas 
they advocated higher prices for farm products and better schools.6 
Where the two groups differed was on their attitude toward re-
forming government: the dang wai candidates criticized the govern-
ment, generally portraying it as bureaucratic and corrupt. 
Kuomintang candidates underscored the accomplishments of the 
government. But even here views were not diametrically opposed. 
Both dang wai and KMT candidates focused more on substance is-
sues than they did in 1980 and some of the problems that deserved 
consideration in 1980 were major issues in this election . 
.Dang wai candidates did bring up some issues the government 
would have preferred remain laid to rest. The Chen Wen-cheng in-
cident-the case of a Taiwanese professor teaching in a U.S. univer-
sity who returned to Taiwan in June and was found dead not long 
after being questioned by the Taiwan Garrison Command-was the 
most important.7 Chen was known to have ties with the Taiwanese 
Independence Movement in the United States and his death in the 
mind of the public, or at least a sizable segment of it, implicated the 
government and the KMT. The case caused controversy also simply 
because it was not solved; few murder cases in Taiwan (unlike most 
Western nations) are unsolved. Thus the issue of police power was 
brought up as a campaign issue by dang wai politicians. And many 
dang wai candidates went beyond the Chen case to make an issue of 
principle to criticize the police apparatus in Taiwan, though this was 
limited in most cases to questioning their arbitrary powers . 
.Dang wai candidates also complained that KMT candidates got 
the best sites at the choice time of the day during the government-
sponsored portion of the campaign, and that dang wai and independ-
ent candidates were frequently sandwiched in between KMT candi-
dates for campaign speeches. In addition, they charged that the 
KMT dominated the Central Election Committee.8 Finally, dang 
wai supporters referred obliquely to the pre-election period as a 
6. Andrew Tanzar, "Much ado about little," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 
114, No. 47 (November 13, 1981), p. 20. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. 
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"holiday of democratic activity"-suggesting that the system was not 
democratic at any other time. 
Two days before the official campaign period began Kang 
Ning-hsiang called a meeting and "nominated" thirty-one dang wai 
candidates who were labelled "mainstream" or the "officially spon-
sored" candidates. Other dang wai candidates opposed this proce-
dure and ran as "unofficial" or "non-sponsored" dang wai 
candidates. This created an open rift in the ranks of the dang wai 
group. A similar, though less serious, problem occurred for the Na-
tionalist Party: 31 KMT candidates quit the Party or ran for office 
without Party approval.9 The Nationalist Party headquarters in 
Taipei also had to expel from the Party five candidates for city coun-
cil seats for violating Party rules. Four of the five later charged that 
the nominating procedure was unfair. Clearly, discipline was a 
problem for both the Nationalist Party and the dang wai group, as it 
had been in 1980.10 
During the campaign a number of "irregular" events occurred 
and a number of candidates engaged in what most considered ques-
tionable campaign practices. Several candidates hired disco dancers 
and some got celebrities to help campaign for them. One had him-
self lifted above a crowd by a crane so that he could speak, and be 
noticed and heard by a large crowd. Another had a friend host a 
U.S. $7,000 feast on deer meat. A number of candidates beheaded 
roosters publicly while taking an oath of honesty-which according 
to an ancient superstition would guarantee that the person would 
keep his oath or promise. In response to the latter two activities 
wildlife groups and enthusiasts criticized the involved politicians and 
started a campaign against this practice. 11 
Vote buying or the bribing of the voters was considered en-
demic and a serious problem. Not just a few candidates passed out 
cookware, gifts of food, monosodium glutamate and even cash to 
voters while asking for their support. In fact, the practice of vote 
buying was so common that it was widely rumored-to the point 
that many regarded it as common knowledge-that the price of a 
vote ranged from U.S. $5 to $10.'2 On the positive side, the press 
criticized vote buying and excessive spending during the campaign 
9. Andrew Tanzer, "A Vote for Democracy," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 
122, No. 47 (November 24, 1983), pp. 27-28. 
10. Ibid. 
II. Robert King, "In Taiwan, Politicians Behead Roosters, Kneel Before Voters," 
Asian Wall Street Journal, November 27, 1981, p. 2. 
12. The local press in Taiwan had for some time been critical of vote buying. This, 
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and even listed the net worth of some of the candidates. Several 
newspapers tried to discredit vote buying by taking up the gauntlet 
against what they called "money politics." This, however, did not 
seem to have a great deal of effect. The bottom line was that money 
helped (as was true in 1980), and there seemed little that could be 
done to change this immediately. In this sense Taiwan seemed to be 
plagued by one of the intractible problems common in Western de-
mocracies. What to do about it still remains of serious concern. 
The public was very enthusiastic about the election and partici-
pated in pre-election activities in large numbers. In some instances 
as many as 50,000 people attended a single rally or campaign 
speech.13 The number of campaign rallies and support meetings 
held throughout the nation numbered in the thousands. Political 
analysts noted during the election that the level of political participa-
tion and the positive attitude toward the democratic process was un-
precedented. In short, the spirit of the 1980 election was recreated 
and in a number of respects was further amplified. 
Voting also reflected the enthusiasm for the political process. 
Voter turnout for the Provincial Assembly election was 71.94 per-
cent. For the Taipei City Council and Kaohsiung City Council it 
was 67.89 and 76.74 percent respectively. For the mayors and 
county magistrated the average was 71.94 percent. The median for 
all four elections was 71.8 percent. 14 This was a bit below the aver-
age turnout in previous provincial elections, but considering the gen-
erally cloudy, gloomy weather, it was high. 
Other than the ubiquitous vote buying, the election must be 
seen as successful and as positive proof of political development and 
democratization of the Republic of China's political system. There 
was no violence and no serious violations of the Election and Recall 
Law or any other laws (unless one considers the fact dang wai candi-
dates organized and behaved like a political party in serious viola-
tion of the "Temporary Provisions"). Ballots were counted in record 
time-four hours. 15 In the past the ballot counting usually contin-
ued through the nights making it more likely that someone could 
tamper with the ballots. In fact, quite in contrast to the last "gen-
however, seems to represent the first effort on the part of the media to expose some 
candidates' personal worth and make it a campaign issue. 
13. Tanzer, "A Vote for Democracy," supra note 9. 
14. See Statistical Abstract of Interior of the Republic of China, 1982 (Taipei: Minis-
try of Interior, 1982) pp. HX>-08, for further details on the number of candidates, ratio of 
successful candidates and other data on this and past elections. 
15. Tanzer, "A Vote for Democracy," supra note 9. 
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eral" local election in 1977, when violence erupted following charges 
of vote tampering, there were no meaningful charges of election 
fraud or irregularities . .Dang waipoliticians labeled the election very 
fair in almost all respects. 
As in the case of the 1980 election, assessing who won is diffi-
cult. Both the KMT and dang wai politicians claimed victory, and 
both had evidence to support their claims. Of the 189 total seats up 
for grabs, the Nationalist Party won 145 or 77 percent. 108 of 127 
officially sponsored KMT candidates won-or 85 percent. This was 
above the goal of 80 percent declared by Party leaders before the 
election. 19 of 31 "official" dang wai candidates won. This was a 
higher percentage of victories than in the 1980 election . ..Dang wai 
candidates won a total of 44 seats. Non-party candidates won 4 of 
19 (counting one who left the KMT) county magistrate seats--con-
sidered the most important post filled during the election. While this 
is the same number as dang wai candidates won in the 1977 election, 
inasmuch as 3 of the 4 were regarded as genuine dang wai candidates 
(as opposed to 2 in 1977) this was considered a victory. Also 8 of 9 
official non-party candidates won in the Taipei City Council elec-
tion, giving the dang wai group 13 of 51 seats, or more than they held 
after the 1977 election. .Dang wai candidates won 10 of 42 seats in 
the Kaohsiung City Council and 18 of 77 seats in the Provincial As-
sembly-both slightly less than in 1977. Overall, dang wai candi-
dates won about one ~uarter of the seats contested-nearly the same 
as in 1977 and 1980. 1 
For the KMT, while over 92 percent of its officially-sponsored 
candidates won in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly election, the 
number of defections was quite high. Though none repudiated the 
Party, 78 ran without Party recommendation and 24 of those won. 
In the county and city magistrate races a number of KMT "defec-
tors" ran though none won. In the Taipei City Council and Kaohsi-
ung City Council races defectors were fairly large in number, though 
in only one case (in Taipei) did a candidate that repudiated the Party 
win. 17 "Unofficial" dang wai candidates fared even better, although 
because the dang wai group is not so well organized this was not 
unexpected. It does, however, suggest that even though dang wai 
politicians have organization and are behaving like a political party, 
16. "High Percentage Turnout: Enthusiasm Marks Campaign Scene," Free China 
Weekly, November 22, 1981, p. I. 
17. For complete data on the categories of candidates and victories and defeats in the 
election, see Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times) (in Chinese), November 15, 1981, p. 2. 
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they are far from having the party discipline of the KMT or of most 
political parties in Western democracies. 
In terms of the qualifications of the winners, as a whole the re-
sults were gratifying. Winning candidates were younger and there 
were more women victors. The level of education was higher. The 
average age of those elected to the Provincial Assembly and city 
council positions in Taipei and Kaohsiung was 42.98 compared to 
44.98 in 1977. The average age of mayors and county magistrates 
elected was 45.7, compared to 45.1 in 1977. Of those elected to seats 
in the Provincial Assembly 2 had Ph.D. degrees, 6 M.A. degrees, 41 
B.A. degrees, 28 high school diplomas,-up considerably from the 
winners of the 1977 election. Of the mayors and county magistrates 
3 had M.A. degrees, 14 B.A. degrees, and 1 a civil service certificate. 
Of the winners in the Provincial Assembly and the city council races 
147 were men and 23 were women (10 in the Provincial Assembly). 
Of the victors in mayors and county magistrates all were men. 18 
Winners of almost all offices were Taiwanese, though in the case of 
many of the younger candidates elected the distinction between 
Taiwanese and Mainlander was either not clear or not very impor-
tant-since some of the "Mainlanders" were born in Taiwan and in 
the case of some of the younger candidates their ethnic background 
was not publicized or was not an issue to a fairly sizeable number of 
voters. This was a first for both of these phenomena. 
Comparing this election to similar local elections in Western de-
mocracies, the enthusiasm generated was remarkable and the voter 
turnout was high. The stress placed upon the level of education of 
the candidates was considerably more. As much or more weight was 
given by the electorate to candidates' experience. And voters' 
knowledge of the candidate compared very favorably to the elector-
ates in Western democracies. A significant number of women were 
elected to positions in the Provincial Assembly, bringing the total 
there to almost 13 percent-more than in its counter-part body in 
almost any Western nation. The election of so many women and 
better educated candidates and considerably more competition in the 
campaigning were new phenomena, though not completely so. 
Otherwise voting behavior and the results of the elections did not 
differ too much from previous elections. Irregularities occurred but 
not in numbers that compare unfavorably with past elections or with 
18. See China News Agency (Taipei), November 14 and 16, translated in Foreign 
Broadcasting Information Service, China (hereinafter cited as FBIS), November 18, 1981, 
p. VI for further details. 
86 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
similar elections in Western nations. Sensationalism was more ap-
parent, but this may well represent a passing phase. 
A fortnight after the election the government announced a re-
shuffling of the cabinet and a number of new appointments at the 
top. These changes and the injection of new talent at this level of 
government were no doubt timed to come after the election and to 
some degree represented the satisfaction with which top government 
officials viewed the election. Of nine appointments made to the cabi-
net, top Executive Yuan positions or other high offices almost all 
were Taiwanese and most were considered young by Chinese stan-
dards. Chiu Chuang-huan (age 56 and Taiwanese) was appointed 
Vice President of the Executive Yuan, or Vice Premier. Lin Yang-
kang (age 54 and Taiwanese) was made Minister of the Interior. 
Lien Chan (age 45 and Taiwanese) was picked Minister of Transpor-
tation and Communication. Lin Chin-sheng (age 65 and Taiwanese) 
became Minister without Portfolio. Chen Chi-lu (age 58 and 
Taiwanese) was promoted to the position of Chairman of the Cul-
tural Development Commission. Li Teng-hui was promoted from 
Taipei City Mayor to Taiwan Governor; Shao En-hsin was moved 
from Taipei County Magistrate to Taipei City Mayor; Chen Shou-
shan was moved from Deputy Commander in Chief of the Army to 
Commander of the Taiwan Garrison Command. All were 
Taiwanese and young. 19 
While critics of the government have argued that many of these 
positions should be elective, the individuals chosen to fill these posts 
reflect a continuing effort to get more Taiwanese into high position 
and to install younger, more educated--especially Western-
trained-people in high office. Of special note is the fact that a 
Taiwanese was made Commander of the Taiwan Garrison Com-
mand-<>ne of the nation's important security organizations. Critics 
of the government had long complained that Taiwanese were ineligi-
ble for the ministries of foreign affairs, defense and top positions in 
the security organs of government. This was now refuted. 
On January 16, 1982 another election was held, this time for 
county assemblies, city councils and mayors (under the jurisdiction 
of Taiwan Province and respective counties) and town and village 
chiefs. This election was much less important than the November 
1981 election and it consequently received less public attention. 
Nevertheless campaigning was spirited and voter expectations were 
19. Taipei Radio, November 26, 1981, translated in FBIS, China, November 27, 
1981, p. VI. 
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high. In all 1,684 candidates competed for 799 seats.2° Actually two 
elections (or one two-part election) were held: for 19 city and county 
councils and another for town and village mayors. 
In the former category of positions, the Nationalist Party cap-
tured 682 of 799 seats. In the latter, the KMT won 299 of 312 offices 
contested. Of the non-KMT victors, two councilmen elected repre-
sented the Young China Party. The other minority party, the Demo-
cratic Socialist Party, sponsored no candidates. The rest of the 155 
victors were dang wai politicians, though the distinction between "of-
ficial" and "unofficial" dang wai candidates was not clear in this 
election. Of those elected to city council seats, 505 were "freshmen"; 
294 were incumbents. Of the town and village mayors, 214 were 
new; 98 were incumbents. The voter turnout for city and county 
council seats was 75.25 percent. The turnout for town and village 
mayor elections was 76.6 percent.21 
Of the successful candidates for city and county council seats, 
women got 115 seats or just over 14 percent of the total, doing 
slightly better than men in relation to the number of female candi-
dates. Women, however, did significantly less well in the town and 
village mayoral races. Taiwanese won the overwhelming majority of 
the races in both categories. In fact, Taiwanese won all but one of 
the mayoral races. 
Only one major irregularity occurred during this election. In a 
township election in the southern part of the island, a KMT candi-
date won against an independent who dropped out of the race at the 
last moment. 5,000 votes subsequently cast as protest votes had to be 
declared void. Election officials initiated an investigation almost as 
soon as the polls closed. Apparently the candidate who withdrew 
was bought off; or the other was able, because of the malfeasance by 
the former, to force him to withdraw. In any event, neither KMT 
Party authorities nor the government were in any way implicated.22 
On June 12, 1982 an even smaller election was held for town 
and village council seats. 19,000 candidates applied, including 1,000 
women, for 9,914 representative positions. The voter turnout was 
68.28 percent. 23 Since party affiliation is of little importance in elec-
20. For further details, see Free China Weekly, January 10, 1982, p. I. 
21. See ibid; Statistical Abstract of Interior of Republic of China, 1982, supra note 14, 
p. 107. 
22. "Kuomintang Sweeps Vote," Free China Review, Vol. 32, No.2 (February 1982), 
p. 6. 
23. "Grassroots Election Going On," China News (Taipei), June 12, 1982 and "68% 
Turnout for Grassroots Election," China News, June 13, 1982, p. I. 
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tions at this level and since Taiwanese have long been represented at 
this level, there was no noticeable change in the profile of winners in 
this election. 
Like the previous elections, this one also generated enthusiasm 
among the electorate and passed without violence or major contro-
versy. The degree of free speech and openness as well as competi-
tion mirrored a continuation of the progress in participatory 
democracy and election competition made during the 1980 prece-
dent-setting election. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the record of the 
post-1980 elections. Clearly they supported earlier precedents in 
terms of election competition and offer proof of the success of the 
election process in Taiwan. They also give evidence of the direction 
of political change and some lingering problems. 
Perhaps the main significance of the three elections, or groups 
of elections, is that competitive elections involving the organization 
of candidates that contested offices with the KMT were further regu-
larized. Elections were not held regularly in the past except local 
elections. And there was no party versus non-party or KMT -dang 
wai competition. Moreover, the elections discussed above were con-
ducted in a different spirit: that of relating local politics to national 
politics. This had not really been done before. Finally, elections, 
even local elections, had been held in abeyance after the U.S. der-
ecognized Taipei in late 1978. The December 1980 election ended a 
period of suspended elections, but it was only one election. And 
many felt that it was an exception in the sense a "political holiday" 
was declared at the time and the 1980 election was not intended to 
be a model for future elections, but rather simply a "demonstration" 
of democracy for the U.S. and other foreign nations. This was 
proven an incorrect judgment by the events surrounding the elec-
tions discussed in this chapter as well as their results. 
When one can be certain that the election process is truly regu-
larized to include party competition and is genuinely democratic is 
difficult to say. Perhaps three elections are not enough. Yet maybe 
fifty or a hundred are not enough. After another national election is 
held, followed by more local elections one can obviously be more 
confident that elections have become routine and have become an 
integral part of the political culture and political system. In any 
case, 1981-82 seems to be a good start in that direction, continuing 
the progress made in 1980. 
The fact that the Republic of China's Election and Recall Law 
written in 1980 continued to operate successfully is also significant. 
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In other words, three more elections were conducted according to a 
set of laws (which require considerable interpretations) that the par-
ticipants generally agreed with, or at least accepted. It was generally 
perceived before 1980 that the election codes then in force were un-
fair and needed to be rewritten. This was done and in December 
1980 an election was conducted using the new set of laws. In 1981 
and 1982 three additional tests were made of these laws-success-
fully in terms of the absence of any violence, voter confidence in the 
system measured by their participation, and the moderate to low 
level of complaints registered by both the candidates and the electo-
rate. By almost any standard these elections were conducted 
smoothly and without incident and based upon fundamental under-
standings and agreements concerning the need for rules in holding 
elections and the relevance and fairness of the rules in use. 
However, this is not to say that the Election and Recall Law had 
widespread support in the sense that it should not be changed or 
rewritten. In fact, that was being done throughout 1983. There were 
widespread complaints that some specific provisions of the Election 
and Recall Law were both unfair and undemocratic. Many protests 
were filed regarding the limits placed on candidates during the cam-
paign period and the shortness of it-just ten days. Rules preventing 
candidates from advertising in the paper or using television as a 
means of propagating their positions were also seen as unjust or un-
reasonable by a significant minority. Dang wai candidates com-
plained that students were not allowed to participate in political 
campaigns. Some knew they could rally students to their cause and 
thereby obtain cheap or free campaign workers. Dang wai candi-
dates also objected that the KMT controlled the press to a considera-
ble degree and they had to present their views in magazines and 
other media forms that were frequently banned or placed under gov-
ernment restrictions. In short, the election laws worked because can-
didates realized they could change the laws through legal means. 
Even though the laws were in need of reform, they were better than 
no laws or their preceding guidelines. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Nationalist Party and 
dang wai candidates have come to view each other as legitimate com-
petition in a game with rules and understandings. This was more 
true in these elections, especially the first and second (not so much in 
the third because it was so local), than in the 1980 election. Prior to 
1980 the KMT did not view dang wai politicians as legitimate, and 
saw them as little more than opportunists. In contrast, dang wai and 
independent candidates viewed the Nationalist Party as comprised 
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of those who resisted change and progress or diehards in terms of 
accepting a competitive and democratic election system. Views on 
both sides changed during the 1980 election; yet many observers felt 
that this was only for show or because the top ordered it. Many saw 
it only as temporary. The 1981 and 1982 elections seemed to indi-
cate that changes in perceptions are, or at least may be, permanent 
and that the election system in Taiwan is now competitive and 
founded upon the concept of loyal opposition-an important ingre-
dient in the evolution of democracy. 
Another realm where some concluding comments are needed 
concerns dang wai organization. Dang wai politicians organized in 
ways that seemed to be patently illegal according to the "Temporary 
Provisions." They held "party" meetings, established a platform, 
campaigned for each other, and had a campaign fund. Independent 
observers got the impression that the Kuomintang and the govern-
ment as well accepted the reality of dang wai candidates organizing 
and behaving as a political party, so long as it is done in an orderly 
way and if dang wai candidates otherwise adhered to the understand-
ings mentioned earlier. Never mind the fact that new parties are 
illegal. Most KMT and government leaders seemed to be of the 
opinion that the law prohibiting new parties should remain, even 
though it should not be enforced, as a precautionary measure or 
fallback position if instability arises from party competition in elec-
tions or excessive and uncontrollable polarization results from cam-
paign. Other KMT officials seemed to reason that it is just a matter 
of time until the law restricting new parties will be changed. Thus it 
makes more sense to concentrate on changing the law rather than 
debating whether or not it is being violated. Still both groups per-
ceived that the dang wai group is still factionalized and lacks organi-
zation and hence will not present a substantially bigger threat in 
coming elections than they did in these elections. Thus, let them 
exist. 
Meanwhile the KMT has realized more clearly that it has or-
ganization and discipline problems that are not related solely to the 
dang wai competition. The elections discussed in this chapter con-
firmed what was said in this regard about the 1980 national election. 
Nationalist Party leaders, as well as candidates at all levels, have 
come to be more convinced that actions must be taken to deal with 
candidates who run without Party endorsement or who drop mem-
bership in the Party and run as independents. In the future these 
problems will certainly impair the Party's image and its very 
strength. Party leaders after the 1981-82 elections are also more cog-
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nizant of the fact that they must concern themselves more with issues 
and less with ideology. They similarly became more aware of the 
fact that they must focus more on Taiwan and less (if at all) on "re-
covering the mainland" and defeating communism. And they 
learned a lesson that the KMT must eventually become a Taiwanese 
party if it is to avoid becoming a minority party. It is significant that 
the KMT organized and planned their strategy in these three elec-
tions to support almost exclusively Taiwanese candidates. 
Likewise, dang wai politicians have come to regard the KMT as 
competition rather than the enemy. Thus, dang wai candidates in 
these elections generally followed a tack of presenting themselves as 
talented and experienced individuals who understand the important 
issues that demand attention. They did not, with just a few excep-
tions, present themselves as representatives of revolutionary change 
or as anti-government or anti-KMT. Compared to 1980, the dang 
wai politicians were much more moderate and pragmatic. This must 
be judged an auspicious trend. 
Fourth, the electorate received important training in the use of 
democratic processes and at the same time got a good dose of realism 
in terms of the responsibilities and costs associated with democracy. 
Their idealism was no doubt dampened after seeing several more 
occasions of politicians promise what they could not deliver and re-
sort to sometimes ridiculous tactics to win the voters' support. They 
were also exposed to radical views, which they again rejected. More 
important, they were presented with a long term problem of how to 
cope with the fact that money and politics have mixed and that 
wealth is an advantage in a democratic political campaign. Simi-
larly, they were faced with the problem of how they are going to deal 
with charisma and image building. Looking to the modern Western 
democracies for solutions to these problems is, of course, futile. 
The public has seemingly or at least partially become used to 
campaign rhetoric and other facets of the electoral processes. Of 
special note is the fact that the electorate has become skeptical of 
promises of quick solutions to complex problems and are aware of 
the risks and dangers of extremism. This quick learning process can 
probably be attributed to the fact that democracy has been working 
in local politics in Taiwan for some time, plus the fact that there is 
both democracy and skepticism in the Chinese psyche. 
Finally, the issues that were important in these elections tell a 
good deal about political change and maturation in the election pro-
cess. The issues which the public wanted to hear about and which 
the candidates realized were important and they had to discuss if 
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they wanted to win elections, were different when compared to the 
1980 election campaign. They were predominantly practical, eco-
nomic ones. In contrast to 1980 election, when a large number of 
non-party candidates made issue of ending martial law, releasing 
political prisoners, human rights, unfair election laws, etc., in the 
1981 and 1982 elections the main issues were traffic congestion, sani-
tation, pollution, water control, education, cost of living, health facil-
ities, and unemployment. In other words the public wanted elected 
representatives to deal with problems that are of direct relevance to 
them and spend their time on issues with which they have authority 
or competence to deal. And the candidates realized that the public 
had these perceptions. 
In conclusion, the 1981 and 1982 elections furnished confirma-
tion of the progress made in 1980. It was also a time of settling down 
to bread and butter issues. It was likewise a time of reaching further 
understandings about the election process and making democracy 
something that is not only realizable but also something that has to 
be obtained according to specific and understood guidelines. All of 
this seemed to be accomplished. 
The 1981 and 1982 local elections also created a feeling of self-
confidence regarding another competitive national election in 1983. 
That election could prove that democracy had become a part of the 
system at the top. It would not have to be thought of as another 
experiment. Nor would the freedoms allowed and practiced during 
campaigning have to be regarded as part of an "election holiday." 
The 1983 national election is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE 1983 NATIONAL ELECTION 
On December 3, 1983 Taiwan held its fifth national supplemen-
tary election. In this election, 71 candidates were chosen to the Leg-
islative Yuan including 16 picked to represent trade, professional 
organizations, and other groups. ln addition, 27 were chosen to rep-
resent the Overseas Chinese. However, since this was an "off-year" 
election, there was no election of delegates to the National Assembly 
or Control Yuan. Nevertheless, this was an important election; it 
was the first national election since the competitive 1980 election, 
and like that election, it witnessed a campaign and struggle pitting 
the Nationalist Party against dang wai or non-party candidates. In 
short, it confirmed the role or development of party competition in 
national elections. It also tested still another set of election laws. 
Prior to the election, on July 8, 1983, President Chiang Ching-
kuo signed and promulgated a new Election and Recall Law. The 
1980 national election as well as local elections in 1981 and 1982 had 
proven the earlier set of election laws defective in a number of re-
spects and it was clear that revisions and changes had to be made. 
Suggestions for revision of the Election and Recall Law had been 
made even before the 1980 election just after it had been promul-
gated. More serious post-election proposals led after each of three 
elections to formal discussions that in tum became the prelude to the 
writing of a new set of laws. 
The new Election and Recall Law of July 1983 was in effect a 
major revision of the earlier set of laws. Forty-nine of the 113 arti-
cles were altered. 1 The three themes of changes were: to prevent acts 
of violence during the election; to eliminate vote buying and bribery; 
and to prohibit illegal campaign activities. All were serious 
problems during the 1980 election and during subsequent local elec-
tions. Moreover, throughout 1983 due to the increased level of emo-
tionalism about the pending election and what promised to be more 
competitive elections, many feared that violence might occur, disrupt 
the election, and reverse the progress made toward democratization 
so far. Also very serious actions had to be taken to control vote buy-
ing and illegal campaign activities. 
Specifically, the new Election and Recall Law made a number 
of important procedural changes that to some degree altered the 
electoral system and the democratic processes related to it. The 
method of electing new members of the Control Yuan was changed 
l. See English translation of the Law reproduced in the end of this book. 
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from a single to a multiple vote system. The Control Yuan, which 
was previously chosen through indirect election, or ballots cast by 
the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and the Taipei and Kaohsiung city 
councils on a local constituency basis, suffered from scandal regard-
ing vote buying. In fact, it was rumored that in the 1980 elections 
one candidate purchased six votes from Taiwan Provincial Assembly 
members for around U.S. $3 million.2 Provisions in the new Election 
and Recall Law made this more difficult and at the same time made 
the Control Yuan more representative of the population-inasmuch 
as delegates elected to the Provincial Assembly would now be able to 
choose delegates representing a larger geographical area and a 
broader spectrum in terms of views and experience. On the other 
hand, the change favored the Nationalist Party since it worked to 
split the dang wai and independent vote. It is not surprising that the 
non-KMT opposition strongly opposed the change. 
To reduce the incidence of various illegal campaign activities, 
penalties were increased for campaigning before the official election 
period opened. More detailed restrictions were applied forbidding 
the posting of signs and other forms of political advertising in places 
other than those approved by the Election Commission. The new 
Election and Recall Law also standardized the size of campaign 
pamphlets and limited the number of campaign vehicles. Firecrack-
ers were banned (due to injuries caused by them in the last elections) 
and collective campaigning was made unlawful at privately-spon-
sored meetings during the first week of the campaign. 
The new law also made it illegal for candidates to use the mass 
media for political campaigning, plus parades and demonstrations 
for specific candidates. Television and other forms of mass media 
were not allowed under earlier 1980 election law and a number of 
candidates had complained of these restrictions. The new law went 
even further, however, in restricting the use of the mass media by 
political candidates. In this regard, those who drew up the new set 
of laws cited public opinion in formulating these regulations: the 
majority of the electorate had expressed opposition to candidates 
buying television time-which being especially expensive in the Re-
public China would favor wealthy candidates and exacerbate the 
"money politics" problem. The writers of the new election law also 
sought to avoid the sticky problem of equal time that has become so 
controversial in Western countries. Clearly more laws would have 
had to be written had television campaign advertising been allowed. 
2. This "rumor" was reported by several dang wai magazines. 
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In contrast to the changes made in electing the Control Yuan, in-
dependent candidates generally favored these provisions in the new 
law.3 
The new Election and Recall Law also delineated penalties for 
violations of the law and defined illegal acts more clearly than the 
old law. Penalties for vote buying and bribery were explicitly set 
and the punishment increased in severity. This even extended to the 
voter who might show his vote before putting it in the ballot box. 
Ceilings were also imposed upon campaign spending and require-
ments were specified regarding candidates reporting campaign 
spending along with sources of contributions. Campaign spending is 
now limited according to the size of the electoral district, the number 
of elected officers to be filled and the consumer price index. This 
ranged from NT $3,500,000 (U.S. $87,500) in the smallest district to 
NT $5,400,000 (U.S. $135,000) in the largest for the 1983 supplemen-
tary election.4 Candidates are also prohibited from receiving contri-
butions from foreign governments, groups, foundations or 
individuals, and cannot make contributions to other candidates in 
the same election. 
The public generally agreed that a new set of election laws had 
to be written and was supportive of the results. In fact, polls taken 
after the new Election and Recall Law was announced, reflected a 
high approval level. Clearly, firmer election regulations were 
needed and more specific definitions of illegal acts and punishments 
were required to make elections fairer. The feeling about the exces-
sive use of money in elections was particularly intense. Dang wai 
candidates agreed with most of the provisions of the new set of laws, 
though they felt that some of the provisions discriminated against 
them. Not having sufficient voting strength to prevent the inclusion 
of these parts of the law, dang wai members of the Legislative Yuan 
boycotted the session that approved the new Election and Recall 
Law. However, this was not very serious and can be interpreted gen-
erally as going on record in complaint. There was little protest after-
wards, especially regarding provisions other than those that were 
seen to weaken or restrict opposition candidates unduly.5 
3. For further details, see "Revised Election Law Paves Way for Orderly Vote," 
Free China Weekly, July 3, 1983, p. I. 
4. For further details, see "Goals Set for Election in December," Free China 
Weekly, October 2, 1983, pp. 1-2. 
5. For example, opposition dang waimagazines at this time said very little in oppo-
sition to the new election law other than criticizing certain provisions. No effort was 
made to start a movement against the new election laws. 
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After the government announced the new Election and Recall 
Law, potential candidates started preparations for the December 
election. During the period, October 29 to November 2, 177 candi-
dates registered with various election commissions. Candidates for 
professional or other groups drew lots to decide their election num-
bers on November 14. December 3 was the date set for the election 
of legislators to replace those whose term would expire January 13, 
1984 in accordance with both constitutional provisions and the new 
Election and Recall Law. Candidates registered in six regular voting 
districts or for balloting in Taipei or Kaoshiung City. Eight days 
were allocated according to the election law to self-sponsored forums 
and seven days to government, or election committee-run 
campaigning. 
During the former period, which ended November 25, 2,971 fo-
rums were held. 542 were held in Taipei. An average of 1,000 peo-
ple attended for a total of more than 2 million people during this 
period.6 Chen Ming-tang, a dang wai candidate topped all candi-
dates by holding 46 meetings himself. Some candidates, however, 
decided to forego holding self-sponsored forums. Two candidates 
from Taipei made no appearances at all; eleven candidates island-
wide refused to appear in public at all. The so-called silent candi-
dates were generally not known to the public and had little confi-
dence in their ability to attract an audience.7 A much larger number 
of self-sponsored meetings were held the last day of the eight days, 
just before the government sponsored meetings started. Campaign-
ing during the period was generally orderly and problems were few 
in spite of the fact that issues being debated were serious ones, and 
competition between and among candidates was intense. The Elec-
tion Committee issued only seven warnings for minor offenses com-
mitted by candidates and their workers during this period. 8 
Government-sponsored forums were held from November 26 to 
December 2. Thirty-seven forums were allocated for Taipei, includ-
ing 5 for professional and other groups; 16 were arranged in Kaoshi-
ung, including 3 for professional and other groups. 263 were held 
elsewhere, including 45 for professional and other groups.9 Accord-
ing to the new Election and Recall Law, each candidate could speak 
for only 15 minutes at a time and in a sequence set by the Election 
Committees. And candidates, unlike the self-sponsored forum, had 
6. China Post, November 28, 1983. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid., December 2, 1983. 
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to speak in person. Most of the candidates gave "packaged" 
speeches, but the grouping of many candidates together created in 
essence a debate atmosphere. Candidates were banned from giving 
speeches at other occasions during this period; they were even pro-
hibited from talking in public about non-election issues. Several 
candidates violated this provision in the election law by participating 
in weddings, birthday and tea parties, and other events-as they had 
done before the campaign started. One candidate, Huang Tien-fu, 
allowed (or perhaps instructed) his campaign workers to call a news 
conference to discuss the "unfair treatment of prisoners." Some de-
scribed this as flaunting the election law; others interpreted his ac-
tions as legal. On this issue the new Election and Recall Law is 
clearly not explicit enough. 10 In any event, the government took no 
action. 
Another candidate, Fang Su-min, distributed a campaign pam-
phlet with Teng Hsiao-ping's picture (Deng Xiaoping in Pinyin-
leader of the People's Republic of China) in it. The government im-
mediately seized these pamphlets, but not before it was reported in 
newspapers throughout the island. Fang seemed to have wanted to 
be provocative and test the new Election and Recall Law. Her ges-
ture was not construed as necessarily advocating Communism since 
the picture made reference to U.S.-People's Republic of China rela-
tions. 11 In any case,the government took no action against Fang 
probably because it did not want to be charged with obstructing 
democratic practices. Subsequently, since the government was 
pleased with the results of the election and did not want to sully its 
image abroad it did not pursue the case. 
In addition to making numerous public speeches, candidates 
also had their workers put up campaign posters and made announce-
ments via trucks with loudspeakers. Both of these types of campaign 
activities were, however, much more restricted than during the 1980 
election. Candidates were limited to five trucks each and allocated 
specific places to put up posters. A number of candidates com-
plained that this limited their freedom of speech. The public, how-
ever, generally felt that this made the campaign more orderly and 
eliminated noise pollution and reduced the problem of clean-up af-
terwards-all of which were serious annoyances during the 1980 
campaign. There seemed to be no split between Kuomintang and 
dang wai candidates on these issues. However, on the use of students 
10. Ibid 
ll. Ibid, December 3, 1983. 
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as campaign workers, dang wai candidates were almost unanimous 
in protesting new restrictions in the Election and Recall Law. The 
candidates and the public alike generally accepted the ban on 
firecrackers. 
A considerable amount of campaigning was conducted through 
letter writing and by candidates getting help from friends. The new 
Election and Recall Law demanded the standardization of handbills 
in terms of size and leadership. Some of the handbills were made to 
look like news releases in order to attract more attention. 12 More 
handbills were used during the government-sponsored forums be-
cause of the restriction on the time the candidates could speak. 
As noted above, candidates were not allowed to buy time on 
television, radio or advertise in the newspapers. Some protested this 
limitation, but the public was generally satisfied with the restrictions. 
The new Election and Recall Law also prohibited candidates from 
hiring entertainers or performers who were not officially approved 
campaign workers. It remains uncertain how to assess this restric-
tion. Views expressed by both candidates and the public were more 
mixed on this issue, than concerning other restrictions. 
Many dang wai candidates started their campaigning in 
magazines that they owned or campaigned informally for a long pe-
riod before the election period began. Many used the news or polit-
ical magazines during the campaign. The government took action 
against a number of publications-banning four issues of one, con-
fiscating ten and suspending the publication of five magazines for a 
year. 13 Nevertheless, the number of dang wai magazines proliferated 
during the months preceding the election with the most important 
claiming circulation of 15,000 or more. 14 Moreover, there was gen-
eral agreement that the magazines were able to say many things they 
were prohibited in the past, even in 1980. Dang wai candidates even 
admitted that freedom of the press had increased compared to any-
time in the past notwithstanding the bans. 15 
Dang wai candidates generally campaigned on such issues as de-
mocracy, greater political participation for Taiwanese, human and 
civil rights, freedom of speech, lifting martial law and the Republic 
12. Ibid., November 29, 1983. 
13. Maria Shao, "Taiwan Opposition Gears Up for Elections," Asian Wall Street 
Journal Weekly, October 17, 1983, p. 15. 
14. Maria Shao, "As Taiwan Elections Near, Opposition Seeks Unity," Ibid., Octo-
ber 17, 1983, p. 15. 
15. Ibid. 
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of China's status in the world community. 16 There was a "gen-
tleman's agreement" between the government and dang wai candi-
dates according to which the latter could campaign on any issue and 
say anything, except that they could not advocate Communism or 
Taiwanese independence or represent those jailed after the "Kaohsi-
ung Incident." The former two provisions were also written in the 
Election and Recall Law. Nevertheless, a number of dang waicandi-
dates used the slogan "self-determination" for Taiwan, which had 
been cited by a witness during a hearing by the U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in November 1983 to advance Taiwanese inde-
pendence. The Election Commission asked candidates not to use the 
slogan since it was "confusing and misleading" and sounded like ad-
vocating Taiwanese independence. 17 A number of dang wai candi-
dates continued to use it anyway. 
Many dang wai candidates criticized the government more 
harshly than ever for special privileges; allowing pollution to get 
worse; not doing anything about traffic problems, flooding and other 
social problems; and for not controlling economic crimes. 18 Most of 
the electorate considered these valid criticisms. On the other hand, 
most dang wai candidates were not able to offer cogent or realistic 
solutions other than those already being implemented by the govern-
ment to deal with the problems. 
Koumintang candidates stressed the following themes in their 
campaign: Taiwan under KMT control and leadership had attained 
remarkable economic progress (comparing how things were in the 
past in terms of the comfort and material possessions of the people); 
political change must be evolutionary, not revolutionary-lest every-
thing that has been gained economically be lost because of political 
mistakes (making reference at times to Vietnam); the nation faces an 
external threat-the People's Republic China-and this threat can 
be dealt with only if the people remain united and keep the faith; the 
government and the people must transcend ethnic and other differ-
ences (referring most to Taiwanese-Mainlander differences)--noting 
that an overwhelming proportion of the population has a common 
ancestry. In short, the KMT was standing on its record while advo-
cating peaceful moderate solutions to Taiwan's problems. 
KMT leaders played five popular songs at their rallies or made 
16. See Maria Shao, "Opposition Courting Sympathy Vote in Campaign for 
Taiwanese Elections," ibid., November 28, 1983, p. 16. 
17. China Post, November 22, 1983. 
18. For a synopsis of dang waiviews, see Min Chu Jen (Democratic Person), Decem-
ber l, 1983. 
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reference to their themes in their campaign literature. These songs 
propogated the themes just mentioned and were already familiar to 
most voters. This proved to be a clever and effective way of putting 
across their campaign tenets and winning sympathy and support for 
their platform. 19 It also reflected sophisticated advertising techniques 
and professionalism in electioneering. 
The KMT also devised clever responses to dang wai candidates' 
campaign issues. KMT candidates specifically criticized the slogan 
of self-determination arguing that this concept applies only to people 
under colonial rule. They also criticized dang wai candidates for 
campaigning on non-election issues and constantly mentioning the 
1979 "Kaohsiung Incident." Some KMT candidates in their 
speeches satirically noted that they had no relatives in jail-making 
reference to seven dang wai candidates that were wives, brothers 
other relatives or attorneys of those jailed following violence in 
Kaohsiung in December 1979.2° KMT candidates also underscored 
the logic of their platform while chiding the emotionalism of dang 
wai candidates and their inexperience and lack of realism. 
KMT candidates even criticized the government for special 
privileges Goining with the dang wai on this theme), while calling for 
more government action to deal with pollution, traffic and other 
problems. At times, they also, like the dang wai, called for more de-
mocracy and individual freedoms. At times, the KMT seemed to 
avoid identification with the government. Generally, however, 
KMT candidates spent more time applauding the progress made in 
the realms of human rights and social freedoms (which they often 
argued could only follow economic development or was an inevita-
ble outcome of the economic growth the government had engineered 
up to the present time). Nearly all KMT candidates supported the 
continuation of martial law and during the campaign were able to 
cite a timely poll indicting great public support for keeping it.21 
The KMT's campaign reflected a new identity for the party sep-
arate from the government and the bureaucracy. This is important 
since it suggests that the KMT will in the future no longer want to be 
19. See "The Way They Were Won," Free China Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 
1984), pp. 57-62. 
20. See Hsuan Chan (Election Battle), November 26, 1983. 
21. According to a poll taken by the Republic of China Public Opinion Polling Asso-
ciation in November, more than 80 percent of respondents said that martial law in no 
way inconvenienced them in their daily lives. 9.83 percent said martial law caused them 
some inconvenience. 1.35 percent replied that martial law caused them considerable in-
convenience. See China Post, December 2, 1983. 
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regarded as an official or government party. This, of course, is nec-
essary if the KMT is to win election victories based on its profession-
alism and its large public support as opposed to its special status. On 
the other hand, it also means that the KMT can no longer claim 
"official party" status and will probably have to end many of its ties 
to organs of government. 
A number of both KMT and dang wai candidates criticized each 
other on both substantive and personal issues. A popular issue was 
overspending during the campaign. One KMT candidate was 
named the "golden cow" by other candidates for his lavish spending 
during the campaign. Several candidates were "single issue" candi-
dates--one naming his campaign headquarters the "human rights 
gasoline station" while campaigning almost solely on that issue. One 
candidate accused the government of nepotism making this the main 
theme of his campaign.22 Many used emotional appeals in their 
campaigns. This was especially true of dang wai candidates, some of 
whom frequently made reference to relatives or friends in jail. Some 
implied in public that if they lost the election they would not be able 
to do anything in public again due to the loss of face suffered. One 
candidate had his wife, a locally famous opera star, do much of his 
campaigning. She stated repeatedly that she could not appear in op-
eras again if her husband lost, trying to intimidate the voters to vote 
for her husband. 
The KMT had two internationally famous athletes-Chi Cheng 
(formerly an internationally famous Olympic runner) and Yang 
Chuang-kuang (former "Iron Man of Asia") among their candidates. 
Thus the Party frequently made reference to the health of the nation 
and its informal diplomacy abroad when promoting these candi-
dates. Both added sparkle to the KMT's campaign. Both added to 
the pluralistic nature of the Party: the former being Hakka 
Taiwanese, the latter an aborigine. 
Generally, the KMT platform as well as Party campaigning 
were based primarily upon logical arguments regarding their Party's 
qualifications and ability, achievements of the government and the 
nation to date under its leadership and the experience of its candi-
dates. This pitch was clearly conservative compared to the dang wai 
campaign. Dang wai candidates argued that insufficient progress 
had been to date in realizing the constitution, implementing democ-
22. In fact, one dang wai candidate accused a number of high officials of being re-
lated by blood or marriage to other officials. Several of the accusations, however, wee 
mistaken. See China Post, November 30, 1983. 
102 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
racy and in the fulfillment of human and civil rights. They also 
scorned the government's "return to the mainland" policy and the 
idea of one China, though these issues were not overstressed since 
they smacked of advocating Communism or Taiwanese indepen-
dence. While most voters may not consider such policies a realistic 
ones, they, nevertheless, opposed radical changes so as not to pro-
voke Peking (which has made it clear that no Taiwan independence 
will be tolerated) and to foster political instability. 
On the whole, the KMT was united during the campaign. Some 
Party members did not get the KMT to nominate them or officially 
sanction their candidacy and thus bolted the Party. One or two bit-
terly criticized the KMT leadership and supported dang wai in elec-
tion issues. Generally, however, the KMT maintained Party unity 
and Party discipline. 
The dang wai formed a kind of election or nominating commit-
tee (hou yuan hui) and thus had "official candidates" and a kind of 
standard platform. Thus, as in 1980, the dang waiwas for all intents 
and purposes a political party-even though new political parties are 
still forbidden under "Temporary Provisions." The nation seemed 
no closer to dealing with this contradiction than three years before. 
The dang wai were allowed to do essentially everything a political 
party does. It seems to be an issue that will be resolved in a Chinese 
way-by time and inaction. 
During the campaign the dang wai split into what some de-
scribed as two factions: a moderate or "reform within the system" 
group, and an extreme or "reform the system itself' group.23 This, 
however, may be an oversimplification since the dang wai was in re-
ality even more factionalized than this. Their publications were not 
coordinated and many simply attacked all other candidates. Thus, 
both during and after the campaign it was difficult to predict in what 
direction the dang wai was going in terms of its role as a new polit-
ical force. Some were speculating that it would split into several 
"parties." Others perceived it was simply suffering from lack of 
unity as a result of its "adolescent" status and remains a weak, unor-
ganized pseudo-political party. 
The results of the election were unequivocally a victory for the 
Kuomintang. KMT candidates won 62 of the 71 seats being con-
tested; dang wai won only 6; others won three. Prior to the election, 
the KMT held 57 of the contested seats; thus, they gained five. .Dang 
23. See "A Triumph for the Kuomintang," Asiaweek, December 16, 1983, p. 23. 
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wai had nine, suffering a loss of three. 24 (Independents had four 
before, and one was added due to population increases). 
Of the 58 candidates officially nominated by the KMT, 56 
won-or 96.55 percent. (Calculating on the basis of candidates ap-
proved by the KMT but not officially nominated, the figure is 87.32 
percent.) Ofthe "officially," recommended dang waicandidates, 6 of 
25 won, or 24 percent. 37 of the KMT victors were incumbents, or 
63.78 percent; 21 or 36.21 percent were newly elected. In contrast, 
the dang wai returned only two incumbents.25 
The KMT won 73.1 percent of the popular vote, down slightly 
from 1980. Official dang waicandidates won 19 percent of the popu-
lar vote, nearly the same as in 1980. Counting independent and dang 
wai candidates together, their vote was 26.0 percent-up slightly 
from 1980.26 Which ever way the opposition is defined, non-KMT 
candidates received only about half of the percentage of seats as they 
received popular vote-reflecting poor organization, bad campaign 
strategy and a lack of unity. 
Of the victorious candidates, 66 were Taiwanese; 5 were Main-
landers.27 Both dang wai candidates and winners were overwhelm-
ingly Taiwanese; there was only one exception. This was natural 
since it is regarded as a Taiwanese "party." But a large majority of 
KMT candidates and victors were also Taiwanese, reflecting the dec-
ade long "Taiwanization" of the Party-which was carried a step 
further in this election, with the KMT supporting an even larger per-
centage of Taiwanese candidates than in the 1980 election. Hence, 
Taiwanese became much better represented in the Legislative Yuan 
as a result of this election, though this is not a breakthrough inas-
much as it was also true of the 1980 election and elections previous 
to that. 
Eight women were elected, or slightly over 10 percent. All won 
by a large vote. 3 were dang wai; 5 were KMT.28 According to the 
24. For details on the winners and losers and further figures on the election, see 
China Post, December 3 and 4, 1983 and Free China Weekly, December 4, 1983. 
25. See ibid 
26. This figure would vary somewhat depending on how dang wai and especially 
independents are defined. Several observers put the dang wai popular vote a bit higher, 
around 29%, but argue it was essentially the same as in 1980. See, e.g., Maria Shao, 
"Taiwan's KMT Scores Big in Election," Asian Wall Street Journal, December 5, 1983, 
pp. l, 10. 
27. Mainlander here is defined to include sons and daughters of Chinese born on the 
mainland who came to Taiwan in 1949. Some argue that they should be regarded as 
Taiwanese since they have never been to China. 
28. One of the female winners among dang wai candidates was not regarded as dang 
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Temporary Provisions, one woman must be elected for every 5 to 10 
legislators. Since women won a sufficient number of seats to fulfill 
this requirement no special action was required to fulfill this provi-
sion. The women dang wai candidates tended to be more progressive 
or radical; KMT women candidates were even more traditional or 
conservative than their male counterparts. The average age of the 
women elected was 45-slightly older than male winners. 
Of the winners, by age, 13 were in their 30s, 40 in their 40s, 17 in 
their 50s and 1 over 60. The youngest candidate was 38. The aver-
age age of elected candidates was 44.85.29 This compares to 40 for 
the 1980 election. Dang wai candidates and winners were slightly 
younger than their KMT counterparts, as was true in 1980; the gap, 
however, was narrowed in 1983. The level of education of winning 
candidates also rose compared to 1980 and previous elections: 10 
high school graduates, 40 with college, university or technical de-
grees; 21 with graduate education. 11 victorious candidates had 
M.A. or Ph.D degrees. 3° KMT candidates and winners had higher 
educational qualifications. 
6,741,937 ~eople voted in the election, or 63.17 percent of the 
eligible voters. 1 The turnout was slightly lower than in the 1980 
election and below average for elections in Taiwan. This was true 
notwithstanding the good weather almost island-wide. There were 
various explanations for the lower voter turnout. Too many candi-
dates turned off many of the voters with their resort to emotional 
appeals. Many candidates promised things they could not deliver, 
turning the campaign into a contest of promising and lying. Money 
played too large a role, discouraging many potential voters. Some of 
the electorate decided that increased political freedoms included the 
right not to vote.32 It is uncertain how big a role any of these reasons 
played, but all were mentioned by those who did not vote. 
As usual, the voter turnout in Taipei was less than the national 
average: 62.92 percent. Kaohsiung registered 64.14 percent-some-
what above the national average. Voters went to the polls more in 
the rural areas and less in the cities. The highest voter turnout was 
wai by many observers. Her inclusion here is based upon the formal endorsement by 
dang wai. That is also true of the total figure of dang wai victors. 
29. "6.7 Million Voters Select 71 Legislators: Democracy Moves Forward in the 
ROC: KMT Wins Huge Vote of Confidence," Free China Weekly, December 4, 1983, p. 
l. 
30. Ibid 
31. China Post, December 4, 1983. 
32. Ibid 
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on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.33 
The majority of the KMT winners, as well as their biggest vote 
getters, generally stuck to the Party platform and would be described 
as moderates that based their campaigning on issues. Few can be 
defined as ideologues. Most conducted a clean campaign. A large 
majority stressed their experience and education. Most praised the 
government, yet also maintained some distance to avoid being iden-
tified with the government. 
Most of the dang wai winners would be categorized as "progres-
sives" or "radicals." Four of the seven relatives and attorneys of 
those jailed after the Kaohsuing incident won. In terms of victors, 
moderate dang wai candidates did not fare well. Even the leader of 
the moderate dang wai, Kang Ning-hsiang, lost. This prompted a 
number of foreign reporters to conclude that the dang wai would be 
in the future more radical since the voters had repudiated the moder-
ates and supported radical candidates.34 Since elections are always 
complex events, this explanation is without doubt an oversimplifica-
tion. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence to support quite 
different conclusion regarding the dang wai's appeal or lack of ap-
peal in this election. Further analysis is needed to explain why 
moderate dang wai candidates fared so poorly. 
The biggest vote getter among the dang wai, Fang Su-min, prob-
ably received more votes out of sympathy than because of her radi-
cal views.35 Shortly after the trial of the Kaohsiung defendants (that 
included her husband), her two daughters and mother-in-law were 
murdered. The crime was not solved. Fang took her only remaining 
child to the U.S. and returned to Taiwan shortly before the election. 
During the campaign she carried pictures of her mother-in-law and 
children and told the story of their murder in her speeches and cam-
paign literature. She campaigned actively and gave emotional 
speeches in public. On a number of occasions she provoked the au-
dience to become emotional and even to throw money at her. 
In contrast, moderate Kang Ning-hsian, standing on his laurels, 
generally refused to campaign. He expected an easy victory. The 
polls predicted his win, which until the day of the election seemed 
certain. Kang's attitude, his meager campaign effort, his split with 
the dang wai radicals and the fact that a disenchanted KMT candi-
33. Ibid 
34. See e.g., Maria Shao, supra note 26. 
35. See ibid Cf, "A Triumph for the Kuomintang." Asiaweek, December 16, 1983, 
p. 23. 
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date ran without Party approval and appealed to poorer and less 
educated voters in Kang's district probably explains Kang's defeat 
more than a shift of dang waivoter support from moderate to radical 
candidates. 36 
Huang Tien-fu, a dang wai incumbent from the same district as 
Kang and who was defined as a radical, lost for many of the same 
reasons Kang lost: the split in the dang wai and the KMT rebel can-
didate taking votes away. Furthermore, most dang wai candidates 
that frequently mentioned the Kaohsiung Incident, martial law and 
human rights without putting forth other issues lost their audiences 
and ultimately were not voted into office. Ideological dang wai can-
didates, as in the 1980 election, generally lost. Other than the larger 
number of victors among more "radical" dang wai candidates, there 
is little evidence for a shift in dang wai supporters in terms of radi-
cals versus moderates. 
It can also be argued that the dang wai "moderates" are really 
misnamed: they are simply more experienced or have had more con-
tacts with the government. Since the dang wai vote in large part rep-
resents a protest vote as witnessed by the fact that few dang wai 
incumbents won, it naturally did not favor those that were defined as 
"moderates." In contrast, the so-called "radical" vote may better be 
defined as protest vote. 
In terms of big individual winners in the election, Lin Keng-
shen, a male Taiwanese, age 48 and a member of the KMT, was the 
biggest winner, receiving 141,941 votes.37 Lin was an excellent cam-
paigner and could boast of experience in politics, a clean record, 
good education and the support of other leading politicians. His 
large support came primarily from voters who viewed him as highly 
qualified and expected a good performance from him. The second 
largest vote getter was Yu Chen Yueh-ying, female, Taiwanese, age 
57, recommended and supported by the dang wai Yu was well 
known because her father-in-law was one of the important dang wai 
politicians in the 1970s and who was arrested following the 1979 
anti-government protest after the U.S. broke diplomatic relations 
with the ROC. Yu may be described as somewhat moderate among 
the radical dang wai politicians. 
Fang Su-min, already mentioned, was the third largest winner 
36. See Andrew Tanzar, "Strategy Wins Out: The Ruling Kuomintang Outmaneu-
vers a Disorganized Opposition," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 122, No. 50, De-
cember 15, 1983, p. 17. 
37. See Free China Weekly, December 4, 1983. 
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in terms of number of votes. She benefited from a huge sympathy 
vote and other dang wai candidates helping her-including "moder-
ate" Kang Ning-hsiang. She also had a strong base of support in her 
home town because of this some competing candidates dropped out 
of the election early, leaving more votes for her. 
Dang wai candidates generally were bigger winners than their 
KMT counterparts, which reflects good individual efforts but poor 
collective planning. KMT candidates were more consistent in their 
campaigning and showed more cooperation with other party mem-
bers in terms of helping others to victory. They also had help from 
KMT officials in other branches of the government. In contrast, 
some dang wai candidates got some help from some dang wai repre-
sentatives in the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, the Con-
trol Yuan, and from some sympathetic local government officials, 
but in relative terms, this was not very profitable. 38 
A number of implications can be drawn from the results of this, 
the second national election with party (or Party versus dang wm) 
competition. It was an important election simply because it was held 
and took place peacefully and without major incident. Some had 
described the 1980 election as unique or an "election holiday," sug-
gesting that it was staged for foreign observers and did not set a pre-
cedent in terms of genuine political change or democratization. 
Obviously this charge is no longer credible. The 1983 election was 
even more open and competitive. At the same time, however, it was 
less exciting because it was the second one and because understand-
ings between and among the competitors had become customary. In 
addition, the new Election and Recall Law improved upon the previ-
ous set of laws and made possible the new smoother and fairer 
elections. 
The election can be described as mirroring three processes going 
on politically in the Republic of China: democratization, 
Taiwanization and rejuvenation.39 Clearly democracy was in ac-
tion-more so even than in previous elections because both the can-
didates and the public were less inhibited about exercising free 
speech. Candidates were more aware of what they should not say in 
terms of what the public did not want to hear or issues that were not 
important. Thus, there was more genuine free speech and less free 
38. See Tanzar, "Strategy Wins Out," Far Eastern Economic Review. Vol. 122, No. 
50 (December 15, 1983), p. 15 for further details. 
39. See Steve Lohr, "Voting in Taiwan is a Sign of Gains," New York Times, Decem-
ber 5, 1983, p. A7. 
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speech simply for the sake of free speech. This translates into work-
ing democracy. 
The political system was Taiwanized inasmuch as the over-
whelming majority of the winning candidates were Taiwanese. The 
KMT, often thought of as a party of Mainlanders, successfully pro-
moted mostly Taiwanese candidates. Thus it can truly be said to be 
a party of all citizens. 
The political system was rejuvenated inasmuch as a legislative 
body which had an average age of 78 was made younger. The newly 
elected are more energetic and will tend to dominate debate in the 
Legislative Yuan even though they are still in a minority strictly in 
terms of numbers. Considering the fact that many of the older mem-
bers do not attend Legislative Yuan sessions, and, when they do they 
lack the ability or energy to engage in debate, the body is already 
functioning as a democratically elected body. 
Some critics have argued that the results indicate this election 
was less competitive-because the dang wai lost. In fact, looking be-
yond the number of winners and losers, the election results were 
mixed. For example, the KMT won a slightly smaller percent of the 
popular vote than in 1980. Moreover, the reason for the KMT vic-
tory in this election can be attributed almost solely to two thing: bet-
ter planning and superior strategy. Also the KMT had more 
candidates. The KMT nominated 58 candidates for 41 seats in con-
trast to 1980 when it nominated 38 for 70 seats. The KMT also ex-
perienced fewer running without Party nomination-{) with approval 
and 28 without permission 42 fewer than in 1980. Party discipline 
was maintained much better and members who resisted were effec-
tively punished. This produced a more unified campaign effort and 
helped foster cooperation and consistency in KMT electioneering. 
Thus, plus careful and studious planning, won them the election. 
If one wants to add something else, it may be good fortune. Not 
even the staunchest opponents of the KMT accused them of rigging 
the election. Some criticized certain provisions of the new Election 
and Recall Law that discriminated against the dang wai. But few, if 
any, had any illusions that this is why the dang wai failed in the 
election. It was their lack of organization, in-fighting, their inferior 
qualification in terms of education and experience and their resort to 
emotionalism and non-issues. 
It seems likely that the dang waiwillleam from this election and 
will do better in the next one. Better planning and a well thought 
out election strategy should improve their showing in 1986. It seems 
likely that some of the dang wai candidates who won because of sym-
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pathy votes will not perform well in debates in the Legislative Yuan; 
or they will learn some lessons in political realism very quickly. 
Some already appear to have adopted more moderate views. The 
losers will probably teach a lesson to others that will run in future 
elections: that the voting public is concerned with issues and that 
professionalism in politics is a sine qua non for victory. 
The KMT demonstrated a high degree of professionalism in this 
election. This is why they won. It also explains why the Party was 
able to make concessions in terms of allowing the dang wai to com-
pete even more freely and to continue to organize and behave as a 
political party. One can expect that this will be precedent setting in 
terms of future party competition. This thus confirms some of the 
conclusions made about the 1980 election and comments made in 
previous chapters: that democracy is evolving through competitive 
elections and party politics. However, it does not necessarily mean 
that a two-party system is developing. If the dang wai remains fac-
tionalized, the Republic of China will evolve into a one-party domi-
nant system as exists in Japan. In this connection it is worth noting 
that there are no working two-party systems anywhere in East Asia. 
If this election is a guide to the future there will be less voting 
along ethnic lines, the military will not influence so many votes, the 
electorate becoming younger will reflect "younger" issues, and inter-
est groups will probably weaken as will almost all traditional group-
ings to which politicians appeal. Replacing interest groups will be 
professional groups and newly forming blocs based upon new inter-
ests. The business community and the press will be even more influ-
ential in future elections. 
Seats representing professional and other groups will probably 
become more competitive in the future. In the past elections, candi-
dates representing these groups were almost assured election if they 
won the support of the group or got the KMT nomination. Usually 
they had both and were only "elected" in a pro forma manner. Dur-
ing this election these seats became subject to KMT -dang wai compe-
tition. The Young China Party and the Democratic Socialist Party 
also competed for these seats. In fact, there was heated campaigning 
and party or professional nomination meant much less.40 It is likely 
that they will become even more competitive in the next election. 
Polling was more important in this election in that more candi-
dates paid attention to opinion polls in determining what issues to 
40. See China Post, November 25, 1983 for a description of some of the competition 
for professional and other group seats, p. I. 
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stress in the campaigning. The polls did not prove worthy, however, 
in predicting winners.41 But this is likely to come. As mentioned in 
an earlier chapter, Chinese are basically suspicious of polls; but this 
is changing. 
The role of the press has been changing. It is playing a greater 
role in campaigns and elections. Before and during this election 
there was much more editorializing as compared to the past. The 
press obviously influenced more votes than before. Candidates 
made special efforts to cultivate the press and did things especially to 
attract press attention. Some candidates, especially dang wai candi-
dates, focused their attention on their own publications. But this was 
a diminishing trend. More channeled their energies and attention to 
the established newspapers, both local and national. 
Money politics was a less serious problem than in the 1980 elec-
tion, in large part due to the more vigorous controls established via 
the new Election and Recall Law and the more severe penalties for 
violations. There was less vote buying, bribery and vote showing (to 
prove to the buyer that he actually bought a vote) in this election 
than in the past election. The use of money, however, remains a 
serious problem. It seems to be a problem, judging from the 1983 
election, that cannot be resolved easily, if at all. Taiwan has simply 
become too affluent, too quickly. Maintaining the status quo or 
making marginal progress may be the best that can be expected. 
Violence, violations of the election laws and other behavior det-
rimental to the institutionalization of democratic procedures were 
not serious problems. Incidents of violence, intimidation and other 
irregular behavior were minimal. In the 1983 election, controlling 
violence was facilitated by a high level of public concern about 
crime, which was increased at the time because of several incidences 
of crime during the campaign period that did not relate to the elec-
tion but required stem police action. In any case, there seems to be 
sufficient public concern and support for police organizations that 
future elections will not evoke lawlessness, notwithstanding the 
changed atmosphere of Taiwan's elections and continued apprehen-
sion by many that this will occur. 
In short, the 1983 election in the Republic of China signifies 
41. This was not only true of the polls that predicted that Kang Ning-hsiang was an 
easy winner. Many other polls published during the campaign were also incorrect re-
garding voting for specific candidates as well as voter turnout and trends. See, e.g., "Vot-
ing Results Predicted in Local Papers," China Post, December I, 1983, and "Two ofTen 
Non-Partisan Legislators Expected to Retain their Seats," China Post, December 3, 1983, 
and compare the predictions with the actual results. 
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continued campaign competitiveness, democratization and political 
development. It marks another step in a long process that over the 
last ten to twelve years has rapidly accelerated. Taiwan should now 
be regarded as a model or prototype for other nations to follow. It 
has democratized quickly without a bloody revolution. The 1983 
election is further proof that credit is due for these 
accomplishments. 42 
42. For a short analysis of the election in terms of its importance to the United 
States, see A. James Gregor, "Election Proves Democracy is Alive and Well in ROC," 
New York Tribune, January 26, 1984, p. lB. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
An analysis of the election process in the ROC-the constitu-
tional provisions for elections, the election laws, campaigns and elec-
tions themselves-proves that significant progress in political 
modernization has occurred. Taiwan's political system now includes 
party competition. It is much more democratic. Political leaders are 
much more responsive. Political freedomshave expanded commen-
surate with the economic freedoms provided several decades ago, 
making elections much more free and meaningful. Taiwan's leader-
ship is also acutely aware that if the Republic of China is to survive, 
it must prove that it has the support of the population. Only a demo-
cratic Taiwan will survive; an undemocratic one will be sacrificed to 
the People's Republic of China. 
Taiwan's elections are important for still other reasons. Among 
them is the fact that the Republic of China is a model for other na-
tions in terms of the role elections will play in political moderniza-
tion. Taiwan has institutionalized representative, open and 
competitive elections faster than perhaps any country in modem 
times. Some would say that it was forced to do this-by the United 
States and the international community. Regardless of the impetus, 
Taiwan has done it, and successfully so. Other developing nations 
are also under pressure to democratize, and elections are the most 
important proof of that process working. 
Taiwan's political development is also in many ways unique. It 
has not slavishly adopted Western democracy. In fact, the Republic 
of China has avoided some of the pitfalls and undesirable character-
istics of Western democracy. It may be in the process of making 
what some have called "Asian democracy" more widely known and 
appreciated. 
Reiterating several points made earlier before explaining the 
meaning of this term, Chapter 2 argued that democracy is not new to 
the Republic of China. Clearly, there are democratic roots in Chi-
nese tradition and political culture. These co-exist with authorita-
rian tendencies, a bureaucratic system and an innate fear of political 
instability. Thus, Chinese democratic traditional differs from the 
Western experience in some important ways. But there are also 
some important similarities. The rulers' need for popular approval 
and the concern for the welfare of the masses, both of which give the 
rulers legitimacy, are similar to the assumptions upon which democ-
racy was built in the West. The importance of morally correct be-
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havior among the political elite and its role in establishing political 
legitimacy are more important traditions than in the West. 
Western democracy also influenced Chinese political thought. 
It began to have a strong impact on China in the 1800s. After Sun 
Yat-sen's revolution in 1911 China attempted to institutionalize 
Western democratic political forms. But traditionalism, factional-
ism, warlordism, World War II, and civil war between the Commu-
nists and the Nationalists impeded its progress for some time. When 
the Republic of China moved to Taiwan in 1949 its leaders faced 
other problems that distracted them and served as a reason for not 
implementing democracy immediately. Nonetheless, the system re-
mained constitutionally a democracy. In fact, there were no efforts 
made to change the system; democracy was to be realized sometime 
in the future. 
While there was pressure on Taiwan from the early 1950s from 
the U.S. and other Western nations to adopt Western democracy 
wholesale, the most rapid progress in modernizing and democratiz-
ing the system has occurred in the last decade-when economic 
growth had laid the groundwork for political change and moderniza-
tion and when it was clear that the excesses of Western democracy 
could be avoided (and when the Western democratic model was less 
credible). Thus, the Western democratic political model was used 
selectively. 
Observers have also noted that the process of political develop-
ment in Taiwan has been an evolutionary one, not a revolutionary 
one. This viewpoint may, however, be in some ways deceptive. 
Rapid economic growth and the rather formidable penetration of 
ideas and culture from outside--coming from tourism, trade and the 
presence of American military forces in the country until 1979-
evoked significant and lasting social change in Taiwan. In the sense 
that political change did not cause social disruption, democratization 
in Taiwan has not been revolutionary. In the sense that it has been 
accomplished in a very short span of time, it has been revolutionary. 
Why has this generally gone unnoticed? There are two explanations. 
First, foreign observers especially of liberal persuasion define the 
R.O.C.'s polity as authoritarian without redeeming or secondary 
qualities---<)bviously a superficial view. They have been unwilling to 
recognize the depth the change that has occurred and are reluctant to 
redefine the system as a democratic or mostly democratic system. 
Second, Taiwan's leaders do not want to overstate the democratiza-
tion of the nation's polity; instead, they want to stress respect for 
Chinese political culture, which gives the impression that change can 
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come only slowly. Thus, they do not stress the magnitude of polit-
ical change that has occurred in Taiwan. 
Others have believed that economic development preceded 
political development and was the cause not the result of political 
change. Never are such things so clearly black and white or simple 
cause and effect. Obviously, one could also argue that economic 
change caused social change, which in turn fostered political mod-
ernization. It seems, however, more accurate to say that all of these 
changes occurred together and were mutually reinforcing. Surely 
economic and social change could not have transpired at the pace 
they did had the political system been a primitive one or its political 
leaders opposed to progress. At minimum the political system al-
lowed change and as it did, it modernized even quicker to allow for 
further change. In some ways, at least, the political system may be 
said to have modernized before the economy began to develop. This 
can certainly be said of the Constitution-which has not been re-
vised or rewritten to adapt to economic modernization and yet is 
compatible with rapid economic change. 
Another point that deserves repeating is the fact that local gov-
ernment in Taiwan was already operating in a democratic fashion in 
the 1950s. Since the workings of local government, not to mention 
local elections, were not noticed very much by outside observers, it 
was assumed that the system was undemocratic and that little polit-
ical modernization had occurred. The fact that local government op-
erated in a representative, democratic way made possible both 
economic growth and democratization at the national level at a high 
rate of speed. This must be taken into consideration to understand 
Taiwan's political change and the degree of democratization at-
tained by 1984. 
Of course, the most convincing proof that political development 
of a democratic kind has been rapid and is vast in its scope are Tai-
wan's recent competitive party elections. The 1980 election was pos-
itive proof that democracy could and would work. Since then party 
competition has been a vital part of the political process. The fact 
that the dang wairemain technically illegal and the "Temporary Pro-
visions" have not been amended or discarded matters very little. 
One must look beyond superficial appearances. The dang wai is ac-
cepted as legitimate competition that has a right to criticize and pro-
pose alternative solutions to problems and new ways of making the 
system work. Commensurately, dang wai politicians have come to 
treat the KMT as an opponent, not an enemy, regarding themselves 
as a loyal opposition. 
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In this connection, political parties and party influenced com-
petitive elections were not part of American democracy in its early 
stages of development. Nor was this the case in the development of 
democracy in most other Western nations in the early stages. Thus, 
one might conclude that by the early 1980s the Republic of China 
had reached a kind of "take off'' stage in terms of the development 
of democracy. Reaching this stage in just over three decades, consid-
ering the external threat Taiwan faced and the centrifugal tendencies 
fostered by provincial differences that were exacerbat~d in the late 
1940s by a government staffed almost exclusively by Mainland Chi-
nese that controlled the majority Taiwanese, is extraordinary. It is 
also remarkable when compared to the political development made 
by most developing countries during this same time frame. 
Besides the fact that democracy was allowed to work at the local 
level from the very beginning and thus "seep up" (many in the West, 
especially in the United States, think of democracy seeping down, 
not up), and the existence of competitive elections after 1980, is the 
fact that government at the top, though not evolving very fast toward 
democracy in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in the sense of com-
petitive elections, was by the mid 1970s taking rapid strides in be-
coming more fair, efficient and responsive to public demands. In 
other words, the national government during the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s reformed by getting rid of corruption and red tape and becom-
ing sensitive to the needs of a rapidly modernizing nation economi-
cally before undertaking significant political change. Some other 
countries did it the other way around-with much less successful 
results. 
Hence one can argue that in 1980 competitive national elections 
were in many ways a natural or logical development of what had 
transpired up to that time in terms of local democracy matched by 
reform and efficiency in the government at the top. Outside observ-
ers not sympathetic with the leadership of the Republic of China 
spoke of a "revolutionary gap" that existed because of the tremen-
dous progress made in economic development, not accompanied by 
commensurate progress in political modernization. This gap was ob-
viously not as serious as it appeared if it was a problem at all. Nor 
did the distractors realize how easy it was to fill that gap. This is 
obvious in retrospect; it should have been apparent to the critics 
sooner than it was. 
This is not to demean the importance of encouragement and 
pressure from the U.S. to democratize the system. Liberals in the 
U.S. were fond of attacking the Republic of China for its human 
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rights abuses, its authoritarianism and its "police state" atmosphere. 
Taiwan was sensitive to this. Taipei's friends in the U.S. were less 
critical, but were in many ways more persuasive. They said that it 
was much easier to help Taiwan if it implemented democracy at the 
national level. Meanwhile Taiwan's citizens were painfully aware of 
the need to please both the U.S. and the global community in this 
regard in order to survive. Democracy thus became the lynch pin for 
survival of the nationstate and the retention of its sovereignty, know-
ing that the United Nations and the world community supported 
self-determination as a means of deciding the future of territory in 
dispute and knowing that a democratic system offered both evidence 
and the right of choice. The Republic of China suffered a serious 
shock to its legitimacy in 1971 when it was expelled from the United 
Nations and again in 1978 when the United States transferred diplo-
matic recognition to the People's Republic of China. The need for 
decisive action at this time was apparent to both the government and 
the populace. 
The majority of the electorate in Taiwan if asked about the 
speed of democratizing the political process would say that it has 
been too fast, engendering a serious danger of political instability. 
However, viewed against the emergency situations just mentioned, 
they would also say that they had to take some degree of risk. The 
bottom line then is: given the entire situation, the majority would 
say that the rate of democratization has been about right. And this 
seems likely to remain so of future political development. 
This evokes the question: how democratic is the Republic of 
China's political processes and political system now? This, of 
course, is a difficult question. How democratic any political system 
in the West or anywhere else is cannot be said with any degree of 
certainty or accuracy. It is in large part a subjective judgment. Nev-
ertheless some assessment needs to at least be attempted. 
In terms of participation in regular, honest elections, the Repub-
lic of China deserves high marks. Voter turnout compares very fa-
vorably to the United States-where turnout is generally just over 
fifty percent in presidential elections and below fifty percent in off 
year elections. In fact, Taiwan's record is much better. Taiwan's 
voter turnout is about the same as European democracies where the 
rate of voting is considered good or in Japan or Singapore where 
voter turnout is high. Polls taken asking about confidence in govern-
ment or the responsiveness of government to the needs and demands 
of the citizens is also high-in fact, consistently higher than the 
United States and almost all Western democracies. Perhaps this is 
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because the average citizen expects less from government. Still, gov-
ernment in Taiwan deserves high marks for instituting changes de-
manded by the public. Clearly, it has done what the population 
wants more than in most countries. 
In terms of the cost of government, corruption and bureaucracy, 
the Republic of China would compete well with the United States 
and other Western democracies. The cost of government is, in fact, 
much less. So is corruption. Bureaucratic red tape is reflected less in 
the speed the government passes legislation, issues permits and 
licenses, and completes private sector projects. 
In contrast, in terms of providing for the people's livelihood, the 
Republic of China would not rank as well. The same is true in the 
realms of public safety, environmental protection, and similar areas. 
This, however, is not proof of lower levels of progress toward de-
mocracy. The public is less concerned about these things than it is 
about efficiency in government and lower taxes. Also rather impres-
sive progress has been made in these areas as well as welfare, work-
ers' rights, housing, etc. in recent years. Inasmuch as leaders in most 
democratic countries the majority, like Taiwan, prefers lower taxes, 
less government control, these things probably do not reflect just 
how far democracy has progressed anyway. They are merely de-
mands to which the political system must respond. 
Does Taiwan's political system have a problem with undemo-
cratic rules, too much power in the hands of the courts and other 
non-elective bodies or money control in politics? Clearly it rates 
well compared to the U.S. and other democratic systems in the first 
two realms. In the last category the Republic of China has a prob-
lem, though it is probably not any more serious than in the U.S., 
European nations or in Japan or Singapore. It remains to be seen 
how the Republic of China will deal with "money politics." 
The fact that the National Assembly indirectly elects the Presi-
dent is to some degree undemocratic-but it is not unlike the electo-
ral college in the U.S. or the system of electing the heads of 
governments in parliamentary systems. The fact that many of the 
representatives of this elected body represent provinces other than 
Taiwan does make the system undemocratic. On the other hand, 
something may be said in defense of the National Assembly: it has 
never selected a president that does not have the support of the pop-
ulation. The U.S. electoral college has. European parliaments have. 
Also, inasmuch as this is in reality a decision made by the Party, the 
existence of delegates that are not elected in Taiwan does not, to the 
degree that some observers suggest, make the system undemocratic. 
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It will, however, in the future assuming party competition becomes a 
part of the political system. Yet, the reduction through attrition of 
old delegates is faster than the growth of the opposing parties in 
Taiwan. 
There are other undemocratic facets about the "Temporary Pro-
visions": but they are not serious impediments to the system evolv-
ing further in the direction of competitive democracy. Certainly 
martial law is not considered an obstacle to a better political system 
or democracy in the minds of most in Taiwan. Numerous public 
opinion polls have so indicated. In fact, some would argue that it 
has furthered the democratic process inasmuch as it preserves polit-
ical stability-the milieu in which democracy develops. Clearly 
there is a contradiction in arguing that it should be abolished to 
make the system more democratic, when the majority wants to keep 
it. 
The fact that the Legislative Yuan has less political power than 
its counterparts in many Western systems may also be said to consti-
tute evidence of lack of progress in the democratization process. 
This, however, is typical of presidential systems. In Taiwan's case it 
is also offset by the popularity of the executive branch of government 
and high ratings given it by the public as well as its responsiveness to 
public demands. It is less democratic than the Legislative Yuan in 
the sense it is not elected; however, the Executive Yuan is considered 
more reflective of public demands and is certainly more efficient. 
That the judicial branch of government in Taiwan is not as 
powerful as its counterparts in Western democracies may in this con-
text be said to be a point of argument in favor of greater democracy 
in Taiwan. Inasmuch as the judiciary is not elected the fact it has 
less authority would mean Taiwan's political system is more demo-
cratic. Clearly, the Judicial Yuan in the Republic of China has not 
encroached upon legislative authority as it has in many Western 
democracies. 
Discussing minority rights and basic freedoms, Taiwan in a 
number of respects compares favorably to Western democracies. 
Minority rights are protected in the Constitution and provision is 
made in the electoral processes to represent various groups that 
would otherwise not be sufficiently represented. In other words, the 
election system of the Republic of China as specified in the Constitu-
tion protects various minorities from the "tyranny of the majority." 
Professional labor (labor is not well organized in Taiwan and there-
fore needs representation-though it is not suffering in the sense la-
bor conditions are not improving or that business can exploit 
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unemployment), women and racial minorities are given special rep-
resentation. This is not yet common in most Western democracies. 
In the constitutional sense it may be said that the Republic of China 
is ahead of most Western democracies in protecting minority rights 
since Western constitutions generally do not contain such provisions. 
In this connection, the representation of Overseas Chinese in 
Taiwan's elections has been criticized as undemocratic and labeled 
by some as an advantage arrogated by the KMT. The legal argu-
ment in support of this is the fact that Overseas Chinese are regarded 
as citizens of the Republic of China. In the sense they are guaran-
teed certain citizen's rights this makes more sense. On the other 
hand, it is not justified otherwise (especially politically) and may be-
come a more contentious issue as it becomes more and more clear 
that the Republic of China represents Taiwan only and that the citi-
zens of Taiwan alone should have the right to elect their political 
representatives. 
Women are given a special place in the Republic of China's 
electoral system. Women have won more seats in elective bodies 
than in almost all Western democracies. Singapore-rated the sec-
ond best political system in the world by the Book of the Bests and 
generally ranked as one of Asian's most democratic systems-has 
only one woman in the legislative branch of government. Japan, the 
U.S., and most European nations have considerably fewer than Tai-
wan. Never has the electorate in the U.S. came close to electing 
eleven percent women to either the Senate or the House as happened 
in Taiwan in the last election. Hence, this aspect of "affirmative ac-
tion" is probably no longer needed in Taiwan-if it ever was. 
Taiwan's aborigine population-a group similar in status and 
livelihood to the American Indian in the U.S.-is better represented 
both constitutionally and in real terms in the Republic of China 
through elections than their counterparts are in the U.S. or in most 
other nations. They are given special electoral rights and have been 
given representation and a voice in government in practice. 
Regarding progress in basic freedoms and liberties, religious 
freedom has always been respected in Taiwan. Taiwan is, in fact, 
regarded as outstanding in terms of religious freedoms. When the 
Nationalists took political control of Taiwan, this freedom, which 
was also a basic tenet of the political system was preserved. In fact, 
religious freedom has not been impeded in any noticeable way in 
Taiwan since 1949. This cannot be said of many Western democra-
cies. Today, with the exception of the Unification Church (the 
Moonies), which is banned for what may be defined as social or 
120 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
political reasons, any religious group is allowed to freely practice or 
seek converts in Taiwan. There are virtually no controls and there 
is, in fact, almost no government concern. This is not true of most 
Western nations. 
Freedom of speech and the press have been vastly increased in 
the Republic of China-both parallel with political development 
and to a large extent in conjunction with free competitive elections. 
Party competition in elections would not be meaningful if free 
speech and free press did not exist. Thus, while these freedoms were 
being expanded anyway, the greater role given to competitive elec-
tions and the advances made in democratization and political devel-
opment due to growth of party competition in elections, much more 
rapid progress was made. 
Inasmuch as the political culture defines freedom of speech and 
the press to a large degree, something needs to be said in this context 
about the progress made in recent years in expanding the scope of 
these freedoms. The exercise of these freedoms is often seen by for-
eigner observers to be quite restricted because of the absence of per-
sonal criticism of Taiwan's political leaders. The basic reason 
freedom of speech and the press do not include this is cultural. Chi-
nese consider it uncouth to make personal diatribes about top polit-
ical leaders inasmuch as this would reflect badly upon themselves 
(since they picked and supported them) and their nation. Citizens of 
the Republic of China point out that there are obstacles to free 
speech in the U.S. and other Western nations. For example, in the 
United States evidence for racial inequality is seldom discussed in 
public or the press. The reporting of international news favors cer-
tain countries and causes. There is an inordinate bias toward liberal 
causes in the press. Even certain regions are not represented well in 
the U.S. media. 
In any case, there are numerous examples of free speech of a 
political nature in Taiwan. During the last election in Taiwan dang 
wai candidates advocated that President Chiang Ching-kuo step 
down, saying that he was too old and not in good health. Critics 
referred to some of the meeting places of KMT members of the Na-
tional Assembly and Legislative Yuan as gerontocracy wards or "dy-
ing holes." They have remarked in public that older KMT members 
cannot believe in democracy, since they cannot practice it-not be-
ing able to debate because they cannot hear or be understood when 
they speak. They frequently made reference to the immoral behav-
ior of certain leaders in high positions and the venality or corruption 
of people in positions of power who are deserving of such oppro-
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brium. These things are heard more frequently than in Western na-
tions. Dang wai politicians have even used terms used by the 
Communist Party of the People's Republic of China when referring 
to certain leaders they considered less than competent. 
It is very clear if one reads the Chinese newspapers in Taiwan 
that press freedom has increased markedly in recent years. Citizens 
of the Republic of China hear of cases almost weekly of the Govern-
ment Information Office asking the press not to report on something 
which they do anyway-saying that if they do not another paper will 
and they do not want to be scooped. The newspapers are full of 
editorials about improving the political system, political problems 
that need to be resolved, cases of corruption, etc. Many editorial 
writers in Taiwan have become specialists in political speculation. 
Others have become professional political satirists. 
In fact, the expansion of press freedom and freedom of speech 
has created a backlash. A large segment of the population feels that 
there is now too much press freedom. A majority would opine that 
at least in some realms the press regularly takes advantage of press 
freedom and is excessive in its use of its license. This in part ex-
plains why the majority feels that political advertisements in the me-
dia should not be permitted and why the election laws should ban 
this. 
Freedom of assembly and association have not been restricted 
since the outbreak of mass opposition to the government in 1947. 
There are no restrictions in practice other than those that also exist 
in Western democracies with perhaps one exception: assembly is 
limited during the campaign period (applied to candidates only). 
And the purpose of this is to preserve public order and it is not 
something that the majority opposes. Thus the progress made in de-
mocratization as a result of holding competitive elections has sup-
ported basic freedoms more than it has created them. It has made 
the use of them more common; otherwise it has had little effect. 
These freedoms were already practiced. 
Finally, something needs to be said about the future of elections 
in the Republic of China and the party competition that has been 
witnessed in recent elections. It seems unlikely that a two party sys-
tem is evolving in Taiwan, or at least evolving very quickly-
notwithstanding the fact that elections have become competitive in 
the party sense in recent years. There is no two party system any-
where in Asia, even in Singapore and Japan. Both are one party-
dominant systems. The Republic of China is almost certain to re-
main a one-party dominant system for some time. The growth of a 
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two party system is possible. But it probably will not happen. There 
are a number of reasons for this. 
Taiwan has accomplished a miracle economically. The popula-
tion of Taiwan does not want to destroy the standard of living it has 
built over the last three decades. Thus, Taiwan's electorate is con-
servative, at least in this sense. Certainly it is cautious. Hence it is 
likely that, as of the fashion of opposition parties in Japan that are 
protest parties, the dang wai will become that also-if it has not al-
ready. The KMT is given credit for Taiwan's economic develop-
ment and most perceive it as the best bet to continue economic 
growth or protect it. Why change the system? 
Furthermore, the business community in Taiwan (which is 
largely Taiwanese) has developed a very good working relationship 
with the KMT and it is business that is now supplying Taiwan's fu-
ture leaders. The KMT has been dominated by Mainland Chinese; 
but it has been strongly pro-business. The business community re-
gards the dang wai as radical in many ways anti-business or socialist. 
Thus, while business leaders want more Taiwanese in positions of 
authority, they also are very apprehensive of this trend-particularly 
as it is envisioned by the dang wai. If it is assumed that the dang 
wals future to a large extent depends upon their ability to raise 
funds and win support from the business community, it seems likely 
that it will have growth problems. 
The dang wai does face some political issues: the dang wai ad-
vocates an end to the policy of return to the mainland and stresses 
Taiwan's autonomous status. In this sense they are realistic and 
more internationlist. But, the KMT's repose is also irrefutably logi-
cal: why provoke Peking when time is on our side? Declaring inde-
pendence would be provocative. Declaring a "Republic of Taiwan" 
would also result in more nations breaking diplomatic relations and 
the loss of some important international treaties. .Dang wai candi-
dates have not been able to effectively refute this argument. 
The influence of the U.S. on Taiwan politics, however, in some 
ways favor the dang wai and probably will in the future. In the 
United States a political opposition is generally seen as important 
evidence democracy is really working. It also is seen as proof of 
respect for basic freedoms and human rights-both in a sense that 
the dang wai stress both of these and they are more aggressive in 
their utilization of protections of basic freedoms in their political ac-
tivities. Taiwan is no longer dependent upon the U.S. for economic 
assistance; but trade (now nearly fifty percent of Taiwan's imports go 
to the U.S.), political, and military ties (the U.S. remains vital to the 
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defense of the Republic of China even though this may be informal) 
are without doubt any more important than the aid once was. Thus 
the political leadership of the Republic of China will remain sensi-
tive to American opinion about Taiwan. This almost guarantees 
that the dang wai will be entitled to continue to try to become an 
opposition party. 
It is also important to note that the population of Taiwan has 
great respect for American democracy for a very special reason. 
Nearly all of the Chinese-and there are many-who have attained 
international acclaim in higher learning and who have become 
known for their scientific achievements (including Nobel prizes) 
have done so in the U.S. Inevitably Chinese in Taiwan perceive that 
the milieu of American democracy (despite its many faults) has 
something to do with this. It seems likely that this perception will 
remain. This is both a reason for abhoring communism and a cause 
for respecting American democracy. 
In fact, along with admiring the U.S. political system and using 
it as a model, the dang wai has made this point often. It seems to 
help the dang wai cause. So, of course, does America's influence in 
international affairs-which has revived (especially in Asia) in re-
cent years after reaching its nadir after the Vietnam War. 
It seems likely that the dang wai will continue to grow and 
maintain ties with the U.S. This will not, however, make it an inter-
national, cosmopolitan party. After all the dang wai also appeals to 
local and parochial interests. It is also narrow in outlook in some 
ways. It is also divided and future growth is likely to create more 
division. In fact, it may well be that the dang wai becomes two or 
more parties in the future. The two factions of the dang wai that 
evolved before 1983 and became competitive during the 1983 na-
tional election may be the basis for two parties in the future. New 
factions yet to form may also become new parties in the future. In 
this case, a dominant party /multiparty system may evolve. 
This conclusion is also warranted if one assumes that the KMT 
will retain the support of the Mainland Chinese and the business 
community and preempt the dang wai for a significant portion of the 
Taiwanese votes. It also seems likely given the fact that the business 
community will play a paramount role in election politics in Taiwan 
for the foreseeable future. Clearly a farm lobby will not gain much 
in strength; it may well decline. Labor is not organized and will 
probably not become a political force for some time, given the fact 
that wages have increased so rapidly without workers organizing and 
the economy remains so competitive with other nations in Asia with 
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labor costs an important factor of the competitive edge. Most inter-
est groups, including professional groups, various organizations and 
minority groups will remain that. 
A multiparty system is a likely possibility if regional politics be-
comes more important. Most outside observers don't realize that 
there are two groups of Taiwanese (Fukien and Hakka) and that 
their political views differ in some important ways. This could be 
the basis for additional parties. Yet given the rate of intermarriage 
and the declining importance of provincialism in Taiwan generally 
this seems unlikely. The success to date of the KMT becoming a 
broadly based party in terms of ethnic support is also evidence that 
ethnic grouping will not be the basis of a party system. 
Wealth and social status may create political divisions in Tai-
wan as is true in many Western democracies--even though income 
disparity is small. Conservative and liberal political views may also 
serve as the foundation for opposing parties, yet this trend is not 
really observable at the present time. Clearly religious and regional 
differences are unlikely to serve as the basis of party support. 
The Taiwanese Independence Movement in the U.S. and Japan 
is likely to continue to influence politics in Taiwan. While this or-
ganization is highly factionalized in both Japan and the U.S., vari-
ous components or factions do not communicate effectively and 
many in Taiwan regard the movement as out of touch with the real-
ity of politics in Taiwan, TIM will probably increase its influence in 
the United States through the Congress and political candidates that 
receive its financial contributions. The TIM will also continue to 
successfully support candidates in Taiwan financially. It is unlikely 
that the government in Taiwan would try to do anything to trample 
this, or would be effective if it tried. Instead, Taipei will probably 
try to take advantage of TIM factionalism and win over its moderate 
leaders and discredit the radicals and terrorists among its 
membership . 
.Dang wai politicians generally regard the TIM as of little use 
except for financial contributions. On the other hand, they do not 
want it discredited; it serves as a kind of"conscience ofTaiwan." Its 
existence also prevents most dang wai politicians from being labelled 
radicals. .Dang wai politicians like to portray themselves as moder-
ates or as progressives and label the "diehards" in the KMT as radi-
cals (as the KMT defines the TIM as radicals). 
The KMT will undoubtedly continue to be plagued by the prob-
lem of being identified with the government and will have to decide 
its future in terms of being an official party and being a mass party. 
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Party discipline was a serious problem in the 1980 national election. 
Yet it was no more serious and probably less serious in the 1983 
election. This problem will probably remain serious and will be the 
subject of debate in the Party. However, the KMT can probably 
cope with these issues and "suffer" as an official or pseudo official 
party. It will have to adjust in some ways-as the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party in Japan and the People's Action Party in Singapore 
have done. The KMT will also find that there are some benefits to 
being regarded as an official or government party that it did not 
realize. 
It seems almost obvious that the KMT will have to continue the 
trend of professionalism in the Party. It will pay attention to expert 
pollsters, political analysts, campaign specialists and others. It will 
be able to help its candidates with expertise in a way the dang wai 
cannot. It will in these ways follow the trends of political parties in 
the West and in Japan and Singapore. It may advertise its profes-
sionalism in the future. 
The building of democracy has not been an easy task anywhere. 
By comparison, the Republic of China's problems are probably not 
very serious. It also appears to have the advantage of emulating the 
West much more cautiously than developing nations did in the 1950s 
that almost all failed. Taiwan also has the perspective of looking to 
Japan and Singapore as models and trying to build a unique form of 
Asian democracy. If Asian democracy can be defined it would be a 
system of government that follows the Western model of seculariza-
tion and role specialization and is pluralistic. But excessive free-
doms and liberalism are avoided and Asian culture moderates the 
system. Society will be more important than the individual-though 
the individuals' energies and talents will be allowed to develop 
freely. Stability and public safety and continued economic growth 
will be more important than in the West. 
If the Republic of China becomes a model of political develop-
ment internationally, which it has already become at least in Asia, 
outside attention will probably have the effect of both encouraging 
and moderating party competition and continued force and open 
elections. With much of Asia and the Third World watching, the 
KMT and the dang wai will no doubt be more tolerant of each other 
and will be more attentive to the rules of the game and legal restric-
tions on elections and protections of basic freedoms during 
campaigning. This will obviously be a good trend, particularly as 
long as it does not create too much idealism about politics among 
Taiwan's population. 
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To date, Taiwan's progress in election politics clearly makes it a 
nation to be emulated. Third World nations need a model. Asian 
democracy, which is yet to be defined clearly, is a model political 
type or style that avoids many of the pitfalls of Western democracy. 
Yet Japan is considered too much a Western nation by many. 
Others perceive it as already too advanced economically and socially 
to be a good model. Obviously Japan did several decades ago and in 
a much different context what developing nations must do now. Sin-
gapore is a city state. It does not have the same problems as larger 
nations. That leaves the Republic of China as perhaps the best 
model of political development in the region of the world that is 
doing the best economically and needs a model for political modern-
ization that matches its economic progress. 

THE PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION 
AND RECALL LAW 
Effective during the Period of Mobilization for Suppressing 
Communist Rebellion 
Promulgated by presidential decree (69) t'ai t'ung (1) yi 
No. 2660, on May 14, 1980 
Promulgated and amended by presidential decree (72) 
t'ai t'ung ( 1) yi 
No. 3742, on July 7, 1983 
Note: This is a translation from the Chinese text of the 
law. In case of any discrepancy between the Chinese and 
English texts, the Chinese text shall govern. 
ARTICLE 1: 
Chapter One 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
The election and recall of public officials during the period of 
mobilization for suppressing Communist rebellion shall be governed 
by the provisions of this law. Matters regarding their election and 
recall not herein stipulated shall be governed by other relevant and 
applicable laws and orders. 
ARTICLE 2: 
The public officials herein referred to mean the following 
personnel: 
1) Of the Central Government: Members of the National Assem-
bly, of the Legislative Yuan, and of the Control Yuan. 
2) Of the local governments: Provincial assemblymen, council-
men of cities of provincial status, county councilmen, council-
men of cities of county status, hsiang (town and shih) 
representatives, magistrates, mayors of cities of county status, 
hsiang (town and shih) chiefs, village leaders and li leaders. 
ARTICLE 3: 
The election of public officials shall be conducted on the basis 
of universal suffrage, equality among citizens and direct and secret 
ballots. But the members of the Control Yuan shall be elected with 
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secret ballots cast by provincial assemblymen and councilmen of the 
cities of provincial status. The number of names entered on each 
ballot in the election of Control Yuan members shall not exceed half 
the number of the members to be elected in the same election. 
The recalls of public officials shall be decided by the electors of 
their respective constituencies with secret ballots. 
ARTICLE 4: 
The deadline day for calculating the ages and the lengths of res-
idence of the electors and the candidates shall be that immediately 
preceding the election day, and the facts concerning their ages and 
lengths of residence shall be those recorded in their household regis-
tration books. 
The length of residence shall begin and shall be counted from 
the day of registration of the fact of moving into a new residence. 
In reholding an election or a balloting, the balloting day last 
fixed for the election shall be the criterion day for calculating the 
ages and the lengths of residence. 
ARTICLE 5: 
The stipulations for the calculation of the various periods herein 
shall be in accordance with the provisions of the civil code, and a 
fixed period shall not be lengthened when its last day is a holiday. 
Chapter Two 
ELECTION AND RECALL ORGANS 
ARTICLE 6: 
For the election of public officials, a central election commis-
sion, provincial election commissions, election commissions of cities 
of provincial status, county election commissions, and election com-
missions of cities of county status shall be established. 
ARTICLE 7: 
The Central Election Commission shall be in charge of the elec-
tions of the members of the National Assembly, the Legislative 
Yuan, the Control Yuan, the provincial assemblies and the councils 
of cities of provincial status. The Commission shall also direct and 
supervise the related inferior election commissions to conduct these 
elections. 
The provincial election commissions shall be in charge of the 
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elections of county councilmen, city councilmen, magistrates and 
mayors, and shall also direct and supervise the county and city elec-
tion commissions to conduct these elections. 
The county election commissions shall conduct the elections of 
the representatives and the chiefs of hsiangs, towns and shihs 
(municipalities). 
The county election commissions shall conduct the elections of 
the leaders of villages and lis, and the city election commissions shall 
conduct the elections of li leaders. 
The elections provided for in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 shall also be 
under the supervision of the respective superior election 
commission( s ). 
During the election period, the election commissions of the cit-
ies of provincial status and the election commissions of the counties 
and the cities of county status shall establish offices in the districts, 
hsiangs, towns, and shihs to manage election affairs. 
ARTICLE 8: 
The Central Election Commission shall be under the jurisdic-
tion of the Executive Yuan and shall consist of nine to fifteen mem-
bers appointed by the President of the Republic upon the 
recommendation of the President of the Executive Yuan. One of 
them shall be designated as its chairman. The organic rules and reg-
ulations of the Commission shall be drafted by the Executive Yuan 
and shall be submitted to the President of the Republic for his 
approval. 
The provincial election commission shall each consist of five to 
twenty-three members. The election commissions of the cities of 
provincial status shall each consist of seven to eleven members. All 
members shall be appointed by the President of the Executive Yuan 
upon the recommendation of the Central Election Commission. One 
member of each commission shall be designated as its chairman. 
The county election commissions and the election commissions 
of the cities of county status shall each consist of five to nine mem-
bers appointed by the Central Election Commission upon the recom-
mendation of the provincial election commission. One member of 
each commission shall be designated as its chairman. 
The organic rules and regulations of the provincial election 
commissions, the election commissions of the cities of provincial sta-
tus, and the election commissions of the counties and of the cities of 
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county status shall be drafted by the Central Election Commission 
and shall be subject to the approval of the Executive Yuan. 
The members of all election commissions shall be honorary 
without salary. Their terms of office shall be three years, except that 
the post of a member who is appointed because of his holding a cer-
tain public office shall be vacated when he is out of that office and a 
new appointment shall be made. 
ARTICLE 9: 
The recalls of public officials shall be handled by appropriate 
election commissions. For the purpose of handling recalls, Article 7 
shall be applied mutatis mutandis. 
ARTICLE 10: 
During the time of conducting an election or recall, the related 
election commission of any level shall be competent to have the staff 
members of any government agencies transferred and placed under 
its supervision to do election or recall business. 
ARTICLE 11: 
The election commissions of all levels shall be in charge of the 
following affairs: 
1) The proclamation of elections and recalls. 
2) The procedures and plans for elections and recalls. 
3) The screening of the qualifications of candidates. 
4) The planning for election publicity. 
5) The inspection of election and recall activities. 
6) The establishment and management of ballot casting and 
opening stations. 
7) The examination of the results of elections and recalls. 
8) The preparation and issuance of election certificates. 
9) Other affairs related to elections and recalls. 
ARTICLE 12: 
The Central Election Commission shall opt several impartial 
persons who have the right to vote as inspectors at large. They shall 
be appointed by the President of the Executive Yuan upon the rec-
ommendation of the Central Election Commission. One of them 
shall be designated as convener. The election commissions of the 
cities of provincial status, counties, and the cities of county status 
shall each have an inspection group of several members. The respec-
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tive election commissions shall recommend impartial persons having 
voting rights to the Central Election Commission or the provincial 
election commissions for appointment. One member of each group 
shall be designated as its convener. Each inspection group shall exe-
cute the following affairs: 
1) To see if there is violation of any law and regulation regarding 
elections and recalls by any candidate, campaign assistant, re-
call sponsor or public official under recall process. 
2) To see if there is violation of any law or regulation regarding 
elections and recalls by an elector or a recall sponsor. 
3) To see if there is any law violation by the persons executing 
election or recall business. 
4) To oversee other affairs related to elections and recalls. 
All inspectors shall be honorary without salary. The terms of 
office and the number of members shall be stipulated in the organic 
rules and regulations of the Central Election Commission, of the 
election commissions of the cities of provincial status, and of the 
election commissions of counties and the cities of county status. 
The election commissions of the cities of provincial status and 
of the counties and the cities of county status shall each opt impartial 
persons having voting rights as inspectors to work in the meetings of 
political views presentation. 
The work code for inspectors and inspection groups of all levels 
shall be fixed by the Central Election Commission. 
ARTICLE 13: 
The budgets of the election commissions of all levels shall be 
made by the central, provincial (city) and county (municipal) gov-
ernments in accordance with the law. 
ARTICLE 14: 
Chapter Three 
ELECTIONS 
Section 1 Electors 
All nationals of the Republic of China who have attained the 
age of 20 and who do not have any of the following disqualifications 
shall be eligible to vote: 
1) His civil rights have been deprived and have not been 
r~stituted. 
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2) He has been declared incompetent and the declaration has not 
been abrogated. 
ARTICLE 15: 
In an election of public officials representing geographical areas 
a person having the right to vote shall be an elector either in the 
place of his domicile of origin or in the constituency where he has 
lived continuously for six months or longer. 
The regulations regarding domicile of origin shall not apply to 
the elections of representatives of hsiangs, towns and shihs or to the 
elections of the leaders of hsiangs, towns, shihs, villages and lis. 
In the elections of local officials of the cities of provincial status, 
counties, cities of county status, hsiangs, towns and shihs, the length 
of residence of a person as stated in Paragraph 1 shall be based on 
the length of his residence in the administrative area where he lives. 
A person who moves into a new constituency after the proclamation 
of constituencies is made shall have no right to vote in the election. 
ARTICLE 16: 
The electors in an election of the public officials with special life 
habits shall be the electors also with special life habits who have the 
other qualifications set forth in Article 15. 
The electors in an election of the public officials representing an 
occupational or a women organization shall be the electors who have 
been members of their organization for at least six months and also 
have the other qualifications set forth in Article 15. 
The electors in an election of the members of the Control Yuan 
shall be the provincial assemblymen and the councilmen of the cities 
of provincial status. 
ARTICLE 17: 
A person having the right to vote who in one category of elec-
tion has two or more capacities to cast ballots shall choose one of 
them to exercise his right to vote. 
ARTICLE 18: 
A person having the right to vote shall choose a place to exercise 
this right in accordance with the following provisions: 
1) A person qualified to vote both in the place of his domicile of 
origin and in the place of his residence shall exercise his right 
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to vote in the latter place unless he, twenty-five days before the 
balloting day, files a declaration with the household office of 
the hsiang (town, shih, district) of his domicile of origin to the 
effect that he will exercise this right in the place of his domicile 
of origin. 
2) A person qualified to vote both in an occupational or a women 
organization and in a geographical constituency shall exercise 
the right to vote in the occupational or women organization 
unless he (she), sixty days before the balloting day, files a dec-
laration with his (her) organization to the effect that he (she) 
will exercise this right in the geographical constituency. 
3) A person qualified to vote both in an occupational organization 
and in a women organization shall exercise the right to vote in 
the women organization unless she, sixty days before the bal-
loting day, files a declaration with the occupational organiza-
tion to the effect that she will exercise this right in the 
occupational organization. 
4) A person qualified to vote in two or more occupational organi-
zations shall, sixty days before the balloting day, file a declara-
tion with the organization of his choice to the effect that he will 
vote in this organization, and he shall inform the other organi-
zations he belongs of this fact. The one who does not declare 
shall vote in the organization to which he was admitted earlier. 
If he was admitted to two or more organizations on the same 
day, he shall exercise the right to vote in his geographical 
constituency. 
5) A person with special life habits and qualified to vote both in 
an occupational organization and in a women organization 
shall exercise the right to vote in the constituency of persons 
with special life habits unless he (she), sixty days before the 
balloting day, files a declaration with the organization of his 
(her) choice to the effect that he (she) will exercise this right in 
the occupational (women) organization. 
ARTICLE 19: 
If a member of an occupational organization or a women organ-
ization loses its membership 20 days before the balloting day, he or 
she shall not be qualified to vote in the occupational or women or-
ganization. But he or she may exercise the right to vote in his (her) 
geographical constituency or the constituency of persons with special 
life habits in accordance with the law. 
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ARTICLE 20: 
Unless stipulated otherwise, an elector shall cast his ballot at the 
poll of his residence. 
The electors of occupational and women organizations and the 
workers of the polls may cast their ballots at the polls either in the 
places of their household registration or in the places where they 
work. A member of a women or an occupational organization who 
chooses to vote in his (her) working place shall, sixty days before the 
balloting day, file a declaration with his (her) organization to the 
effect that he (she) will vote in his (her) working place. 
The electors who shall elect the members of the Control Yuan 
shall cast their ballots at the polls installed by the election meetings 
held by the provincial assemblies (councils of cities of provincial 
status). 
ARTICLE 21: 
An elector shall obtain his ballot in the poll on the presentation 
of his identification card. 
In the election of the members of the Control Yuan, an elector 
shall obtain his ballot in the poll on the presentation of his credential 
identifying his provincial assemblymanship or city councilmanship. 
ARTICLE 22: 
All electors shall go to the poll to obtain and cast their ballots in 
the prescribed time. After the deadline no one shall be permitted to 
enter the poll. Those who have entered timely but do not yet cast 
their ballots may proceed to cast them. 
Section Two Electoral Registers 
ARTICLE 23: 
The electoral register of a geographical constituency shall be 
compiled by the household office of a hsiang (town, shih, district) 
based on the household registration books. All those who have duly 
registered and in accordance with the law have the right to vote shall 
be included in the register. Those who have moved away from their 
registered residences or changed their domicile registration on any of 
the twenty days before the balloting day shall exercise the right to 
vote in the constituency where they are originally qualified to vote. 
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ARTICLE 24: 
The electoral register of an occupational or a women organiza-
tion shall be compiled by the household office in conformity with the 
provisions of Article 23 above and based on the membership roster 
made and reported by the occupational or women organization. 
Those who have lost their membership on any of the twenty days 
before the balloting day shall exercise the right to vote in the organi-
zation in which they are originally qualified to vote. 
There shall be compiled separate electoral registers of the elec-
tors of occupational and women organizations who have declared to 
the effect that they will cast their ballots in the places where they 
work. 
ARTICLE 25: 
The electoral register of the citizens with special life habits shall 
be compiled by the household office in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article 23 above, and the identification of a citizen as one 
having special life habits shall be based on the record in the house-
hold registration books. 
ARTICLE 26: 
When elections of two or more categories of public officials are 
held at one and the same time, the electoral registers may, according 
to the actual need, be compiled either separately for different elec-
tions or jointly for all the elections. 
ARTICLE 27: 
The electoral registers for the election of the members of the 
Control Yuan shall be compiled by the civil affairs departments of 
the provincial governments and the governments of the cities of pro-
vincial status based on the name lists of provincial assemblymen and 
city councilmen. 
ARTICLE 28: 
The electoral registers of occupational and women organiza-
tions shall be compiled by the respective organizations and shall be 
displayed publicly at the office of each organization 50 days before 
the balloting day for five days for their members to read. Any mem-
ber who finds a mistake or an omission on the register may apply for 
correction during the period of display. 
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ARTICLE 29: 
Upon completion of the compilation of the electoral registers 
the household offices shall submit them to the hsiang (town, shih, 
district) office for transmittal to the election commission of the city 
of provincial status or county or city of county status for reference. 
At the same time it shall send a copy to the respective village or li 
office. The village or li office shall put the copy on display in the 
office for five days. Any citizen who finds a mistake or an omission 
on the copy may apply for correction during the period of display. 
ARTICLE 30: 
At the expiration of public display days the village or li leader 
shall immediately submit the electoral registers together with a re-
port on the applications for corrections, if any, to the hsiang (town 
shih, district) office for transmittal to the household office for re-
checking and re-correcting purposes. 
The electoral registers shall be finally established and fixed after 
public display and corrections, and the election commissions of the 
cities of provincial status and of the counties shall proclaim the num-
bers of electors. 
Section Three Candidates 
ARTICLE 31: 
An elector who has attained the age of 23 may register as candi-
date for a public office, but to be a candidate for county magistrate 
or for mayor of a city of county status one must attain the age of 30, 
and to be a candidate for hsiang (town or shih) chief one must attain 
the age of 25. 
A person whose nationality of the Republic of China has been 
restored for three years or who has been naturalized in the Republic 
of China for ten years shall be eligible to apply for registering as a 
candidate in accordance with the provisions of the above paragraph. 
ARTICLE 32: 
A person intending to register as a candidate in an election for 
public officials shall have to have the following scholastic back-
ground and experience: 
1) A candidate for member of the National Assembly, the Legis-
lative Yuan or the Control Yuan: a senior high school or a 
higher school graduate, or having passed an ordinary or a 
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higher civil service examination, or having served as a provin-
cial assemblyman or a councilman of a city of provincial status 
or as a higher public official for one term. 
2) A candidate for provincial assemblyman or councilman of a 
city of provincial status: a senior high school or a higher school 
graduate, or having passed an ordinary civil service examina-
tion, or having served as a county councilman or a councilman 
of a city of county status or as a higher public official for one 
term. 
3) A candidate for county councilman or councilman of a city of 
county status: a junior high school or a higher school graduate, 
or having passed a Grade D special examination, or having 
served as a hsiang, town or shih representative or as a higher 
public official for one term. 
4) A candidate for hsiang, town or shih representative: a junior 
high school or a higher school graduate, or having passed a 
Grade D special examination or having served as a hsiang, 
town or shih representative or as a higher public official or vil-
lage or li leader for one term. 
5) A candidate for county magistrate or mayor of a city of county 
status: a junior college or a higher school graduate, or having 
passed a high civil service examination with two or more years 
of administrative experience, or having served as hsiang, town 
or shih representative or as a higher public official for two 
years. 
6) A candidate for hsiang, town or shih chief: a senior high school 
or a higher school graduate, or having passed an ordinary civil 
service examination or a higher examination with two years of 
administrative experience or having served as hsiang, town or 
shih representative or as a higher public official for two years. 
7) A candidate for village (b) leader: a junior high school or a 
higher school graduate, or having passed a Grade D special 
examination or having served as a village or /i leader for one 
term. 
The scholastic background and experience set forth in the fore-
going paragraphs shall be determined through a screening process. 
The rules governing the screening of candidates for public officl!s 
shall be decided by the Examination Yuan. 
A person who has passed the screening process required of a 
candidate for a certain public office before the coming into force of 
this law shall be qualified for that office without repeating the 
screening process. 
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A person who has passed the screening process as a qualified 
candidate for membership in the National Assembly, provided for in 
Paragraph 1, Section 1 shall be qualified as a candidate for member-
ship in the Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan, Provincial Assembly, 
council of a city of provincial status, county council, council of a city 
of county status, and for representatives of hsiang, town or shih. A 
person who has passed the screening process as a qualified candidate 
for provincial assemblyman or councilman of a city of provincial 
status shall also be qualified as a candidate for county councilman 
and councilman of a city of county status, and for representative of 
hsiang, town and shih. A person who has passed the screening pro-
cess for county councilman or councilman of a city of county status 
shall also be qualified as a candidate for hsiang (lz) representative. A 
person who has passed the screening process as a candidate qualified 
for county magistrate or mayor of a city of county status shall also be 
qualified as a candidate for hsiang, town, shih chief and vill"age and li 
leader. A person who has passed the screening process as a qualified 
candidate for hsiang, town or shih chief shall also be qualified as a 
candidate for village and li leader. 
ARTICLE 33: 
When elections of two or more categories of public officials are 
held simultaneously, a person shall be permitted to register as candi-
date only for one of them. A person who has two or more qualifica-
tions of candidacy in the election of one category of public officials 
shall be permitted to register only one candidacy. 
The registration of a person who has registered simultaneously 
as a candidate for two or more different public offices or as two can-
didates for one public office shall be null and void. 
ARTICLE 34: 
A person who has one of the following disqualifications shall 
not be permitted to apply for registration as a candidate: 
1) Having committed an offense against national internal security 
or national external security and having been convicted. 
2) Having committed the crime of corruption and having been 
convicted. 
3) Having committed offenses against any of the articles from Ar-
ticle 87 to Article 89 of this law or Article 144 of the Criminal 
Law and having been convicted. 
4) Having committed a crime other than the offenses set forth in 
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the foregoing paragraphs and having been convicted and sen-
tenced to a fixed prison term which has not been wholly or 
partly executed. However, reprieved convicts shall be 
excepted. 
5) Having been subjected to peace and safety preserving measures 
and convicted of misconduct, and the punishment having not 
been executed or having not been wholly executed. 
6) Having been proclaimed bankrupt and having not been 
rehabilitated. 
7) Having been suspended from official appointment or having 
received punishment on suspension from official duty in ac-
cordance with the law and the period of suspension having not 
expired. 
8) Having been deprived of civil rights and his civil rights having 
not been restored. 
9) Having been proclaimed incompetent and the proclamation 
having not been abrogated. 
ARTICLE 35: 
The following people shall not register as candidates: 
1) Militarymen and policemen in active service. 
2) Full-time students still in school. 
3) Persons handling election business. 
If the«militarymen in active service mentioned in Item (1) are 
reservists· or militiamen called to service, this Article does not apply 
to them either before they shall have been called to service or when 
they are called for re-education, for temporary assignment or for 
rollcall inspection. 
An incumbent functionary shall not register as a candidate for 
member of the National Assembly in the constituency where his of-
fice is located. 
ARTICLE 36: 
When any of the following disqualifying facts is discovered, 
either before the name lists of registered candidates are made public 
or before the balloting is conducted, the registered candidacy shall 
be canceled by the election commission. The election commission 
shall also bring a lawsuit against an elected person to invalidate his 
election if a disqualifying fact is found after the balloting under Arti-
cle 103-1 of this law: 
1) The qualifications of the candidate are not accordant to the re-
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quirements specified in Article 31, or the qualification acquired 
through the screening process has been nullified. 
2) The candidacy is in violation of Article 34 or Paragraphs 1 and 
3 of Article 35. 
3) Candidacy registration is forbidden by Paragraph 1 of Article 
85. 
ARTICLE 37: 
A person who has registered his candidacy shall not be permit-
ted to withdraw his registration after the registration deadline. A 
person who has withdrawn his registration before the deadline shall 
not be permitted to apply for registering as a candidate for a public 
office in the same category of election. 
ARTICLE 38: 
At the time of registration a candidate shall make a deposit, the 
amount of which shall be set by the election commissions. To set 
such amounts the election commissions shall take into account the 
actual needs and shall give public notice of the amounts in advance. 
Candidates for village (/l) leaders shall be exempted from making a 
deposit. 
The deposit shall be refunded within ten days after the name 
lists of the elected have been publicly announced. But the deposit 
shall neither be refunded to a candidate for member of the Control 
Yuan who receives no vote, nor to other candidates who receive bal-
lots less than 10 percent of the quotient obtained by dividing the 
number of the qualified electors in their respective constituencies by 
the number of officials to be elected in the election. 
Section Four Constituencies 
ARTICLE 39: 
For the election of public officials, the constituencies shall be 
demarcated in accordance with the following provisions: 
1) For members of the National Assembly to be elected by the 
cities of provincial status and by counties (including the cities 
of county status), the administrative areas of the respective 
counties and cities shall be the constituencies. 
2) For members of the Legislative Yuan to be elected by a prov-
ince or a city of provincial status, the respective administrative 
areas shall be the constituencies and an administrative area 
may be divided into several constituencies. 
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3) For members of the Control Yuan to be elected by a provincial 
assembly and the council of a city of provincial status, the pro-
vincial assembly and the city council shall be the 
constituencies. 
4) For members of a provincial assembly to be elected by counties 
and cities of county status, the respective administrative areas 
of the counties and cities shall be the constituencies. For mem-
bers of a council of a city of provincial status, its administrative 
area may be divided into several constituencies. 
5) For members of a county council or a council of a city of 
county status and for representatives of a hsiang (town or shih), 
the respective administrative areas of the counties, cities and 
hsiangs (towns or shihs) shall be the constituencies, and one ad-
ministrative area may be divided into several constituencies. 
6) For magistrates of counties, mayors of the cities of county sta-
tus, chiefs of hsiangs (towns and shihs) and leaders of villages 
and lis, the respective administrative areas of the counties, cit-
ies, hsiangs (towns and shihs),villages and lis shall be the 
constituencies. 
ARTICLE 40: 
For members of the National Assembly and the Legislative 
Yuan to be elected by occupational organizations, all occupational 
organizations of the same category shall constitute a constituency. 
For members of the National Assembly to be elected by women 
organizations, the women organization of a province and that of a 
city of provincial status shall each constitute a constituency. 
ARTICLE 41: 
For members of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, 
the provincial assemblies, and councils of cities of provincial status 
or for representatives of a hsiang, town or shih to be elected by citi-
zens with special life habits, the constituencies shall be fixed in ac-
cordance with the following provisions: 
1) For members of the National Assembly and the Legislative 
Yuan this group of citizens shall be divided into a constituency 
of those living on the plains and a constituency of those living 
in the mountainous areas. 
2) For provincial assemblymen, councilmen of the cities of pro-
vincial status, county councilmen and councilmen of the cities 
of county status and for hsiang, town and shih representatives 
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to be elected by the citizens with special life habits, the citizens 
of this group in the administrative area of a province, a city of 
provincial status, a county, a city of county status, a hsiang, a 
town or a shih shall each constitute a constituency. These citi-
zens in any administrative area may also be divided into a con-
stituency of those living in the plains and a constituency of 
those living in the mountainous areas. 
ARTICLE 42: 
The demarcation of constituencies provided for in Paragraphs 2 
and 4 of Article 39 and Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 41 for the 
election of provincial assemblymen and councilmen of the cities of 
provincial status shall be carried out by the Central Election Com-
mission; that set forth in Paragraph 5 of Article 39 and Paragraph 2 
of Article 41 for the election of county councilmen (councilmen of a 
city of county status), hsiang, town and shih representatives shall be 
carried out by the respective election commissions. The proclama-
tion of constituency demarcation shall be made simultaneously with 
the election proclamation. If there is a change in the demarcation of 
constituency, the proclamation shall be made six months before the 
expiration of the terms of office of the public officials concerned, or 
before the prescribed dates. 
Section Five Election Proclamations 
ARTICLE 43: 
The election commissions shall issue various proclamations in 
accordance with following provisions: 
I) An election proclamation shall set forth the category of elec-
tion, the number of public officials to be elected, the demarca-
tion of constituencies, the election date and the times of 
balloting. The proclamation shall be issued forty days before 
the expiration of terms of office of public officials concerned or 
before the prescribed dates, but in reholding an election or a 
balloting and in supplementary elections the forty days stipula-
tion shall not apply. 
2) Days of candidates registration shall be proclaimed twenty 
days before the election day. The duration of registration shall 
not be less than five days. But in the elections of representa-
tives of hsiangs, towns or shihs, chiefs of hsiangs, towns or shihs, 
and leaders of villages and lis, the duration shall not be less 
than three days. 
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3) The name lists of the electors shall be proclaimed fifteen days 
before the election day and shall be for public reading for at 
least five days. 
4) The name lists of registered candidates shall be proclaimed one 
day before the beginning of campaign activities. 
5) The number of electors shall be proclaimed three days before 
the election day. 
6) The name lists of persons elected shall be proclaimed within 
seven days after the election. 
When no candidate is registered in a constituency during the 
duration provided for in Paragraph 1, Article 2, a second proclama-
tion for candidates registration shall be issued for a duration of not 
less than two days. 
ARTICLE 44: 
The elections of public officials shall be completed ten days 
before the expiration of their respective terms of office or before the 
prescribed dates. But this provision shall not apply in reholding an 
election, or a balloting or in supplementary elections. 
Section Six Election Activities 
ARTICLE 45: 
The duration of campaign activities of the candidates for public 
offices shall be in accordance with the following provisions: 
1) Fifteen days for the candidates for members of the National 
Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. 
2) Ten days for the candidates for members of provincial assem-
blies, councilmen of the cities of provincial status, county coun-
cilmen, councilmen of the cities of county status, magistrates 
and mayors. 
3) Five days for the candidates for representatives of hsiangs, 
towns and shihs, and for the candidates for chiefs of hsiangs, 
towns and shihs. 
4) Three days for the candidates for village and li leaders. 
Campaign activities shall end on the day immediately before 
the election day. The duration of campaign activities referred to in 
this article shall be counted backward from the concluding date. 
The beginning and closing times of each day of campaign activities 
shall be decided by the election commissions. 
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ARTICLE 45-1: 
The maximum campaign expenditures of a candidate for each 
public office shall be set by the election commissions and announced 
together with the election proclamation. 
To set the maximum campaign expenditures of the candidates a 
basic amount shall be determined, taking into account the categories 
of the public offices concerned and the various kinds of legitimate 
campaigning. The calculation shall be based on the number of the 
total population of the various constituencies divided by the number 
of officials to be elected and then multiplied by the basic amount and 
again by the cost of living index. 
The formula is: 
Maximum campaign expenditure = 
total population 
number of officials to be elected 
X basic amount X cost of living index. 
ARTICLE 45-2: 
Candidates shall not accept campaign contributions from the 
following sources: 
1) Foreign groups, juridical persons or individuals. 
2) Contributions made by other candidates of the same category 
in the same election. 
ARTICLE 45-3: 
A candidate or his designated person shall keep records of cam-
paign funds. 
Within 30 days after the election, the candidate shall report the 
receipts and expenditures to the related election commission. The 
report shall be signed by one of the said persons. 
If the election commission, in view of the facts on hand, sus-
pects the truth of the report, it may require the candidate to file proof 
or documentation. 
These shall be kept on file for six months after the submission of 
the report. In the event of a lawsuit involving him, the proof and or 
documentation shall be kept for three more months from the time of 
judgment. 
The rules for checking campaign receipts and expenditures shall 
be decided by the Central Election Commission. 
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ARTICLE 46: 
Campaign activities shall include: 
1) Establishing campaign headquarters and employing campaign 
assistants. 
2) Holding meeting of political views presentation. 
3) Printing and disseminating name cards and handbills. 
4) Operating campaign vehicles and loudspeakers. 
5) Canvassing and visiting the electors in the candidate's 
constituency. 
1) and 4) of Paragraph 1 shall not be applicable in the election 
of Control Yuan members. 
Regulations pertaining to campaign headquarters and the em-
ployment of campaigns assistants shall be fixed by the Central Elec-
tion Commission. 
ARTICLE 47: 
The following persons shall not be qualified for campaign 
assistants: 
1) Registered candidates. 
2) Public functionaries. 
3) Those who have any of the disqualifications set forth in Article 
34 and those listed in Item (1) of Article 35 above. 
One person shall not serve as a campaign assistant for two 
candidates. 
ARTICLE 48: (Deleted.) 
ARTICLE 49: 
With the exception of the political views presentation meetings 
of the candidates for members of the Control Yuan, all of which 
shall be sponsored by the election commission, political views pres-
entation meetings shall be divided into candidate-sponsored meet-
ings and election commission-sponsored meetings. Candidate-
sponsored meetings shall be held before election commission-spon-
sored meetings, and the number of days for the latter shall not ex-
ceed those for the former. 
The election commission-sponsored meetings shall be held by 
the election commission during the days set for them. The candi-
dates concerned shall personally attend any or all meetings to pres-
ent their views. Whether election commission-sponsored meetings in 
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the election of village and li leaders are held or not shall be decided 
by the election commission in accord with the situation. 
The candidate-sponsored meetings shall be held by the candi-
dates on the days specified. No more than six meetings shall be held 
in any single day, and each meeting shall last no more than two 
hours. Candidates concerned shall be present. No one other than 
the candidate and his campaign assistant(s) shall make speeches at 
the meeting. The time and place of a meeting shall be reported to 
the election commission in charge for its approval two days in 
advance. 
The election commission may send authorized inspectors to 
oversee the proceedings at the political views presentation meetings. 
ARTICLE 50: 
The election commission shall compile the candidates' views, 
serial numbers, photographs, names, ages, sexes, domiciles of origin, 
party affiliations, scholastic backgrounds, experiences, occupations 
and addresses, and shall print in a gazette all these together with the 
legal provisions related to the election and balloting for distribution 
to each household in the constituencies two days before the balloting 
day and for posting in appropriate places. 
When registering their candidacies, the candidates shall submit 
the above-mentioned political views and personal data to the elec-
tion commission. If the political views of a candidate violate any of 
the provisions of Article 54 above, the election commission shall no-
tify him and demand that he correct them within a fixed period. In 
case he fails the demands, the portion that violates one or more of 
the provisions shall not be published in the gazette. Neither will the 
untrue personal data of a candidate be published in the gazette. 
Keeping the requirement of the practical circumstances in 
views, the election commissions may engage in other election activi-
ties through the mass media. 
ARTICLE 51: 
Handbills printed and disseminated by a candidate shall be 
signed in person by the candidate. 
Name cards and handbills shall not be posted at places other 
than those provided or assigned by the election commission in 
charge. 
The sizes of name cards and handbill shall be decided by the 
Central Election Commission. 
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ARTICLE 52: 
A candidate shall not employ more than five campaign vehicles. 
A candidate whose constituency is a city of provincial status, a 
county or a city of county status shall not employ more than three 
campaign vehicles. A candidate whose constituency is a hsiang, a 
town or a shih shall not employ more than two campaign vehicles. 
Campaign vehicles shall fly banners issued by the election com-
mission in charge. · 
Loudspeakers used for campaign activities shall be installed 
only on campaign vehicles, at sites of candidate-sponsored political 
views presentation meetings and at campaign headquarters. Their 
use shall not interfere with the presentation of political views by 
other candidates. 
ARTICLE 53: 
(Deleted.) 
ARTICLE 54: 
The utterances of a candidate and of his campaign assistants 
shall not commit any of the following offenses: 
1) Instigating persons to commit offenses against the internal se-
curity or external security of the state. 
2) Inciting persons to undermine social order with violence. 
3) Committing other offenses set forth in the criminal code. 
ARTICLE 55: 
The campaign activities of a candidate or his assistants shall not 
include any of the following acts: 
1) Making public speeches in any place other than at the political 
views presentation meetings. 
2) Establishing campaign headquarters or employing campaign 
assistants in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of this law. 
3) Engaging in campaign activities not during the prescribed pe-
riod or the prescribed time of the day. 
4) Holding joint candidate-sponsored political views presentation 
meetings. 
5) Assemblying a crowd for a parade. 
6) Engaging in campaign activities outside the candidate's 
constituency. 
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7) Instigating the electors in a name signing movement or utiliz-
ing the mass media for campaign advertising. 
8) Engaging in campaign activities other than those stipulated in 
Article 46. 
9) Setting off firecrackers. 
ARTICLE 56: 
During the campaign, only candidates and their campaign assis-
tant can carry on legalized campaign activities, and no other person 
shall be permitted to engage in any of the following acts: 
1) Making public speeches for a candidate. 
2) Producing or posting self-made handbills, slogans and cam-
paign posters. 
3) Operating motor vehicles and loudspeakers not authorized to 
participate in campaign activities to show support for a candidate. 
4) Assemblying a crowd for campaigning purposes. 
5) Instigating the electors to sign campaign papers or to use mass 
media to do campaign propaganda for a candidate. 
6) Setting off firecrackers to show support for a candidate. 
Section Seven Casting and Opening of Ballots 
ARTICLE 57: 
In the election of public officials, polls shall be established in the 
office buildings, schools, public places and other appropriate places 
in keeping with the size of the constituency and the geographical 
distribution of electors. 
In the election of the members of the Control Yuan, the poll 
shall be established at the provincial assemblies or the councils of 
cities of provincial status. 
Upon completion of balloting, a poll shall be turned into a bal-
lot-opening station and the ballots shall be counted aloud in the 
presence of spectators. After all the ballots are opened and counted, 
the chief administrator and the chief inspector of the ballot-opening 
station shall proclaim together in writing the result of the opening of 
the ballots. 
ARTICLE 58: 
Each poll and each ballot-opening station shall have one chief 
administrator and several administrators appointed by the election 
commission to take charge of ballot casting and opening business. 
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ARTICLE 59: 
Each poll and each ballot-opening station shall have one chief 
inspector and several inspectors to inspect the casting and opening of 
ballots. 
Each candidate shall be entitled to recommend an average 
number of necessary inspectors. The election commission shall ap-
point the qualified ones after screening. A candidate may assign the 
inspectors he has recommended to the polls and ballot-opening sta-
tions of his choice to inspect the casting and opening of ballots. If 
the assigned inspectors are more than the prescribed number for a 
poll or ballot-opening station, the choices shall be determined by 
drawing lots. 
When the number of chief inspectors and the number of inspec-
tors recommended by the candidates are less than needed, the elec-
tion commission shall opt from among the following personnel: 
1) Local impartial people. 
2) Personnel of government organizations and schools. 
3) Adult students of the colleges and universities. 
The rules governing the recommendation of inspectors and their 
service shall be decided by the Central Election Commission. 
ARTICLE 60: 
The ballots shall be printed and distributed by the election com-
mission, taking into account the different constituencies. The ballots 
shall bear the serial numbers, names and photographs of all 
candidates. 
The above-mentioned ballots shall be delivered to the chief ad-
ministrators of the polls the day before the balloting day. Each chief 
administrator shall count the ballots together with the chief inspector 
in the presence of spectators. 
ARTICLE 61: 
Before casting his ballot an elector shall vote for a single candi-
date with a marking tool prepared by the election commission. In 
the election for members of the Control Yuan, an elector shall vote 
for a number of candidates not exceeding the number provided for 
in Section 2 of Paragraph 1 of Article 3. 
After marking his ballot the elector shall not show it to anyone. 
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ARTICLE 62: 
A ballot shall be invalid in any of the following instances: 
1) It is not prepared and distributed by the election commission in 
charge. 
2) It is marked for two or more candidates or in the case of the 
election for members of the Control Yuan, for a number of candi-
dates exceeding the number stipulated. 
3) The mark is put in such a place that the elector's choice cannot 
be ascertained. 
4) The mark is altered. 
5) The ballot bears a signature, name chop, fingerprint, words or 
any other writing sign. 
6) The ballot is tom. 
7) The ballot is so stained that the elector's choice cannot be 
ascertained. 
8) The ballot is not marked with the tool prepared by the election 
commission in charge. 
Any question regarding the validity of a ballot shall be deter-
mined by the chief administrator together with the chief inspector of 
the ballot opening station. If there is a disagreement between them, 
it shall be voted upon and decided by all inspectors. In the event of 
a tie, the ballot shall be declared valid. 
ARTICLE 63: 
The chief administrator together with the chief inspector shall 
order a person to leave the poll or that ballot opening station if any 
of the following facts exists: 
1) He has made a din or has interfered with or persuaded others 
to vote or not to vote, at defiance of interdiction. 
2) He carries a weapon or dangerous articles into the poll. 
3) He has other improper acts and has defied interdiction. 
If any of the above-mentioned circumstances happens to an 
elector and he is ordered to leave, the ballot at his hand shall be 
taken back and the incident shall be recorded under his name in the 
electoral register. If the case is serious, a specific report shall be 
made to the election commission. 
ARTICLE 64: 
If the casting or opening of ballots is prevented by a natural 
calamity or other acts of God, the chief administrator of the poll or 
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ballot-opening station shall report the situation to the election com-
mission of a city of provincial status or that of a county (or city of 
county status), and shall ask for approval to change the date or place 
for casting or opening the ballots. If it is an election of public offi-
cials of the Central government, provincial assemblymen (or coun-
cilmen of a city of provincial status), county councilmen (or 
councilmen of cities of county status), magistrates or mayors, the 
case shall also be reported and transmitted to the Central or provin-
cial election commission for reference. 
Section Eight Election Results 
ARTICLE 65: 
In an election of public officials there shall be a prescribed 
number of vacancies. The candidates in a constituency who have 
won a plurality of ballots shall be elected. When two or more candi-
dates have received an equal number of ballots, the winner shall be 
determined by drawing lots. 
In an election of public officials when there is a woman quota 
and when the women elected are less than the quota, the ballots ob-
tained by the female candidates shall be separated from those ob-
tained by male candidates and shall also be counted separately. The 
female candidate(s) who has (have) won a plurality of ballots shall 
be declared elected. 
ARTICLE 66: 
Except in an election of the members of the Control Yuan and 
of the village and li leaders the candidates who have received a plu-
rality of ballots shall be elected. A candidate in an election of public 
officials of other categories, in order to be elected, shall have to ob-
tain the following stipulated number of ballots: 
1) In the election of the members of the National Assembly and 
the Legislative Yuan, of provincial assemblymen, councilmen of a 
city of provincial status, county councilmen, councilmen of a city of 
county status and hsiang (town or shih) representatives, the number 
of ballots a candidate receives shall have to reach or exceed 20 per 
cent of the quotient obtained by dividing the number of electors in 
the constituency with the number of the vacancies to be filled in the 
same constituency. 
2) In the election of county magistrates, mayors of cities of county 
status and hsiang (town and shih) chiefs, the number of ballots ob-
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tained by a candidate shall have to reach 25 percent of the number 
of electors in the constituency. 
If no one is elected or the number of the elected does not reach 
the number of the vacancies to be filled, a hi-election shall be pro-
claimed within a fixed period after the balloting day in the case of an 
election of a magistrate (mayor of a city of county status) or hsiang 
(town or shih) chief; and it shall be deemed as vacancies still left 
unfilled in the case of an election of the members of the National 
Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, provincial assemblymen, coun-
cilmen of a city of provincial status, county councilmen, councilmen 
of a city of county status, hsiang (town or shih) representatives. If the 
number of vacancies reaches one half of the total number of the pub-
lic officials to be elected in any one constituency a date shall be fixed 
for a hi-election. 
ARTICLE 67: 
When an elected person dies or when his election is declared 
null and void before his taking office, the case shall be handled in 
accordance with the following provisions: 
1) In the case of a magistrate, a mayor of a city of county status, a 
chief of a hsiang (town or shih), a leader of a village or a ~~~ a hi-
election shall be held within a fixed period. 
2) In the case of a member ofthe National Assembly, the Legisla-
tive Yuan, the Control Yuan, a provincial assembly, the council of a 
city of provincial status, a county council, the council of a city of 
county status, or the board of hsiang (town or shih) representatives, it 
shall be deemed as vacancies still left unfilled. If the unfilled vacan-
cies reach one half of the total number of the public officials to be 
elected in any one constituency, a vacancy-filling election shall be 
held within a fixed period. 
ARTICLE 68: 
The persons duly elected in an election shall take office at a 
stipulated data. Any person elected in a hi-election or after a rebal-
loting in an election and thus cannot take office at the stipulated 
date, his term of office shall also begin from the stipulated date. 
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Chapter Four 
RECALL 
Section One Initiation of a Recall Case 
ARTICLE 69: 
The recall of a public official may be initiated by an elector of 
the official's constituency. It shall be brought to the election com-
mission. An elected official who has not yet served one full year 
after taking office shall not be subjected to recall process. 
ARTICLE 70: 
A recall paper shall be accompanied with a statement of rea-
son(s), and the initiation shall be made by electors of the official's 
constituency. The number of the initiators shall have to conform 
with the following provisions: 
1) In the case of a member of the National Assembly, the Legis-
lative Yuan, a provincial assembly, the council of a city of provincial 
status, a county council, the council of a city of county status, or of 
hsiang (town or shih) representatives, the number of initiators shall 
be 5 percent or more of the quotient obtained by dividing the total 
number of the electors in the official's constituency with the number 
of the public officials to be elected in the constituency. 
2) In the case of a member of the Control Yuan, the number of 
initiators shall be 10 per cent or more of the total number of the 
members of the provincial assembly or the council of a city of pro-
vincial status, which has elected that member. 
3) In the case of a magistrate, a mayor of a city of county status, or 
a hsiang (town or shih) chief, or a village or li leader, the number of 
initiators shall be 2 per cent or more of the total number of electors 
in the official's constituency. 
Iu any of the above-mentioned recall cases, no more than one 
person shall be subjected to in one proposal, but if in the same con-
stituency there are two cases of recall, they may be voted on at the 
same time. 
ARTICLE 71: 
No militaryman in active service, policemen or functionary can 
serve as an initiator of a recall proposal. 
ARTICLE 72: 
A recall proposal may be withdrawn from the election commis-
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sion with a written application with the concurrence of two-thirds of 
the initiators before cosigners are solicited. 
Section Two Establishment of a Recall Case 
ARTICLE 73: 
After having received a recall proposal, the election commission 
shall check up the initiators of the proposal within fifteen days. If 
they are found in conformity with the provisions of this law, the 
commission shall notify the leading initiator to take a book or books 
of cosigners from the commission in ten days and to solicit cosigners 
within a fixed period. 
If any of the initiators is found not in conformity with the provi-
sions of this law, his name shall be cancelled and the election com-
mission shall notify the leading initiator to make up the number of 
initiators in five days. Any making-up beyond this time limit shall 
be inadmissible. 
ARTICLE 74: 
In cosigning a recall proposal, the cosigners must be the electors 
of the constituency of the official to be recalled, and the number of 
the cosigner must be in conformity with the following provisions: 
1) In proposing to recall a member of the National Assembly, the 
Legislative Yuan, a provincial assembly, the council of a city of pro-
vincial status, a county council, the council of a city of county status, 
or of a hsiang (town or shih) representative, the number of cosigners 
shall be 15 per cent or more of the quotient obtained by dividing the 
total number of electors of the official's constituency with the pre-
scribed total number of the public officials to be elected in the 
constituency. 
2) In proposing to recall a member of the Control Yuan, the 
number of cosigners shall be 20 per cent or more of the total number 
of members of the provincial assembly or the council of a city of 
provincial status, which has elected that member. 
3) In proposing to recall a magistrate, a mayor of a city of county 
status, a chief of a hsiang (town or shih), or a leader of a village or 11~ 
the number of cosigners shall be 18 per cent or more of the total 
number of electors in the official's constituency. 
ARTICLE 75: 
The total number of electors referred to in Articles 70 and 74 
above means the total number of electors of the constituency of the 
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official to be recalled at the time of his election. The criterion day 
for determining both the ages and the periods of residence of the 
electors referred to above shall be the day when the case of recall is 
initiated. 
ARTICLE 76: 
After having found that the cosigning for the case of recall con-
forms with the law, the election commission shall proclaim the case 
of recall established. If the case of recall is found inconsistent with 
the law and is proclaimed that it is not established, the original initi-
ator shall not initiate another recall proposal against the same person 
within a year beginning from the day when the case of recall is pro-
claimed not established. 
ARTICLE 77: 
After a case of recall has been proclaimed and established, a 
copy of the statement of reason or reasons shall be sent to the official 
to be recalled and he shall submit a statement of reply in ten days. 
ARTICLE 78: 
The election comnnss10n shall proclaim the following items 
within five days after the official to be recalled has submitted a state-
ment of reply: 
1) The date and the beginning and ending time of balloting on the 
case of recall. 
2) The statement of reason or reasons for recall. 
3) The statement of reply. 
The statement of reply shall not be proclaimed if it is not sub-
mitted by the official to be recalled within the stipulated time. 
ARTICLE 79: 
Except in a proposal to recall a member of the Control Yuan, 
the initiators of the recall proposal may, while soliciting co-signers, 
set up a recall headquarters and employ a staff. 
Except for the soliciting of co-signers, there shall be no activities 
favoring or opposing the recall during the proceedings. 
Regulations regarding the establishment of the recall headquar-
ters, the employment of staff and the soliciting of co-signers shall be 
decided by the Central Election Commission. 
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Section Three Balloting on a Recall Case 
ARTICLE 80: 
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The balloting on a recall case shall be held within 30 days after 
the establishment of the case has been proclaimed. 
ARTICLE 81: 
A recall ballot shall have two printed columns: One bearing the 
wording "agree to recall" and the other "disagree to recall" to be 
marked by the electors with tools prepared by the election commis-
sion in charge. 
The elector shall not show his marked ballot to any one. 
ARTICLE 82: 
The provisions of this law regarding the ballot casters, ballot 
casting, and ballot opening shall apply mutadis mutantis on the ballot 
casters, ballot casting, and ballot opening in the case of balloting on 
a recall case. 
ARTICLE 83: 
A case of recall shall be carried when the ballots agreeing to 
recall outnumber the ballots disagreeing to recall, but the number of 
ballot casters shall have to be in conformity with the following 
provisions: 
1) In the case of recalling a member of the National Assembly, 
the Legislative Yuan, a provincial assembly, the council of a city of 
provincial status, a county council, a city of county status, or of a 
hsiang (town or shih) representatives, one-third or more of the elec-
tors in the official's constituency shall have cast their ballots. 
2) In the case of recalling a member of the Control Yuan, one half 
or more of the total number of the members of the provincial assem-
bly or the council of a city of provincial status which has elected him 
shall have cast their ballots. 
3) In the case of recalling a magistrate, a mayor of a city of county 
status, a hsiang (town or shih) chief or a village or li leader, one half 
or more of the electors of the official's constituency shall have cast 
their ballots. 
If the electors who have cast their ballots on the recall case do 
not reach the respective numbers set forth in the above provisions or 
if the ballots agreeing to recall do not outnumber the ballots dis-
agreeing to recall, the case shall be rejected. 
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ARTICLE 84: 
Within seven days beginning from the balloting day, the elec-
tion commission shall proclaim the result of balloting on the recall 
case. If the case is carried, the recalled person shall be relieved of his 
official duty on the day of proclamation. 
ARTICLE 85: 
After the case of recall is carried, the recalled person shall not 
be permitted to be a candidate for the same public office in four 
years beginning from the day of the deprivation of official duty. 
This provision also applies to a person who has resigned in conse-
quence of the establishment of a case of recalling him. 
If the case of recall is rejected, no more recall proposal against 
the same official shall be permitted during his term of office. 
Chapter Five 
PUNISHMENT OF OFFENSES AGAINST 
ELECTION AND RECALL 
ARTICLE 86: 
A person who has violated the provisions of Item ( 1) of Article 
54 above shall be sentenced to a prison term of not less than seven 
years; a person who has violated the provisions of Item (2) of Article 
54 above shall be sentenced to a prison term of not less than five 
years; and the punishment of a person who has violated Item (3) of 
Article 54 above shall be decided in accordance with the related 
laws. 
ARTICLE 87: 
A person who takes advantage of a campaign or of assisting in a 
campaign to openly assemble a crowd and to use violence against the 
social order shall be sentenced to a prison term of not less than seven 
years. The initiating leader shall be sentenced to a prison term of 
not less than ten years. 
ARTICLE 87-1: 
During the period of election or recall any person who commits 
acts of violence or duress against a public servant executing his offi-
cial duties shall be sentenced to a prison term of not more than five 
years. 
In the event of the death of a public servant is resulted from that 
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violence or duress, the punishment shall be life imprisonment or a 
prison term of not less than seven years. If the public servant is se-
verely injured, the offender shall be sentenced to a prison term of not 
less than three years but not more than ten years. 
ARTICLE 87-2: 
For those who openly assemble a crowd to commit offenses de-
scribed above, they shall be sentenced to a prison term of not more 
than three years, a detention at hard labor or a fine of not more than 
30,000 yuans. The principal leader and the perpetrators shall be sen-
tenced to prison terms of not more than ten years and not less than 
three years. 
Of those who commit offenses described in Paragraph 1, the 
leader and perpetrators who put a public servant(s) to death shall be 
sentenced to life imprisonment or to a prison term of not less than 
seven years; and those who severely injure a public servant(s) shall 
be sentenced to a prison term of not less than five years and not more 
than twelve years. 
ARTICLE 88: 
A candidate or any person who is qualified as a candidate and 
who offers, agrees to pay or pays a bribe or offers other improper 
benefits to a candidate in order to make him withdraw from the elec-
tion or engage in illegal campaign activities shall be sentenced to a 
prison term of not more than five years or a fine of not more than 
50,000 yuans. 
A candidate or any person who is qualified as a candidate de-
mands, agrees to accept or accepts a bribe or other improper benefits 
from another candidate(s) in exchange for his promise to withdraw 
from the election or to engage in illegal campaign activities shall be 
punished under the provision of Paragraph I of this article. 
The bribe or other improper benefits shall be confiscated or ab-
rogated in whole or in part. 
ARTICLE 89: 
A person who offers, agrees to pay or pays a bribe or offers other 
improper benefits to a candidate to make him withdraw from the 
election or engage in certain campaign activities shall be sentenced 
to a prison term of not more than five years and a fine of not more 
than 50,000 yuans may thereto be imposed. 
The above provisions shall apply to a candidate who demands, 
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agrees to accept or accepts a bribe or other improper benefits in ex-
change for his promise to withdraw from the election or to engage in 
certain campaign activities. 
The bribe or other improper benefits the candidate has accepted 
and thus has committed one of the foregoing two crimes shall be 
confiscated. If the whole or a part thereof cannot be confiscated, the 
value thereof shall be collected from the offender. 
ARTICLE 90: 
A person who has committed one of the following offenses 
through violence, duress or other illegal means shall be sentenced to 
a prison term of not more than five years: 
1) Interfering with other's campaign or forcing others to withdraw 
from the campaign. 
2) Obstructing others to initiate or cosign a case of recall or to 
f~rce others to initiate or cosign a case of recall. 
An unaccomplished offense specified in the preceding para-
graph shall be punished. 
ARTICLE 91: 
A person who has committed any of the following offenses shall 
be sentenced to a prison term of not more than five years and a fine 
of not more than 50,000 yuans thereto be imposed: 
1) To offer, to pay or to agree to pay money and material thing or 
other improper benefits to an organization or office in the constitu-
ency under the pretext of donation in order to induce the members 
of the organization or office not to exercise their right to vote or to 
exercise it in a certain manner. 
2) To offer, to pay or to agree to pay money and material thing or 
other improper benefits to an initiator or cosigner of a case of recall 
in order to induce him to refrain from initiating or cosigning the case 
or to proceed to initiate or cosign it in a certain manner. 
ARTICLE 92: 
With an intent to influence the outcome of an election, anyone 
employing written words, pictures, audio-tapes, audio-video tapes, 
speeches or other methods to circulate trumped-up stories sufficient 
to damage a public servant or other person(s) shall be sentenced to a 
prison term of not more than five years. 
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ARTICLE 93: 
A person who has committed any of the offenses set forth in 
Paragraph 2 of Article 61, Paragraph 2 of Article 81, or Paragraph 1 
of Article 63 and has refused to leave the polling place or the ballot 
opening station after being ordered to do so shall be sentenced to a 
prison term of not more than two years or a fine of not more than 
20,000 yuans. 
ARTICLE 94: 
During the recall process, a person who agitates the crowd on 
the spot where others are committing any of the following offenses 
shall be sentenced to a prison term of not more than a year or a fine 
of not more than 10,000 yuans, and the principal leader and the per-
petrators of any of these offenses shall be sentenced to a prison term 
of not more than five years: 
1) To assemble a crowd to beseige the person involved in the re-
call, the initiators of co-signers of a recall, the staff officers, their re-
call headquarters, their domiciles or their residences. 
2) To obstruct by violence, duress or other illegal means the per-
formance of duty by the person under recall process and the initia-
tors and co-signers of recall process and their staff members. 
ARTICLE 95: 
With an intent to interfere with or obstruct balloting and ballot 
opening, a person who detains, destroys, changes or seizes a ballot 
box, election ballots, recall ballots, an electoral register, a ballot-cast-
ing report, a ballot-opening report, a statistic table or a ballot-mark-
ing tool shall be sentenced to a prison term of not more than five 
years. 
ARTICLE 95-1: 
A person whose campaign expenditure exceeds the maximum 
set forth by the election commission in charge in accordance with the 
provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 45-1 shall be fined not less than 
10,000 yuans but not more than 50,000 yuans. 
ARTICLE 96: 
A person who has violated the provisions set forth in Paragraph 
3 of Article 49, Item 1 of Article 55 or Item 1 of Article 56 and has 
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refused to conform after being restrained by an inspector shall be 
sentenced to a prison term of not more than one year. 
ARTICLE 97: 
A person who has violated the provisions set forth in Item 2 of 
Article 45-2, Paragraph 1, 2 or 4 of Article 45-3, or Paragraph 1 or 2 
of Article 51, or who has violated the regulations set forth in the 
provisions of Paragraph 5 of Article 45-3 or Paragraph 3 of Article 
51, shall be fined not more than 10,000 yuans. 
A person who has violated the provisions set forth in Article 52, 
Items 2 to 9 of Article 55, Item 2 to 6 of Article 56, or who has 
violated the regulations set forth in the provisions of Paragraph 3 of 
Article 79 and who has rejected the order of an inspector, shall be 
subjected to the same punishment set forth in the previous para-
graph of the same article. 
A person who puts anything other than an election ballot or a 
recall ballot into a ballot box or who takes an election ballot or a 
recall ballot away from the polling place shall be fined 5,000 yuans. 
ARTICLE 97-1: 
A person guilty of any of the following acts from the day the 
election proclamation is made to the beginning time of campaign 
activities, as provided in Article 45, and refuses to heed the restraint 
set by an inspector, shall be fined no less than 1,000 yuans but no 
more than 10,000 yuans: 
1) Making a public speech or openly assemblying a crowd for 
campaign purposes. 
2) Disseminating handbills or making or posting slogans and pos-
ters for campaign purposes. 
3) Utilizing campaign vehicles or broadcasting to a crowd for 
campaign purposes. 
ARTICLE 97-2: 
A person who has committed the crime described in Paragraph 
2 of Article 89 or Paragraph 1 of Article 143 of the Criminal Law, 
but who surrenders within three months after committing the crimi-
nal act shall be exempted from punishment. If the person surrenders 
three months after the commission of the criminal act, the punish-
ment may be commuted or exempted. If the person admits of the 
crime during the investigation or trial, the punishment may be 
commuted. 
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A person who surrenders as described in the previous paragraph 
but fabricates stories with an intent to have someone else punished 
shall be punished in accordance with the criminal law provisions re-
garding false accusation. 
ARTICLE 98: 
Where other laws provide for more severe penalties for offenses 
listed in this chapter, their provisions shall govern. 
Any election or recall official who makes use of his official 
power, opportunity or means of duty to commit the crimes listed in 
this Chapter shall receive a penalty(ies) one and a half times more 
severe than that(those) herein prescribed. 
A person sentenced to a prison term for an offense listed in this 
Chapter or offenses of interference with voting contrary to the spe-
cial provisions of the Criminal Law shall be deprived of civil rights. 
ARTICLE 99: 
An incumbent functionary who has registered as a candidate 
and has committed any of the following offenses and the commission 
has been proved true by an election commission, the commission 
shall first notify the competent office of the offending functionary to 
suspend his duties and at the same time to handle the case in accord-
ance with the law: 
1) Rejecting without justifiable reason the election commission's 
request for assisting in certain matters or for assigning staff 
members. 
2) Interfering in the personnel or operations of the election 
commission. 
3) Using public fund to pay campaign expenses under a pretext. 
4) Demanding an organization and its head subordinate to him or 
under his command or his supervision to support his campaign. 
5) Abusing his power to make campaign personnel arrangements 
by transferring persons without due reason. 
ARTICLE 100: 
In the election of public officials of the Central Government the 
chief prosecutor of the Supreme Court shall head the prosecutors of 
all levels, and in the election of local public officials the chief prose-
cutors of the competent courts of law shall head his subordinate 
prosecutors. Their duties shall be to monitor and to prosecute on 
their own initiatives the criminal cases regarding interference in an 
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election or a recall, and meanwhile to dispose of the accusation, 
complaint or surrender to justice brought by an office, organization 
or individual. Each prosecutor shall J:!lake prompt investigations 
and take necessary measures. 
In conducting the above-mentioned investigation, a prosecutor 
may command the judicial police in accordance with the provisions 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Statute for Transferring 
and Directing the Judicial Police. 
ARTICLE 101: 
Chapter Six 
ELECTION AND RECALL SUITS 
When an election commission has violated the law so as to af-
fect the results of an election or a recall, a prosecutor, a candidate, 
the person under recall process and the initiator of a recall case may, 
within 15 days after the proclamation of the name list of the elected 
persons or the proclamation of the result of a recall is made, bring a 
suit against that election commission before a competent court of 
law to request nullifying the election or recall. 
ARTICLE 102: 
In a suit of nullifying the result of an election or a recall ballot-
ing, when the court has adjudicated and declared the invalidity of 
the election or recall, the election or recall shall be null and void. A 
period of time then shall be set in which a hi-election or recall be 
held. If the violation involves only a part of the election or the recall 
process, the part of the election or the recall process involved shall be 
null and void, and a reballoting on the nullified part shall be held 
within a fixed period. But this shall not apply to a situation in which 
the nullified part obviously has not affected the result of the election 
or recall. 
ARTICLE 103: 
An election commission, a prosecutor and a candidate of the 
constituency of the elected person may each, within 15 days after the 
proclamation of the name list of the elected persons is made, sepa-
rately bring a suit against an elected person before a competent court 
of law to apply for the nullification of his qualification as an official 
elect in any of the following events: 
1) The number of ballots listed in his name is so inaccurate as to 
affect the election result. 
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2) He has violated the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 49, or 
Item 1, 4, or 6 of Article 55 and has refused to heed the written order 
of an inspector. 
ARTICLE 103-1: 
An election commission, a prosecutor and a candidate of the 
constituency of the elected person may each, within the prescribed 
various dates, bring a suit against the elected person before a compe-
tent court of law to request nullifying his qualification as an official 
elect under any of the disqualifying facts set forth in Article 36. 
ARTICLE 104: 
The election of a person shall be null and void after a court has 
adjudicated the suit for nullifying his being elected and has declared 
his election invalid. 
ARTICLE 105: 
A judgment on the invalidity of an election or of the election of 
a candidate shall not affect his performance of official duties made 
after his taking office. 
ARTICLE 106: 
After the approval or rejection of a recall case, if the number of 
ballots is found inaccurate enough to affect the balloting result, the 
election commission, the prosecutor, the recalled person and the ini-
tiator of the recall case each may, within fifteen days after the proc-
lamation of the balloting result, bring a suit against the initiator of 
the recall case or the recalled person before a competent court to 
apply for nullifying the approval or rejection of the recall case. 
After the court has adjudicated and declared that the approval 
or rejection of the recall case is null and void, the approval or rejec-
tion of the recall case shall be null and void, and a period of time 
shall be set in which a re-balloting shall be held. 
After the nullification of the approval of a recall case, the offi-
cial duties of the recalled person shall be restored. 
ARTICLE 107: 
When an elector discerns a fact that may invalidate an election, 
the election of a candidate, the recall of an official, or the approval or 
rejection of a recall case, he may, within seven days after the procla-
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mation of the name list of the elected persons or the balloting results 
on a recall case, file an accusation with a prosecutor or an election 
commission together with the support of evidence. 
ARTICLE 108: 
The allocation of the jurisdiction of the courts over election and 
recall suits shall be in accordance with the following provisions: 
1) The election and recall suits against a member of the National 
Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, the Control Yuan, a provincial as-
sembly, the council of a city of provincial status, or against a magis-
trate of a county or a mayor of a city of county status shall be under 
the jurisdiction of a competent high court or a branch high court. 
2) The suits for nullifying the election or recall of a county coun-
cilmen or a councilman of a city of county status shall be under the 
jurisdiction of a competent high court or a branch high court. The 
suits regarding the invalidity ofthe election of a person and the inva-
lidity of the approval or rejection of a recall case shall be under the 
jurisdiction of a competent district court. 
3) The suits regarding the election and recall of a hsiang (town or 
shih) representative, a hsiang (town or shih) chief and a village or /i 
leader shall be under the jurisdiction of a competent district court. 
The above-mentioned competent court shall be the court lo-
cated at a place where the act of election or recall happens. 
ARTICLE 109: 
The court in exercising its jurisdiction over an election suit or a 
recall suit shall set up an election chamber, adopt an in bane system, 
and try and decide the suit before all other suits. The proceedings 
shall be concluded when the judgment is declared after the first trial. 
A person concerned who disagrees to the judgment on the 
above-mentioned proceeding may request for a retrial of the suit if 
any of the following circumstances exists: 
I) Any of the circumstances set forth in Paragraph One of Article 
496 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
2) A vital evidence that may affect the judgment has not been 
considered by the court in the judgment. 
3) The judgment fails to give the reasons or the reasons given are 
self contradictory. 
4) The provisions for open oral proceedings have been violated. 
A request for a retrial shall have to be made within the peremp-
tory period of 20 days after the judgment is duly served. Calculation 
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of the peremptory period shall not be changed by arguing that the 
reason for retrial is known after the period or that it occurs after the 
judgment has been served. 
The above-mentioned suit may be brought before a court only 
once. 
The court exercising jurisdiction over it shall conclude the pro-
ceedings in three months. No disagreement to the judgment made in 
consequence of the retrial shall be permitted. 
ARTICLE 110: 
In addition to the provisions regarding procedures for election 
and recall suits set forth in this law, those in the Code of Civil Proce-
dure shall apply mutatis mutandis. But those provisions relating to 
the effect of abandonment, acceptance of liabilities and admission of 
undisputed facts that do not apply to the actions shall not apply. 
Chapter Seven 
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 111: 
The fines stipulated in this law shall be ruled by the election 
commission. When a fine is not paid in time after notification, the 
case shall be referred to a court for compulsory execution. 
ARTICLE 112: 
The enforcement rules for this law shall be drawn up by the 
Ministry of the Interior and it shall submit them to the Executive 
Yuan for approval. 
ARTICLE 113: 
This law shall be put into execution on the day of its 
promulgation. 
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